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Abstract 
 
New Zealand initiatives to address supply-chain labour conditions are tending towards reliance on 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), a form of private regulation. This thesis explores the 
effectiveness of private regulation for improving labour conditions, and reasons for its emergence, 
using the case study of the New Zealand-China relationship. It is argued that CSR brings only 
cosmetic improvements to a minority of workers in China. It is no replacement for strengthened law 
enforcement and organisation of workers for affecting significant improvements. CSR can 
also undermine improvements, and should be approached with caution. The trend towards CSR in 
New Zealand can be explained by businesses‘ gradually-increasing need and capacity to defend and 
pursue competitive advantage. However, the trend is best explained as a result of the constraints and 
power imbalances resulting from the neoliberal political context. For New Zealand to make a 
genuine commitment to social responsibility would require a shift in power, to groups that will 
challenge existing constraints and demand explicit action from the Government. It would also 
require New Zealand consumers and businesses to assume a greater share of the true costs of 
production. For New Zealand to contribute to improved labour conditions in China would require 
greater support for the Chinese labour movement and state enforcement. This support could take the 
form of increased cooperation, highlighting non-compliances, union collaboration and development 
aid.    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
On January 2, 2012, dozens of workers at the Foxconn plant in Wuhan, China, threatened mass 
suicide. Foxconn is the world‘s largest electronics manufacturer and supplies major brands such as 
Apple, Hewlett-Packard and Microsoft. The workers, reports of whose numbers vary between 80 
and 200, demanded severance pay and compensation for being transferred to another site (Barboza, 
2012; The Guardian, 2012; Zhang, 2012). Threatening to jump from a factory roof, they also 
complained of low pay, insufficient training and a high work pace which left them with blisters on 
their hands (Moore, 2012; United Press International, 2012). After two days they were coaxed down 
by managers and local officials (Moore, 2012). However, this incident is only the most recent 
insight into conditions at Foxconn. In 2010, at Foxconn‘s Shenzhen plant, maker of Apple‘s iPhone 
among other brand products, 17 workers attempted suicide and 13 died (Students and Scholars 
Against Corporate Misbehaviour [SACOM], 2010c, p. 2). 
 
2010 investigations revealed low wages, military-style discipline, excessive overtime and cramped 
conditions (Chen, 2010; SACOM, 2010a,c). Foxconn‘s management system was described by a 
Chinese union official as ―quasi-military‖, with workers forbidden from talking during shifts (Chen, 
2010; SACOM, 2010c). Workers were compelled to work as many as 120 hours of overtime a 
month, more than three times the legal limit (SACOM, 2010a, p. 7; see also SACOM, 2010b). 
Monthly base wages were as low as 800 yuan ($NZ160) (SACOM, 2010a, p. 7). With illegal 
overtime, workers could make between 1,500 and 2,000 yuan ($NZ300-400) (Anonymous, 2009, p. 
4; Hille, 2010). The 2010 findings echoed those of a 2006 exposé by a British newspaper: 
dormitories with up to 100 workers per room, strict discipline, low wages and long working hours 
(The Mail on Sunday, 2006).  
 
Six years since the first exposés, brand buyers from Foxconn, developed-country consumers of its 
products and the Chinese Government have all failed to address the unsatisfactory conditions. 
Workers have been unable to demand improvements. Consumers and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) have pressured Apple and other buyers to adopt some of the world‘s most 
developed supplier auditing practices. Foxconn itself reports to have comprehensive corporate 
social responsibility policy (Foxconn, 2008, 2009, 2010). In 2012, Apple joined the Fair Labour 
Association, thus subjecting itself to third-party audits and international scrutiny (Arthur, 2012). 
Yet these initiatives have failed to effect significant improvements. This raises a number of 
questions: Why have ―corporate social responsibility‖ (CSR) approaches been so ineffective, and 
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why, despite their lack of effectiveness, are they still pursued? Why have Chinese workers been 
unable to secure better conditions? Why does their government apparently support current 
practices? And what role should trading partners play to contribute to improvements?  
 
Trading partner governments and consumers are intrinsically connected to poor conditions in 
offshore production. Manufacturing increasingly takes place through globalised production 
networks, spanning dozens of countries and as many as tens of thousands of individual suppliers. 
As local industries close down in developed countries, and extremely cheap products appear in local 
shops, uncomfortable questions emerge as to the responsibility of trading partners for protecting 
offshore workers in situations like Foxconn. Concerns are raised not only for humanitarian reasons, 
but also from a desire to protect domestic jobs and standards. For both these reasons, those trading 
with developing countries are increasingly accepting responsibility for a role in addressing the 
conditions of work in their supply chains. Predominantly, trading partners attempt to influence 
offshore labour standards through CSR. This is defined as businesses‘ voluntary initiatives to 
deliver environmental and social outcomes beyond legal requirements. CSR is a form of private 
regulation: the formulation and enforcement of codes, regulations and standards not enforced by 
any state (Vogel, 2008). 
 
New Zealand is one of many states confronted with the dilemmas of labour conditions in its 
producers‘ and retailers‘ supply chains. It is rapidly expanding trade with developing countries, 
particularly with China. China is now New Zealand‘s largest developing-country trading partner. It 
is New Zealand‘s second largest source of imports. In 2008, New Zealand and China finalised a 
free trade agreement (FTA), China‘s first with a developed country. The New Zealand-China 
relationship is thus an excellent case to explore supply-chain social responsibility. 
 
Thesis Concept 
 
The aim of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of private regulation for improving labour 
conditions in developing countries, and reasons for its use, through a case study of the New 
Zealand-China relationship. I will examine to what extent, and why, private regulation dominates as 
the method of improving offshore working conditions in the case of New Zealand. I will also 
explore the impact of private regulation on working conditions in China. These findings will inform 
a discussion of what it would take for New Zealand to genuinely improve social responsibility in its 
supply chains, and to contribute to improving working conditions in China more broadly. 
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There has been insufficient research into New Zealand efforts to address supply-chain labour 
conditions, both generally and in relation to China. Alongside the FTA, New Zealand and China 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Labour Cooperation (MoU), yet there has been no 
research into its effectiveness. Neither has there been research into private initiatives to improve 
labour conditions, or third-sector partnerships in this area. To my knowledge, this thesis is the first 
time New Zealand efforts to address supply-chain labour issues have been documented. 
 
The significance of the research extends well beyond this particular case. Increasing international 
reliance on CSR makes continued research into its effectiveness in various contexts essential 
(Blowfield & Frynas 2005, p. 506). The way in which social responsibility is handled in the New 
Zealand-China relationship may offer insights into other trade relationships worldwide. The sheer 
number of workers affected in China—China has 104 million manufacturing workers (Harney 
2008, p. 8)—makes a focus on China pertinent. Furthermore, China is an expanding power, and 
projects its norms and practices to other developing countries along with outflows of Chinese 
investment. The improvement of conditions in China may therefore be relevant to the developing 
world more generally. 
 
This thesis contributes to two key debates. The first concerns the effectiveness of private regulation 
for delivering outcomes of social responsibility. While advocates of CSR herald its success at 
regulating supply-chain labour conditions, opponents argue its effectiveness is fundamentally 
limited by its reliance on market forces. A third group argues that CSR is counterproductive and 
potentially harmful; consequently, it should be treated with caution. 
 
The case study of China is used to examine the effectiveness of private regulation. Through an 
analysis of the common and ―best case‖ CSR initiatives in China, the following questions are asked: 
How effective is private regulation in improving labour conditions in China? What limits its 
effectiveness? The three positions in the literature, that CSR is effective, of limited effectiveness or 
counterproductive, are considered against the evidence in the China case. It is argued that while 
CSR delivers cosmetic improvements to a minority of workers in China, it is no substitute for the 
legislation, enforcement and collective bargaining which have brought improvements in other 
countries. Furthermore, CSR can be potentially harmful; consequently, it should be implemented 
cautiously, and alternatives prioritised. 
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The second debate concerns why private regulation tends to emerge rather than alternatives. The 
competitiveness approach argues that CSR emerges as a result of rational actors‘ pursuit of 
competitive advantage. The political approach argues that actor-focused explanations are 
insufficient. The political approach explains the emergence of CSR as a settlement of conflicts 
between competing actors, in light of their differing degrees of power in the neoliberal context.  
 
The case study of New Zealand is used to test the contending explanations. The following questions 
are asked: To what extent is private regulation used to regulate social responsibility in New 
Zealand‘s offshore supply chains? Why is private regulation used to regulate New Zealand‘s 
offshore supply chains? It is argued that the competitiveness approach explains some, but not all the 
movement toward CSR activity in New Zealand. In the absence of government and NGO pressure, 
businesses have voluntarily pursued a solution to defend their reputations, and to maintain positions 
in foreign markets where social responsibility is more important. Businesses have also proactively 
pursued power benefits and positions in newly-emerging markets. However, the political approach 
offers a far more thorough explanation, taking into account the (lack of) action by states and NGOs. 
Both these explanations are necessary to understand the trend towards CSR in New Zealand. 
However, the political approach is particularly important, as it sheds light on the shifts in power 
necessary for stronger alternatives to be pursued. 
 
Finally, these discussions shed light on the broader questions: What would it take to improve social 
responsibility in New Zealand‘s offshore supply chains? What would it take for New Zealand to 
contribute towards improved working conditions in China? Given the limited effectiveness and 
risks of CSR initiatives in China, it is essential that alternatives be pursued. The findings culminate 
in recommendations offering a path forward for New Zealand. 
 
Research Process 
 
This thesis will address the following questions: 
• To what extent is private regulation used to regulate social responsibility in New Zealand‘s 
offshore supply chains? 
• Why is private regulation used to regulate New Zealand‘s offshore supply chains? 
• How effective is private regulation in improving labour conditions in China? 
• What limits the effectiveness of private regulation in improving labour conditions in China?  
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Following on from this, it will also consider: 
• What would it take to improve social responsibility in New Zealand‘s offshore supply chains?  
• What would it take for New Zealand to contribute partner towards improved working conditions 
in China? 
 
Background 
 
This thesis was inspired by a personal desire to take responsibility for the social and environmental 
impacts of my own consumption. As I studied Chinese language throughout my degree, my interest 
came to focus on Chinese workers.  
 
In 2009, I tailored a brief Honours project to investigate the extent of New Zealand efforts to 
address supply-chain labour conditions. I aimed to determine which companies I should and should 
not buy from, or alternatively, with which companies my dollars would make a positive impact or at 
least not cause harm. I interviewed business people, read numerous company websites, and wrote to 
roughly 30 managers with the questions: 
• What company policies ensure you are having a positive impact on labour conditions in your 
supply chain? How are these policies audited? 
• How do you assure customers that your products are not made under exploitative working 
conditions in your suppliers‘ factories? 
 
I found nothing that suggested that supply-chain issues were adequately addressed. Ten companies 
made no response. Three companies responded saying that these issues were commercially sensitive 
and policies could not be disclosed. Even when companies did disclose attempts to address these 
issues, initiatives appeared painfully inadequate. As a consumer seeking to mitigate negative 
impacts of my consumption, I found myself unable to do so in New Zealand, hampered by the lack 
of transparency and my inability to discern effective initiatives. To ensure I was not contributing to 
harm, I was left buying second hand goods and the limited products available from the nascent Fair 
Trade movement. (At that time, there were no Fair Trade products available from China.) 
 
Participant Observation 
 
Many subsequent experiences have shaped this thesis. In 2010, I studied for one year at Sun Yat-
sen University, Guangzhou. I also undertook a six-week internship at the Asia Monitor Resource 
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Centre (AMRC), a labour rights NGO in Hong Kong. This led me to work as note-taker in a 
conference organised by AMRC for its network of occupational safety and health organisations 
throughout Asia, held in Bandung, Indonesia. During this time, while not intentionally in the role of 
―researcher‖, I was a participant observer1 in a number of activities which have shaped my research.  
 
During my stay in China I made six factory visits. One visit was accompanying a Chinese social 
auditor to the supplier of a New Zealand company. This included sitting in on worker interviews. 
Of the other visits, two were accompanying Western business people to visit their suppliers; one 
was with a Chinese business person visiting their own factory, a supplier to Chinese and foreign 
markets; and a further two visits were with a Chinese middleman who purchased on behalf of 
Western buyers. These visits gave me insights into the range of labour conditions at manufacturing 
plants, the varying attitudes of business people to labour issues and the practicalities of social 
auditing. 
 
During my stay I also sat in on a dialogue between the Guangzhou district-level trade union and the 
Canadian auto workers union, which happened to be timed soon after the Honda strikes. This gave 
me insight into the working of the Chinese union, and the potential of international union exchange.  
 
As a language student at Sun Yat-sen University, I was also able to sit in on a course of lectures 
―Labour in China and the US Compared,‖ taught by a visiting US lecturer. Through this I not only 
learned about aspects of labour in China, but also experienced the sensitivities of labour issues in 
China and the reactions of Chinese students. 
 
During my stay at AMRC in Hong Kong, I observed day-to-day operations of a labour NGO. I sat 
in on a training course for Chinese labour NGOs. I also participated in a demonstration to demand 
compensation for victims of cadmium poisoning at a Chinese battery plant. During the conference 
in Indonesia I met more staff of Chinese labour NGOs, as well as their counterparts from other 
Asian countries. These experiences demonstrated to me the challenges of NGO work and labour 
rights campaigning. I also got a feeling for the constraints facing Chinese labour NGOs and other 
Asian counterparts, and the efforts underway to overcome these constraints. 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Becker and Geer define participant observation as ―a method in which the observer participates in the daily life of the 
people under study, either openly in the role of a researcher or covertly...observing things that happen, listening to what 
is said, and questioning people, over a length of time‖ (1957, p. 28). 
7 
 
Methodology 
 
      Primary Sources 
 
To conduct this research I undertook email correspondence and approximately forty qualitative 
interviews and informal discussions with labour activists, business people, social auditors, 
academics, unionists, staff of business associations and government officials, in New Zealand, 
Hong Kong and China. These contacts provided invaluable first-hand insight into many subjects. 
Interviewees demonstrated and explained a variety of opinions, and raised numerous issues for 
consideration. 
 
Interviews and personal correspondence were used primarily to inform my own understanding and 
research direction. Given this intention and the range of interviewees and subjects, interviews were 
unstructured and grounded theory methods were used (Atkinson & Hammersley, 1994, p. 248; 
Glaser and Strauss, 1967, as cited in Charmaz 2002, p. 675). Data was not coded. Interviews were 
in a conversational style. While I prepared questions specific to interviewees‘ area of expertise, I 
allowed conversations to follow tangents, and asked subsequent questions as they arose. I also 
sought further participants whose experiences related to new concerns raised. With interviewees‘ 
permission, I took notes. None have been quoted without their permission. A list of disclosable 
interviewees is provided in Appendix A. 
 
New Zealand interviewees consisted of business people, social auditors, academics, unionists, staff 
of business associations and government officials. Business contacts were selected in an attempt to 
cover a range of industries and levels of attention to supply-chain labour issues. Initial business 
contacts were selected from my 2009 Honours project. To ensure I covered a range of sectors, I 
identified others from company websites. Once I began interviewing, I used snowball sampling, 
asking each interviewee to recommend others they thought I should speak to (Warren 2002, p. 87). I 
also sought further participants whose expertise related to newly-raised concerns (an element of the 
grounded theory method above).  
 
Hong Kong interviews included labour activists, trade unionists and business people. These were 
recommendations from AMRC staff, as well as experts I had come across in secondary sources. In 
Hong Kong I also met staff of Chinese labour NGOs, to whom I spoke informally. Formal 
interviews in China were limited to two social auditors working for foreign companies, including 
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one that sells in New Zealand. These were contacts recommended by New Zealand interviewees. 
Given their regular contact with foreigners, these interviews were not sensitive.  
 
Throughout the year in China I undertook numerous informal discussions. These included 
conversations with foreign and Chinese labour academics, Chinese postgraduate students, foreign 
unionists, Chinese trade union officials and one government official responsible for implementing 
health and safety legislation in a small manufacturing town. In the contexts these conversations took 
place, the interviewees were not at risk. 
 
The understanding I formed from interviews has the following limitations. Due to my process of 
selecting interviewees, it is possible I missed some perspectives. It is likely business interviewees 
were biased towards responses that painted their companies in a good light. Their responses were 
restricted by commercial sensitivities. Furthermore, it was primarily businesses with well-
developed initiatives that were willing to speak with me. I have needed to take these biases into 
account. Despite this, I did manage to speak to several business people opposed to implementing 
supply-chain labour initiatives, so was not uninformed of their perspectives.  
 
My research was also limited by language barriers. Some informal discussions were in Mandarin or 
Cantonese. With only stilted Mandarin, I was limited in what I could ask and understand. Even in 
environments where interpreting was provided, this was sometimes limited by the skills of available 
interpreters. I may therefore have misinterpreted some experiences. 
 
In addition to personal communication, I also acquired transcripts of the negotiations on the New 
Zealand-China Memorandum of Understanding on Labour Cooperation, under the Official 
Information Act.
2
 I also read numerous company websites. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 I requested: 
1. Key documents relating to negotiations of the NZ-China Memorandum of Understanding on Labour Cooperation (including 
proposed drafts). 
2. Minutes of any discussions during MoU negotiations in which prison labour, re-education through labour, freedom of association 
or collective bargaining were mentioned. 
3. Minutes of discussions during MoU negotiations in which the second point of the preamble was discussed ("sharing a common 
aspiration..."). 
4.  Key documents from the NZ-China FTA negotiations which concern technical barriers to trade, exceptions, or China's adherence 
to ILO conventions. 
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     Secondary Sources  
 
Secondary sources used were academic books and journal articles, reports and websites of NGOs, 
business associations and international organisations, and online media articles. These were selected 
by database searches, recommendations and exploring bibliographies of relevant articles. With one 
or two exceptions, sources have been in English. 
 
My use of secondary sources has been limited by the availability of relevant information. Chinese 
data on labour conditions is typically of a low quality. My access to Chinese sources has been 
limited by my painstakingly slow reading of Chinese texts. I have tried to overcome these 
limitations by relying on research by international experts who can access Chinese sources. In the 
case of secondary sources on CSR initiatives, commercial sensitivities and transparency barriers 
have created a bias towards positive case studies. Failed cases of CSR are less likely to be 
disclosed, particularly where they paint businesses in a poor light. In the New Zealand case, sources 
on CSR are further limited due to the recent development of this field.  
 
Outline of the Thesis 
 
The thesis has seven chapters, which are organised as follows.  
 
Chapter Two provides an overview of private regulation, and details the development of CSR in 
New Zealand. I then review the literature on the two key debates about CSR. The first debate 
concerns whether CSR is an effective tool to improve labour conditions. Important background to 
this debate is to consider ―pro-sweatshop‖ arguments, that contend that any intervention to improve 
labour conditions is misguided. The second debate concerns the emergence of CSR, and whether 
the competitiveness or political approach best explain this trend.  
 
Chapter Three provides an outline of current labour conditions in China. This discussion 
establishes the need for social responsibility, by outlining the conditions prevalent in many factories 
that export to New Zealand companies. Next, factors affecting the improvement of labour 
conditions are discussed: the labour supply, economic pressures, political barriers to workers‘ 
representation and the development of the labour movement. This demonstrates that there are 
complex factors that determine the state of labour conditions. There are therefore many avenues 
through which trading partners can contribute towards improvements. 
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Chapter Four addresses the first two research questions. I examine to what extent New Zealand 
has turned to private regulation to regulate labour conditions in its offshore supply chains. I also 
explore whether the competitiveness or political approach best explains this trend. It is argued that 
social responsibility efforts in New Zealand are at a low level of development, and tending towards 
private regulation. The competitiveness approach explains these trends in light of businesses‘ 
defence and pursuit of competitive advantage. However, the political approach offers a far more 
comprehensive explanation, taking into account the influence of the neoliberal context, and 
subsequent state and civil society (in)action.   
 
Chapter Five explores the effectiveness of private regulation for improving labour conditions in 
China, addressing the third and fourth research questions. After exploring the spread and 
effectiveness of both common and ―best case‖ examples of CSR practice, it is argued that CSR can 
bring improvements in select aspects of labour conditions in China. However, these are 
fundamentally limited by CSR‘s reliance on market forces. CSR also has potential to cause harmful 
effects. This makes over-reliance on CSR not only misguided, but potentially counterproductive. It 
is argued that CSR should be seen as one of many tools to advance labour conditions in China, and 
implemented with caution. Alternatives should be prioritised. 
 
Chapter Six outlines the possibilities for New Zealand if it were to challenge the current settlement 
at private regulation and take serious steps to address labour conditions in its offshore supply 
chains. This chapter answers the fifth and sixth research questions, and provides a framework for 
action. It is argued that to improve social responsibility of New Zealand businesses would require 
explicit state action, and ultimately for the Government to impose mandatory requirements and 
legal sanctions. Short of these methods, New Zealand should promote and resource CSR, but only 
with acknowledgement of its limitations. Any of these steps would require a shift in power towards 
confrontational groups, and a willingness to accept costs. For New Zealand to contribute to 
improving labour conditions in China more broadly would take increased support of the Chinese 
labour movement and state enforcement. This support could occur through cooperation, 
highlighting non-compliances, union collaboration and development aid. 
 
Chapter Seven concludes, with a discussion of the limitations of this study and suggestions for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2: Private Regulation and the Governance of Labour Conditions 
 
Developed countries are increasingly choosing to address labour conditions in their supply chains 
through corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives, a form of private regulation. This thesis 
contributes to two key debates concerning private regulation. The first is CSR‘s effectiveness for 
addressing supply-chain labour conditions. The second concerns why private regulation currently 
predominates. This chapter introduces private regulation and provides background to the case study 
of supply-chain labour initiatives in New Zealand. The two debates on CSR are then outlined. 
 
Private Regulation 
 
Private regulation is the formulation and implementation of codes, regulations and standards not 
enforced by any state (Vogel, 2008). Usually private regulation initiatives are constructed by a firm 
or industry sector, though occasionally there is collaboration with civil society actors and even 
states (Bartley, 2005, 2007). However, private regulation mechanisms increasingly develop with no 
input from public authorities (Fuchs, 2005). The defining feature is that they are voluntary (not 
accountable to states), and that sanctions come from non-government actors or market forces. The 
rise of private regulation thus has two consequences: first, many standards and practices which were 
traditionally governed by the state are now commodified, made subject to the market. Second, 
regulation and enforcement roles are privatised, moving out of the hands of the state (which can 
impose legal sanctions for non-compliance), to private actors. Traditional state-centric views of 
regulation are inadequate (Cutler et al., 1999, p. 4). 
 
Private regulation is used to govern product safety, quality, technical standards, and increasingly 
social and environmental standards (civil regulation). The most basic forms are guidelines and 
codes of conduct, adopted at the firm, sectoral and international levels. Examples include the Apple 
Supplier Code of Conduct (Apple, 2012), the Electronics Industry Code of Conduct (Electronics 
Industry Citizenship Coalition, 2009), and the international code of conduct for marketing of breast 
milk substitutes (Utting, 2005b, p. 10). Advanced codes receive third-party auditing, as do 
standards and certifications. The most developed forms of private regulation are multi-stakeholder 
initiatives (MSIs), in which a coalition of private and civil society actors collectively negotiate a 
code. These sometimes include sanctions for non-compliance, such as public disclosure of breaches 
or expulsion from the association (Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 396), though some have no 
sanctions (for instance the UN Global Compact). While private regulation is technically a form of 
 12 
 
―soft law‖ in that it is not legally binding (Cutler, 1999, p. 284), businesses do face various 
pressures to participate. In cases where costs of non-participation are high, or where participation is 
integral to entering a market, private regulation can effectively be required (Vogel, 2008, p. 264). 
Initiatives exist on a spectrum from the ―softest‖ mechanisms (pure self-regulation) to ―harder‖ 
initiatives requiring some certification of compliance. 
 
Private regulation is not a new phenomenon (Bartley, 2011; Cutler, 1999, 2003; Fuchs, 2005, p. 18-
19; Porter, 1999; Vogel, 2008). Industry self-regulation has existed since medieval Europe, 
involving technical rules and guidelines to improve coordination and lower costs. Certifications 
were used to indicate product quality, safety and technical standards throughout the 20
th
 century 
(Bartley, 2011, p. 6). However, private regulation has historically fallen in and out of favour. For 
instance, private regulation of maritime rules dates back to the medieval period, was displaced by 
state authority during the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, and is now seeing a comeback (Cutler, 
1999, 2003). 
 
What has been seen in recent decades has not only been a return to private regulation seen in 
previous eras, but an explosion in numbers of private regulation mechanisms, and their spread to a 
wider range of policy areas. There are now approximately 300 codes covering numerous economic 
sectors (Vogel, 2008, p. 262): environmental governance, labour standards, data privacy, marine 
transport, international finance, advertising, transport of dangerous goods and food safety, among 
many others (Cutler et al., 1999; Fuchs, 2005; Haufler, 1999, 2001). These mechanisms have risen 
to hold immense power in many markets. Private standards can act as barriers to market access 
(Cutler, 1999:315-6; Sinclair, 1999; Vogel, 2008, p. 273), for instance, if certifications become de 
facto requirements for entering a market (Bartley, 2011, p. 13; Huige, 2011, p. 175-6). Private 
regulation mechanisms can also assist in trade access, by providing guidance on necessary legal 
compliance. This makes the formation of private regulation a site of intense contestation, as 
participation or non-participation may have significant economic consequences.  
 
While lacking legal sanctions, private regulation is far from illegitimate or ineffective. Industry 
associations and other mechanisms can regulate effectively. Gunningham argues that private 
regulation is the ―most effective mechanism‖ for governing futures markets, as peer pressure 
provides stronger sanctions than distant and unenforced state rules (Gunningham, 1991). Private 
regulation appears to have effectively prevented overfishing in Turkey (Ostrom, 1990, as cited in 
Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 367) and protected reserve land in Brazil (Gunningham & Rees, 
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1997, p. 368). Private regulation has also made a ―highly significant‖ contribution to the safety of 
nuclear power plants (Rees, 1994, as cited in Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 369). In New Zealand, 
private industry associations regulate the legal and dentistry professions (the New Zealand Law 
Society and Dental Council). Private bodies also regulate advertising standards, the content of print 
media (Barker & Evans, 2007, p. 12) and insurance practices (BusinessNZ, 2006, p. 12).   
 
The interaction between private and public regulation is complex. In some cases, states have 
initiated private regulation (Bartley, 2003). It is also common for states to have ongoing 
involvement, creating a continuum of co-regulation forms (Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 365-6; 
Lipschutz & Fogel, 2002, p. 125; see also Figure 1 in this chapter).
3
 Co-regulation is seen, for 
instance, in the regulation of New Zealand broadcasting standards, in which a complaints panel is 
funded 50 percent each by Government and industry (Barker & Evans, 2007, p. 8). Private 
initiatives can complement state regulation. Private standards have assisted compliance with 
environmental legislation in Serbia (Zaric, Gorton, Lowe, & Quarrie, 2008, p. 1, 5) and food safety 
legislation in the EU, by providing step-by-step guidelines on what compliance entails (Huige, 
2011, p. 177). Private regulation can also provide a precursor to state regulation, as soft laws are 
later ―hardened‖ (Utting, 2005b, p. 11; Vogel, 2008, p. 265). The rise of private regulation does not, 
therefore, signal the demise of the state. 
 
However, there is evidence that private regulation can undermine public regulation objectives, by 
―crowding out‖ more stringent mandatory regulations. For instance, some states have reduced state 
regulation for factories that have ISO 14001 certification (a private standard of environmental 
management relying on market sanctions) (Fuchs, 2005, p. 18). Private actors have also sought self-
regulation in order to avoid perceived risk of state regulation (Salzmann, Ionescu-Somers, & Steger, 
2005, p. 27; Vogel, 2008, p. 268). This raises questions about the effect of private regulation on the 
pursuit of social goods. As Vogel notes (2008, p. 276), the question is what mix of public and 
private regulation would enable the best governance of global firms and markets? This mix differs 
markedly between sectors. 
 
The Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
A significant aspect of the shift to private regulation has been the rise in civil regulation, 
―regulations that govern the social and environmental impacts of global firms and markets without 
                                                 
3
 Braithwaite depicts the degrees of state involvement as a pyramid, with self-regulation at the base, and increasing 
input from state and other actors on subsequent tiers, as necessary to promote compliance (Braithwaite, 2006). 
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state enforcement‖ (Vogel, 2008, p. 261). Civil regulation is most commonly referred to as part of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR), defined as businesses using voluntary initiatives to deliver 
environmental and social outcomes over and above legal requirements. The umbrella term CSR 
refers to business initiatives to protect the environment, employees and communities in national and 
offshore supply chains. Many initiatives constitute civil regulation (such as codes of conduct, 
standards and certifications), however some aspects of CSR fall outside the purview of regulation 
(such as community projects and philanthropy). The term ―social responsibility‖ will be used more 
broadly, referring to all efforts to increase business responsiveness to stakeholders (workers, local 
communities and the environment). Social responsibility encompasses CSR, but also binding 
regulation and non-business-led initiatives.  
 
Government policy towards social responsibility can include enabling and incentivising CSR, 
imposing legal requirements through co-regulation, or imposing legal sanctions for social 
irresponsibility, as depicted in Figure 1. Policy instruments can be divided into informational 
instruments, partnering instruments, financial incentives, and legal or ―mandating‖ instruments, as 
shown (Berger, Steurer, Konrad, & Martinuzzi, 2007, p. 11; Steurer, Martinuzzi, & Margula, 2011). 
Governments can therefore play an active role in promoting CSR, among a range of tools. 
 
Like other forms of private regulation, CSR initiatives have existed for some time. As early as the 
1890s, US consumer movements created a White Label which certified garments produced under 
fair conditions (Boris, 2003). In the 1930s, similar movements again used private regulation. 
Organic certifications have grown since the 1970s, and fair trade certifications since the 1980s 
(Bartley, 2011, p. 6). However in more recent decades civil regulation has expanded to an 
altogether new scale. 
 
The CSR movement began in force in the 1990s. Firm-level codes of conduct proliferated, along 
with ―triple bottom line‖ (TBL) reports, which document an organisation‘s social, environmental 
and economic performance (also known as ―CSR reports‖). The CSR movement initially focused 
on environmental issues (Bartley, 2007, p. 303; Brammer, Hoejmose, & Millington, 2011, p. 17). 
The earliest labour-focused codes emerged in the early 1990s (Andersen & Skjoett-Larsen, 2009, p. 
77; Harney, 2008, p. 188), though until the end of the decade they were far from commonplace. As 
codes spread among firms, they also developed at the industry and international levels. While some  
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remain guidelines, such as ISO26000 on social responsibility, codes have increasingly conformed to 
international standards and been made subject to in-house or third-party auditing.  
 
Some codes also developed into certifications, such as ISO14001, certifying environmental 
management in a company, and labeling schemes, such as the Fair Trade label and Rugmark. The 
Fair Trade label on products certifies that producers are ensured a fair return and work in acceptable 
conditions throughout the supply chain (see for instance, Becchetti & Costantino, 2008). Rugmark 
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certifies that carpets have been produced without child labour in India, Pakistan and Nepal (Nadvi 
& Waltring, 2004, p. 26). However, there remain few other certifications of compliance with 
supply-chain labour standards. SA8000, certifying a company for taking steps towards providing a 
decent workplace, and OHSAS 18001 on occupational safety and health, focus on management 
systems rather than compliance levels (Kortelainen, 2008:433). The overwhelming majority of CSR 
activity internationally on supply-chain labour issues remains limited to TBL reports and codes of 
conduct, which involve minimal to modest investment. While to varying degrees foreign companies 
divert value to auditors, they almost never transfer value to suppliers in order to resource 
improvements.  
 
In a minority of cases of CSR, businesses join MSIs, or demonstrate greater commitment to 
transparency, stakeholder engagement and tackling systemic problems. MSIs arose in response to 
concerns about the ―democratic deficit‖ of CSR initiatives and consensus about the insufficiency of 
even well-audited codes (Hughes et al. 2008, Bulut and Lane 2010, AMRC, 2006a). Examples in 
the labour field include Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), the Fair Wear 
Foundation, the Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI), Workers‘ Rights Consortium and the Fair Labour 
Association (Hughes, 2001; O'Rourke, 2003, 2006). While firms may join MSIs without any 
genuine change in practice (AMRC, 2006b), activity in these mechanisms does demonstrate 
comparatively high commitment. In addition, in a few highly advanced cases, firms have invested 
considerable resources in greater disclosure, NGO involvement and efforts to address systemic 
problems. (They still fall short of resourcing improvements in suppliers.) These initiatives are 
described in Chapter Five.  
 
Many companies that implement supply-chain CSR initiatives are transnational corporations 
(TNCs), companies with a head office in their ―home‖ country and offices or factories in other 
―host‖ countries. Some participants do not have overseas offices or their own factories, but simply 
purchase from overseas suppliers (whether directly or indirectly). Many New Zealand companies 
fall into this category. New Zealand companies are predominantly small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs). In 2011, 97 percent of New Zealand companies employed 19 or fewer staff (Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2011, p. 5). Many do not have offshore bases. However, while SMEs may 
have particular peculiar motivations and barriers to take-up of CSR (Collins, Dickie & Weber, 
2009), they are in no way precluded from participation in supply-chain labour initiatives. 
Depending on their degree of clout over the foreign factory, SMEs may be more capable than some 
larger companies of implementing these initiatives. 
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As will be expanded in this thesis, all CSR activities are implemented without state enforcement. 
They operate in response to market pressures, as ―socially-responsible production‖ becomes a 
means of adding value to a product. Thus, while tasks of protecting society and the environment 
from the hazards of private sector competition are traditionally the role of governments, social 
responsibility has now been commodified; it has become a product on the market.  
 
CSR in New Zealand 
 
The case of CSR development in New Zealand provides necessary background for understanding 
the emergence of labour-focused initiatives. CSR in New Zealand is at a low level of development, 
and like elsewhere, has historically focused on environmental initiatives. Supply-chain initiatives 
have only recently emerged and are implemented by a minority of businesses. Compared to other 
forms of CSR, supply-chain initiatives are relatively costly to implement, and address problems 
largely hidden from consumers. They are therefore a ―pinnacle‖ of CSR practice. As there has been 
limited research into CSR implementation in New Zealand, some parts of the picture remain 
unknown. 
 
Triple Bottom Line Reporting 
 
One measurable indicator of business attention to social responsibility is the prevalence of TBL 
reporting. While reporting does not necessarily reflect a change in behaviour, it does indicate a 
consideration of CSR issues, and is often a first step towards implementation.
4
 TBL reporting is 
voluntary in New Zealand. The trends in reporting have been the area of CSR most extensively 
researched in New Zealand (Bebbington, Higgins, & Frame, 2009; Chapman & Milne, 2004; 
Davey, 1985; Guilding & Kirkman, 1988; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Hall, 2002; Ho, 2007; Hossain, 
Perera, & Rahman, 1995; Milne & Gray, 2008; Milne, Tregidga & Walton, 2003, 2004; Ng, 1985; 
Orr, 2000; Robertson, 1977; Tregidga & Milne, 2006).  
 
New Zealand rates of TBL reporting are extremely low and lag behind other countries (Chapman & 
Milne, 2004; Kuruppu & Milne, 2009; Milne & Gray, 2008; Milne, Owen, & Tilt, 2001; Nichols, 
2005). A 1996 KPMG survey of corporate environmental reporting ranked New Zealand last out of 
                                                 
4 The potential for divergence between reporting and practice should be noted. In 2011, the New Zealand company Sanford Ltd. 
received two New Zealand awards for its sustainability report (Association of Chartered Accountants, 2011). In the same year, it 
became embroiled in allegations of mistreatment, underpayment and even bonded labour of employees in its immediate contractors 
(Skinner, 2012).  
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13 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries (Milne et al., 2001, 
p. 2). By 2007, only five of New Zealand‘s 100 largest listed companies produced standalone TBL 
reports (Ho, 2007), compared to 2008 figures of 37 in Australia, and 60 by leading countries 
(Kuruppu & Milne, 2009, p. 45). By 2008, the New Zealand businesses reporting on social and 
environmental impacts numbered no more than ―a couple of dozen‖ (Milne & Gray, 2008, p. 8).  
 
With the exception of a few stellar performers, the quality of these reports is low (Milne, Ball & 
Gray, 2005; Milne et al., 2003). In 2008, New Zealand had no organisations with reports registered 
under the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) (Milne & Gray, 2008, p. 60-61). One study found ―no 
apparent continuous improvement‖ of report quality (Nichols, 2005, p. 88). Neither do New 
Zealand companies commonly provide independent verification of their reports (Milne & Gray, 
2008, p. 60-61). TBL reporting in New Zealand is thus scarce and of a generally low quality. This 
indicates that CSR in New Zealand is developing from a low base.  
 
Extent of CSR Implementation 
 
Implementation appears to be more widespread than the level documented in TBL reports, however 
it remains at an early stage of development. Research documenting implementation in New Zealand 
is limited (Collins, Lawrence, Pavlovich, & Ryan, 2007; Lawrence, Collins, Pavlovich, & 
Arunachalam, 2006; Nichols, 2005; New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development 
[NZBCSD], 2010b; Stenger, 2007). Three survey series do monitor the gradual changes in New 
Zealand. Massey University annually surveyed between 15 and 88 top companies by turnover 
(Massey University, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2005, 2007). Waikato Management school 
conducted surveys in 2003, 2006 and 2009/2010 which included 500 and 750 businesses of varying 
sizes (Collins, Lawrence, & Roper, 2007, 2010; Collins, Lawrence, Roper, & Haar, 2010; Lawrence 
& Collins, 2004; Lawrence, Collins, Roper, & Haar, 2011). ShapeNZ surveyed consumers about 
businesses‘ environmental roles in 2007 (ShapeNZ, 2007). It then conducted the online ShapeNZ 
Fairfax Business and Consumer Surveys of over 1000 business and consumer participants in 2009, 
2010 and 2011 (ShapeNZ 2011, as cited in Gibson, 2011a; ShapeNZ 2009, as cited in Mandow, 
2009; ShapeNZ, 2010, as cited in NZBCSD, 2010b). The surveys document a gradual increase in 
CSR activity in New Zealand, with an initial focus on environmental activities.
5
 
 
 
                                                 
5 Because the surveys were filled out on a voluntary basis, all are likely to reflect greater engagement with sustainability practices 
than is representative of the entire business population. They nevertheless provide insight into practices and trends.  
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      Environmental Initiatives 
 
While in 2001 the overall level of CSR performance in New Zealand was ―modest‖ (Massey 
University, 2001, p. 14), surveys indicated ―continued steady improvement‖ in environmental 
responsiveness (Massey University, 2003, p. 7). The areas of least progress were environmental 
management systems, stakeholder communication, and supplier programmes. Even the 2007 survey 
of 15 ―leaders‖ found that few had environmental management systems in place. The surveys also 
found significant sectoral differences. Heavy industries such as manufacturing, chemicals and 
pharmaceuticals, and oil or electricity producers were more likely to score highly in environmental 
activities. ―Retail, wholesale and distribution‖ scored among the lowest (Massey University, 2007). 
 
The Waikato surveys document the nature of environmental initiatives among New Zealand 
businesses (see Figure 1 below). In 2006, 83 percent of respondents had instituted some form of 
environmental initiative (Collins, Lawrence, & Roper, 2010, p. 483-484). The most common 
activities were recycling programmes (79 percent of businesses in 2010 [Collins, Lawrence, Roper 
et al., 2010, p. 4]). Business size had an impact on activity, with smaller businesses more likely to 
have no environmental practices (Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 6). In larger companies 
there appears to be some degree of institutionalisation of environmental strategy. In 2010, 32 
percent of respondents from large firms reported having an environmental manager at their 
organisation (Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 4). While generally the trend was towards 
increased take-up of environmental initiatives, the recession caused some decline in activities by 
businesses outside of sustainability networks (Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 1). This 
indicates that these networks are a significant driver of sustainability practice.  
 
      Social Initiatives 
 
The Waikato surveys found social initiatives to be more common than environmental initiatives, 
despite the slower development of research in this area (Collins, Lawrence, & Roper, 2010, p. 479). 
In 2006, 98 percent of respondents had instituted some form of social initiatives (Collins, Lawrence, 
& Roper, 2010, p. 488). The most common activities were giving to charity (75 percent of 
businesses) and job training (p. 486). It is noteworthy that ―ethical sourcing‖ was included in 
Waikato survey only in 2010.  
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ShapeNZ and Massey surveys document lower involvement, but similar types of social activities. 
The 2010 ShapeNZ survey found 60 percent of New Zealand businesses were engaged in some 
form of community or social activities, for instance volunteering, philanthropy or staff education 
(ShapeNZ 2010, as cited in NZBCSD, 2010b, p. 1; see also, ShapeNZ 2009, as cited in Mandow, 
2009). The 2005 and 2007 Massey surveys document similar activities. The 2007 Massey survey 
notes that CSR is an important goal for leading New Zealand businesses, and that some responses 
indicate strategic approaches. However, relationships with suppliers ―poses a more difficult 
problem‖ (Massey University, 2007, p. 8). 
 
Figure 2. Environmental Practices 2003-2010 
Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 5 
 
Figure 3. Social Practices 2003-2010  
 
Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 12 
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Supplier Programmes 
 
Supplier programmes have consistently been the least-developed area of CSR in New Zealand. This 
is understandable as they address offshore problems, hidden from consumers, and implementation 
often necessitates travel or communication with suppliers from foreign cultures. They can therefore 
be costly and complex to implement. Environment-focused supplier programmes can deliver some 
cost savings (for instance through reduced packaging), and are therefore more appealing to many 
businesses than social supplier programmes. Yet even environmental supplier programmes have 
been an area in which New Zealand has scored ―very poorly‖ (Massey University, 2000, p. 21). In 
each year of the Massey surveys (1999-2007), ―supplier environmental programme‖ was 
consistently the lowest scoring section. Scores generally improved, indicating that more companies 
had programmes or were planning them. However, even in the 2007 survey of companies leading in 
CSR, only ―a few‖ had put in place environmental purchasing policies (p. 20).  
 
The Waikato surveys, with a much larger survey cohort, provide a better picture of the spread of 
environment-focused supplier programmes. In 2003, 10 percent of respondents reported to have 
such programmes (Collins, Lawrence, & Roper, 2010, p. 483). By 2006, this had increased to 18 
percent, and by 2010 to approximately 23 percent of respondents (Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 
2010, p. 5). These findings equated to 39 percent of respondents affiliated with a sustainability 
network, and 11 percent of those not affiliated. Firm size was insignificant (p. 31-32). These 
findings demonstrate growth in implementation of environment-focused supplier programmes. 
However, without more specific research, it is uncertain what these initiatives entail. To what 
degree programmes consist of mere discussions with suppliers, contracted agreements, 
certifications or codes of conduct remains unknown. 
 
      Supply-Chain Labour Initiatives 
 
Supply-chain labour initiatives have been extremely rare in New Zealand, but are gradually 
becoming more numerous. Prior to 2005, dialogue on managing supply-chain labour conditions 
remained ―in its infancy in New Zealand‖ (APEC Human Resources Development Working Group, 
2005, p. 15). No major surveys questioned businesses about supply-chain social responsibility, 
indicating a lack of activity and awareness in this area. An informal 2005 survey by the New 
Zealand Herald found only ―a handful‖ of businesses with checks in place for their suppliers (Chan, 
2005). In the 2005 Massey survey, businesses were asked about initiatives to address ―social 
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responsibility in the supply chain‖ for the first time. Fourteen of 30 respondents reported having 
some form of audits in place (Massey University, 2005, p. 29). However, the survey did not probe 
into what social criteria were addressed, what audits entailed, or what proportion of suppliers were 
covered. Respondents may have re-cited environmental supplier programmes.  
 
In recent years, initiatives appear to have become more numerous. By 2007, ―a few‖ of the fifteen 
respondents to the Massey survey were ―grasping the challenge of supply-chain social 
responsibility‖ (2007, p. 25-26), albeit through poorly monitored initiatives. One company reported 
that it checked suppliers against a code. A few more companies scrutinised environment and health 
and safety records of their suppliers, or were in the process of developing codes of conduct or 
procurement policies. These initiatives were undertaken by a minority of companies recognised as 
CSR leaders. They monitored progress only through meetings with suppliers, or, in some cases, 
audits of ―high risk‖ suppliers. The survey notes that ―monitoring and measuring progress in the 
area of supply and procurement is still relatively new to companies‖ (p. 8; see also Stenger 2007, p. 
170). 
 
Since 2010, more information has become available, as ―ethical purchasing policies‖ were for the 
first time included in the Waikato survey. While not defined in the survey, ethical purchasing 
policies were included as a ―social activity‖, and were a category distinct from ―environment-
focused supplier programmes‖. Thirty-eight percent of respondents reported having ethical 
purchasing policies (Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 10). There was no significant 
difference between small and large businesses (p.33). Affiliation with sustainability networks was a 
significant factor, roughly doubling the likelihood of involvement in ethical purchasing. Fifty-two 
percent of affiliated businesses reported ethical purchasing policies, compared to 26 percent of 
those not affiliated (Lawrence et al., 2011, p. 13). 
 
However, the 2011 ShapeNZ Fairfax Business and Consumer Survey reported similar levels of 
activity for environmental and social supplier programmes combined (ShapeNZ 2011, as cited in 
Gibson, 2011a). Thirty-four percent of managers or executives reported their organisation to 
include social or environmental criteria in their supplier terms and conditions. Twenty-six percent 
said they had discontinued a supplier relationship for poor performance in these areas. These figures 
suggest that the Waikato findings may be overly optimistic. The findings suggest it may be well 
under one third of businesses that engage in labour-focused CSR initiatives.  
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There has yet to be focused research into what ethical purchasing and supplier programmes entail or 
to what degree they are implemented. (What companies determine as ―ethical‖ has not been 
defined, and policies may concern only suppliers within New Zealand). Focused research is needed 
to determine what proportion address labour issues. Nevertheless, from the limited information 
available, these initiatives do appear to be an area of growth in New Zealand.  
 
However, there is considerable contention internationally about the effectiveness of private 
regulation to deliver outcomes of social responsibility. There is also contention about why CSR 
tends to emerge rather than more effective alternatives. Both questions are pertinent to a discussion 
of what it would take to improve supply-chain labour conditions. Before turning to these debates, an 
important issue must be addressed. 
 
Why Worry About Poor Labour Conditions? The Pro-Sweatshops Argument 
 
There are arguments that any intervention to improve labour conditions is misguided and 
detrimental to the impoverished workers it aims to help. This literature typically refers to and 
defends ―sweatshops,‖ defined as ―workplaces employing vulnerable labour and which 
systematically fail to pay a living wage and to comply with labour and health and safety legislation‖ 
(Montero, 2011, p. 5). There are many authors that defend sweatshops as ―tickets out of poverty‖, 
workplaces freely chosen, and a vast improvement on impoverished agricultural work or 
unemployment (Bhagwati, 2000; Kristof, 1998, 2002, 2006, 2009; Kristof & WuDunn, 2000; 
Krugman, 1997). To these authors, sweatshops are a temporary and necessary phase in industrial 
development, and improving conditions can actually harm workers, by raising costs and creating 
unemployment (Academic Consortium on International Trade, 2000 as cited in Miller, 2003, p. 9). 
This argument must be addressed to justify any action towards the improvement of labour 
conditions.  
 
Does Improving Labour Conditions Harm Workers? 
 
There is truth in the argument that sweatshops are a step up for impoverished workers. The ―free 
choice‖ of these jobs is dubious given workers‘ multiple vulnerabilities, such as irregular 
immigration status and a desperate economic situation (Miller, 2003, p. 7). In some cases, the 
persistence of forced labour means that workers are coerced by even more than these 
vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, the contribution of sweatshops to the betterment of livelihoods should 
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indeed be celebrated. The spread of foreign-invested factories in developing countries does provide 
employment, and the conditions in multinational firms have been found to surpass domestic 
factories in many cases (Powell & Skarbek, 2006). However, this is no reason to ignore the 
desperate need to improve these conditions. Instead, improving sweatshop conditions must be part 
of broader action against exploitative working conditions, in factories and in rural areas. Miller 
advocates linking anti-sweatshop movements to those on ending poverty, so that action is also taken 
for the ―brothers and sisters‖ of factory workers left toiling in the informal and agricultural sectors 
(2003, p. 17).  
 
The argument that improving conditions harms production workers is not supported by evidence. 
Numerous cases contradict the claim that improving labour conditions results in unemployment. 
Pollin, Burns and Heintz, using data from forty-five countries over the period 1992-97, found no 
statistically significant relationship between real wages and employment growth in the apparel 
industry (2001, in Miller, 2003, p. 12). A study from the US showed that the imposition of 
minimum wage laws did not increase unemployment, as was feared (Rothstein, 2005, p. 43-4). 
Furthermore, an analysis from Indonesia found that wage increases from anti-sweatshop activism 
did not harm employment, perhaps due to the large profit margins of brand companies (Harrison & 
Scorse, 2006, p. 14-5). While global competition does mean that rising costs can deter investment, 
labour conditions are just one factor. For instance, costs of raising standards can be offset by 
improved productivity. Falling employment is thus not an inevitable consequence of improving 
conditions. Small wage rises make a substantial difference to workers (Rothstein, 2005, p. 44), and, 
as in the examples cited above, can be absorbed without raising unemployment. Objections to this 
merely distract from the need for redistribution of wealth in production chains, and justify the 
current excessive disparities (Montero, 2011, p. 12).  
 
Are Sweatshop Conditions Just a Temporary Phase of Industrial Development? 
 
The second major argument from sweatshop defenders is that poor labour conditions are a 
temporary phase, an ―essential first step‖ in industrial development (Conforti, 2006; Kristof & 
WuDunn, 2000; Krugman, 1994, in Miller, 2003; Miller, 1997).
6
 These authors assert that for the 
Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) and the industrialised West, 
labour-intensive industries were stepping stones to improved conditions before they outgrew this 
                                                 
6
 Bender and Greenwald note this view also contains traces of racism typical of early 20
th 
C anti-sweatshop activism, in 
which the sweatshop was seen as primitive and foreign. The return of sweatshops in the US, discussed below, puts to 
rest these arguments (Bender & Greenwald, 2003, p. 12). 
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phase through market-led development and productivity increases (Krugman, 1994, in Miller, 2003, 
p. 12). Although individual conditions may be horrible, they are ―representative of a whole 
generation sacrificed in varying ways, and to varying degrees, for the future of the country‖ 
(Conforti, 2006, p. 120-121). These arguments imply that action need not be taken on poor labour 
conditions, as they will more or less automatically become obsolete.  
 
These arguments ignore the historical record in which far more than economic development has 
been required to improve labour conditions (Boris, 2003; Miller, 2003; Rothstein, 2005). Historians 
stress that improved labour conditions are the product of continuous struggle. The history of the US 
garment industry provides but one example (Bender, 2004, p. 12-13; Boris, 2003, p. 207; 
Greenwald, 2003, p. 82; Ross, 2004, in Montero, 2011, p. 50; Rothstein, 2005, p. 45). In the 1890s, 
abysmal conditions in US workplaces (see Montero, 2011, p. 48) ignited a movement of unions, 
consumers and reformers. These groups were instrumental in provoking leaps forward in state and 
federal legislation and enforcement. Tripartite alliances of government, labour and business also 
supplemented enforcement by government inspectors (Bender & Greenwald, 2003, p. 9). Unions 
and consumer groups were a necessary addition to ensure legislation was enforced. It was thus the 
combination of these movements and government protection, not merely economic development, 
that led to an almost sweatshop free era in the US from World War II to the 1970s. Political 
struggle was essential, as was also seen in Britain, France, and other European countries (Bender & 
Greenwald, 2003, p. 9; Boris, 2003, p. 207).  
 
The importance of this struggle is highlighted by the re-emergence of sweatshops in the highly-
industrialised US (Ross, 2004, in Rothstein, 2005, p. 45). Since the 1970s, as union movements 
have been weakened, sweatshops have returned (Montero, 2011, p. 64-65). The Reagan 
administration also reduced funding for labour inspectors who monitored wage levels and working 
hours, and overturned bans on homework (Boris, 2003, p. 213; Greenwald, 2003, p. 78). 
Sweatshops are not, therefore, a temporary phase of low industrialisation, and progress a direct 
product of economic development. Rather, labour conditions are the product of political action. 
Specifically, labour conditions reflect unions‘, consumers‘ and reformers‘ ability to maintain 
legislative protection and enforcement, a capacity that waxes and wanes with the political context. 
In this neoliberal era, the struggle for reform is, if anything, more sorely needed. 
 
A final response to proponents of sweatshops is that we can do better (Collins, 2003, p. 411; Miller, 
2003). Even if sweatshop phases have been seen in other countries, ―nothing requires us to go that 
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route again‖ (Bhagwati, 1997, as cited in Miller, 2003, p. 16). Avenues for international 
cooperation, and to require greater business responsibility have progressed. Technology, legislation 
and enforcement methods can be transplanted to alleviate suffering. Developed countries can afford 
to contribute to the betterment of conditions. Without corresponding efforts to improve conditions, 
justifications for continued use of sweatshop labour do not withstand scrutiny. 
 
The Effectiveness of Private Regulation for Improving Working Conditions 
 
Having settled that action on poor labour conditions is needed, the question is whether private 
regulation is a useful route to take. The ability of private regulation to improve supply-chain 
working conditions is hotly contested. There are three positions in this argument: those who view 
CSR as effective, those who believe its effectiveness is severely limited, and those who believe it is 
counterproductive. 
 
CSR is Effective for Improving Labour Conditions 
 
Many authors argue that CSR is an effective means of regulating offshore supply chains (Cashore et 
al., 2004, p. 4, in Bartley, 2007, p. 297-298). Proponents point to the theoretical advantages of 
market mechanisms over government regulation (Nadvi & Wältring, 2001, as cited in O'Rourke, 
2003, p. 4). Others back arguments with successful case studies. They also argue that CSR will 
inevitably spread as a result of market forces. This view, of the market and therefore CSR as ―the 
solution‖, is an unspoken assumption in management literature on CSR implementation (for 
instance, Andrew W. Savitz & Weber, 2006; Brammer et al., 2011). (This literature often refers to 
―ethical sourcing‖ and ―supply chain management‖ rather than CSR.) This pro-CSR view is also 
commonly held by businesses and business organisations (for instance, Business for Social 
Responsibility, 2002). This view puts faith in the market to deliver improved labour conditions. 
 
Many herald CSR for its speed, flexibility, sensitivitity to market circumstances and capacity for 
greater effectiveness than government regulation (Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 365-366; Nadvi & 
Wältring, 2001, as cited in O'Rourke, 2003, p. 4). Government enforcement of labour standards has 
its own shortcomings. Laws can be absent, standards unrealistic, and monitoring plagued by 
corruption or lack of resources for stringent checks. CSR can fill these gaps. Standards in codes of 
conduct can also be adjusted to a level realistic enough to promote improvements. While national 
laws necessarily set high standards, enforced through sanctions, these are not necessarily the most 
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effective means of encouraging improvements. High government standards may simply be ignored. 
The rectification periods offered by many CSR mechanisms may more effectively encourage 
improvements than do government sanctions, which can encourage suppliers to conceal problems. 
Furthermore, the economic clout of business partners may more effectively motivate improvements 
than the requirements of corrupt or incompetent officials (personal communication with social 
auditor, 2011). 
 
Advocates back up these principles with a variety of successful case studies. In the manufacturing 
industry, CSR initiatives have increased the frequency of factory inspections and reduced accidents 
(personal communication with social auditor, 2010),  improved worker health (Business for Social 
Responsibility, 2010a), helped establish factory health and safety committees (Association for 
Sustainable and Responsible Investment in Asia, 2002, p. 34) and in some cases reduced overtime 
and increased wages (Ramaswamy, 2005). Proponents use such cases to argue that CSR is 
successful. It should be noted that businesses often deny access for research on CSR due to 
commercial sensitivities and fear that findings will expose persisting violations. They usually grant 
access only when confident of a good report. However, in literature which assumes the potential 
effectiveness of CSR, any non-compliances that are reported are attributed to poor implementation, 
for instance, poorly-trained auditors. Problems are not depicted as a structural failure of CSR. Those 
who believe in CSR‘s effectiveness thus advocate putting energies into improving CSR 
methodology, in order to iron out these problems (Brammer et al., 2011, p. 50; Kortelainen, 2008). 
 
Proponents of CSR also argue that it is effective as a means of regulation broadly. They argue that 
the ―business case for CSR‖ will ensure its spread, as businesses seek to do good as a strategy for 
business success (Business for Social Responsibility, 2010b; Hart, 2005; Kemp, 2001; Savitz & 
Weber, 2006). The business case holds that CSR is good for profits, as it improves a business‘s 
reputation, manages risks, attracts customers and employees, and seizes opportunities for efficiency 
and position in socially-responsible markets (Holliday, Schmidheiny, & Watts, 2002; Porter & Van 
der Linde, 1995, in Utting 2005a, p. 379). Some further argue that CSR will lead to a ―race to the 
top‖, as businesses compete to ―ratchet up‖ labour standards (Auld, Bernstein, & Cashore, 2008, p. 
4; Sabel, Fung, & O'Rourke, 2000). In the view of advocates, CSR thus has potential to be a 
widespread, effective regulation method, if given time to develop in response to market pressures.  
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CSR is of Limited Effectiveness for Improving Labour Conditions 
 
Opponents argue there are inherent limits to the effectiveness of private regulation. While most 
critics acknowledge that CSR can bring some positive outcomes (Bulut & Lane, 2011; Chan, 2005; 
Prieto-Carron, 2006; Yu, 2008), many note that its spread and scope are fundamentally limited by 
its voluntary nature and reliance on market forces (Aaronson, 2007a; AMRC, 2006b; Chang, 2004; 
Doane, 2005; Haufler, 2001; Lipschutz & Fogel, 2002; O'Rourke, 2006; Pun, 2006, Clean Clothes 
Campaign, 2005). Buyers almost never share the costs of implementation, but instead demand 
compliance at the same time as lower prices. CSR therefore does not build capacity among 
suppliers incapable of improving conditions. Lack of transparency and inadequate auditing are 
named as further problems (AMRC, 2006a; Bhushan, Prieto-Carron, Lund-Thomsen, Chan, & 
Muro, 2006; Blackett, 2004; Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 370; O'Rourke, 2002; Pun, 2005a).  
 
In the view of these authors, CSR strategies, as market mechanisms, are highly vulnerable to market 
failures. Consumers are the primary actors to reward or sanction CSR behaviour, yet they have 
imperfect information, divided loyalties, few and simplistic options for action,
7
 and are likely to be 
fickle or apathetic. At the same time, companies face a fundamental conflict of interest, as their 
profitability is enhanced by extracting maximum value from their labour force (AMRC, 2006c; 
Blackett, 2004; Bulut & Lane, 2011; Pun, 2005a). In the view of these authors, the ―business case‖ 
for CSR therefore applies only in very limited cases. While to an extent higher labour standards are 
good for business, where they conflict with profitability, ethical principles are sacrificed (Doane, 
2005). In most circumstances, the weak consumer driver cannot overcome businesses‘ conflict of 
interest.  
 
In the area of supply-chain labour initiatives, the business case is particularly weak. While other 
forms of CSR (for instance recycling programmes) can be pursued for direct cost benefits, supply-
chain labour initiatives are more likely to be costly to firms. Any cost benefits that may arise from 
improved conditions, such as enhanced productivity from healthier workers, would likely be 
accrued by the offshore suppliers; not the foreign company buying from them. The business case 
for CSR therefore applies to supply-chain labour initiatives only insofar as initiatives preserve or 
improve reputation, or prevent other costs. 
                                                 
7
 Consumers can act only through boycotting products, or as citizens, pressuring for regulation. The numbers and types 
of sectors, companies and products able to be ―named and shamed‖ is very limited. Furthermore, businesses are 
inconsistent. How should consumers respond if a firm is doing well in one area, and poorly in another? (Utting, 2003, p.  
26). 
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These authors argue that market pressures can force supply-chain labour initiatives only in very 
select circumstances. CSR is more likely to be implemented where there is threat of government or 
international regulation, low economic competition, high probability of activist pressure, high asset 
specificity (business tied to a specific locale or production process, increasing the likelihood of 
long-term customers), high importance of reputation, high levels of information exchange and CSR 
consensus within the industry (Haufler, 2001, p. 3). A further factor is the economic clout of the 
foreign company over its suppliers, influenced by its relative size, its significance as a customer, 
and whether it sources directly (AMRC, 2005). To the extent that these factors align, social 
responsibility is more likely to be provided by the market. However, confluence of these factors is 
rare (Haufler, 2001, p. 3). Market pressures are thus insufficient to push CSR into all sectors and 
tiers of the supply chain (AMRC, 2006c; Blackett, 2004; Pun, 2005a; Yu, 2008, p. 296). They are 
also insufficient to push for consistent implementation, and deepened scope of CSR initiatives 
(Chang, 2004; Doane, 2005; O'Rourke, 2006).  
 
These limitations are seen in CSR‘s spread primarily to industries visible to consumers, for instance 
toys, apparel, sports equipment and electronics. The limitations are evident even within these 
industries, as businesses who implement CSR initiatives are undercut by those who do not. This 
appears to motivate some businesses to seek government regulation in order to create a ―level 
playing field‖. This may have been behind one unusual case in 1999, in which Levi Strauss and 
other US companies contacted the Chinese leadership, asking it to more strongly regulate labour 
standards (Emerson, 2000, as cited in Pun, 2006).  
 
Critics therefore argue that even while CSR may be improved in various ways, it remains 
structurally flawed. At best, CSR is merely one tool among many (Compa, 2008, p. 6; Haufler, 
2001, p. 121; Vogel, 2005, p. 3; Zarsky, 2002). These authors argue that CSR is an inadequate 
substitute for alternatives, and advocate stronger additional (or alternative) measures.  
 
The limited effectiveness of CSR can be seen by examining the role of private regulation in US 
labour history. In the early 19
th
 century, the ―White Label‖ served as a symbol around which the 
National Consumers League organised to win stronger legislation and enforcement (Boris, 2003, p. 
206). This labeling scheme was administered by the National Consumers League, and was given to 
manufacturers who passed inspections. By 1904, sixty factories had earned the label. However, the 
White Label was dropped in 1918 to prevent competition with collective bargaining. By this time 
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collective bargaining had won higher standards, and manufacturers‘ promotion of the label‘s lower 
standards was counterproductive (Boris, 2003, p. 208). In the 1930s, private regulation was again 
used. Tripartite boards formulated hundreds of codes of conduct, marking compliance with a ―Blue 
Eagle‖ symbol. However, despite state backing of this system, enforcement was sporadic. Unions 
and consumers instead pushed for (and won) the Fair Labour Standards Act (Boris, 2003, p. 211).  
 
As this history shows, private regulation was useful but insufficient for long-term progress on 
labour standards. The real progress came as a result of union, consumer and reformers‘ pressure for 
legislation and enforcement. Private regulation was one of many tools. These limitations of CSR 
occurred in a domestic context. In the context of transnational supply chains, where consumer 
pressure must be rallied in support of overseas (unseen) workers, and CSR mechanisms often lack 
government backing, the potential of CSR seems even more limited. 
 
Recent activity at the UN has also emphasised the limits of private regulation. The UN has made its 
own efforts to promote private regulation, with the development of the UN Global Compact, now 
the largest private business code (Vogel, 2010, p. 72). However, in 2008 the UN developed the 
voluntary Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework. This outlines three areas of responsibility: the 
State duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties, including business enterprises; the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights; and the need for victims to have greater access to 
remedy (United Nations Human Rights Council [UNHRC], 2009, 2011). In doing so, the 
Framework is the first international instrument to highlight the areas of state action necessary to 
regulate global supply chains. This new focus could be interpreted as a high-level recognition of the 
limits of private regulation. The Framework therefore provides a useful model for state action 
(discussed in Chapter Six). 
  
CSR is Counterproductive for Improving Labour Conditions 
 
To some critics, CSR is not only of limited effectiveness. Some view it as counterproductive, 
having the potential to undermine protection for workers. There are concerns that the CSR 
movement hinders unionisation (Compa, 2001; van Regenmortel, 2010) and divides NGOs 
supporting the labour movement (Jeffcott & Yanz, 2000; van Regenmortel, 2010). There are 
concerns that CSR can undermine local labour law enforcement (AMRC, 2011b; Bhushan et al., 
2006; Compa, 2008; Fuchs, 2005, p. 18; Justice, 2001, in O'Rourke, 2006) or even reduce the 
perceived need for government regulation (Braithwaite, 1993, p. 91 in Gunningham and Rees, 
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1997, p. 370; International Labour Organisation, 1998; Nadvi & Wältring, 2001). There are also 
concerns about the effect of the rise of private regulation on democratic governance (Bhushan et al., 
2006; Blackett, 2004; Chang, 2003, as cited in AMRC, 2005; Cutler, 1999, p. 301; Lipschutz & 
Rowe, 2005, p. 64; Pun, 2005a). Critics are further concerned that over-reliance on CSR may 
distract from necessary alternatives (Hui, 2011). 
 
While these problems may be unintentional side-effects of well-intentioned initiatives, not all 
authors see them this way. Some see CSR as a charade, a corporate strategy intended ―to deceive 
the public into believing in the responsibility of a[n] irresponsible industry‖ (Braithwaite, 1993, p. 
91, in Gunningham and Rees, 1997, p. 370). TNCs‘ rhetoric about labour conditions does indeed 
ring hollow, where they demand improvements, but make no contribution to resourcing them. Rowe 
argues that the primary motivation for CSR is ―to quell popular discontent and the political change 
that discontent might propel‖ (2005, p. 132). Many critics therefore suggest that the rise of CSR be 
opposed, to allow a focus on hard law or worker organising (Christian Aid, 2004, p. 14, in 
Lipschutz and Rowe, 2005, p. 166). Alternatively, critics argue that CSR should be implemented 
only under certain conditions, for instance high worker participation and acknowledgement of 
CSR‘s limitations (Compa, 2008, p. 6).  
 
The effectiveness of private regulation is thus highly contested. However, the CSR movement 
continues to grow, and many states are reluctant to pursue alternatives. Explanations for the 
continued focus on private regulation are necessary.  
 
The Emergence of CSR as a Method for Improving Labour Conditions 
 
The second key debate in this thesis is why CSR tends to emerge rather than alternatives. Numerous 
authors describe the context in which CSR has emerged. A common starting point is the trend 
towards globalised production and the complexity this has created in international supply chains 
(Bartley, 2007, p. 298; Cutler et al., 1999, p. 5-6; Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005, p. 25; Vogel, 2008, p. 
266). Alongside these developments has been the rise in power of corporations, to the point that 
they control resources and wield influence comparable to many states (Cutler et al., 1999, p. 5-6). 
States have proven unable (or unwilling) to regulate increasingly complex international supply 
chains, or to rein in the power of business (Cutler et al., 1999, p. 8-9; Vogel, 2008, p. 266). Multiple 
attempts to do so through international law have failed (Cutler, 1999, p. 295-297; Johns, 1993, p. 
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897; Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005, p. 32). It is in the context of this ―regulatory deficit‖ that private 
regulation has emerged (Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005, p. 162; Rowe, 2005, p. 25). 
 
Activists have made numerous attempts to close this regulatory gap. Societies have borne the 
negative externalities produced by unregulated business, such as damage to the health of workers 
and the environment. The resulting injustices have sparked a ―double movement‖ of activists 
seeking reactive protections (Polanyi, 1944). This social activism is itself increasingly globalised 
(Cutler et al., 1999, p. 15; Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005, p. 1). Many activists operate through 
―confrontational groups‖, non profit organisations that ―function as corporate watchdogs, blacklist 
‗irresponsible‘ corporations, arrange for public shaming campaigns, take corporations to court, and 
lobby for the taming of [TNCs] through national and transnational governance structures‖ (Shamir, 
2004, p. 647). These groups include some consumer groups, environmental and labour NGOs. 
Trade unions and tertiary institutions also play some ―confrontational roles‖ (such as lobbying, and 
monitoring corporate activities respectively). The confrontational groups and corresponding 
activism has provoked defensive reactions from businesses. Many depict CSR as one such reaction 
(Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 392; Klein, 2000, p. 430, in Lipschutz and Rowe, 2005, p. 148; 
Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005, p. 19; Potoski & Prakash, 2005 in Bartley, 2007, p. 299; Vogel, 2008, p. 
261). 
 
Authors also point to the influence of business norms around socially responsible production 
(Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 376-7; Haufler, 1999, p. 213; 2001). There has been a growing 
trend towards business responsibility for stakeholders (see, for instance, the literature on 
stakeholder capitalism: Allen, Carletti, & Marquez, 2009; Freeman, 1984; Freeman, Martin, & 
Parmar, 2007; Haufler, 1999, p. 201; Kelly & Gamble, 1997). Haufler (1999) argues that norms of 
eco-efficiency have influenced business behaviour even beyond those industries directly visible to 
consumers. The influence of social responsibility norms are also visible in the chemical, forestry 
and nuclear power sectors (Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 377). These norms are often spread by 
business-led sustainability organisations (BSOs): networks or councils of businesses which exist to 
promote business participation in sustainability discussions and practices. Many authors cite the 
growing social responsibility norms as influencing the emergence of CSR. 
 
A further factor cited is the neoliberal context and the corresponding shift from ―welfare‖ to 
―competition‖ states (Cutler, 1999, p. 299-300; Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 363). As states seek 
to maximise growth and competitive advantage by liberalising trade, ―costly‖ regulatory protections 
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are unpopular (Vogel, 2008, p. 264). In addition, business actors enjoy growing legitimacy in the 
eyes of policy-makers and the public (Cutler et al., 1999, p. 16; Hall & Biersteker, 2002; Vogel, 
2008, p. 265-6). In this context, market-based solutions are increasingly favoured (Bartley, 2003, 
2007; Haufler, 2001; Vogel, 2008, p. 263).  
 
While these factors are all likely to contribute, these descriptions do not explain the rise of private 
regulation over alternatives. A number of questions are unanswered: Why were pursuits of binding 
regulation unsuccessful? Why did business pursue CSR rather than alternatives as the means to 
defend its reputation?
8
 Why did those seeking competitiveness accept any form of regulation at all? 
The context described could have led to national and international regulation, purely symbolic 
commitments or even ad hoc or non-systematised efforts (Bartley, 2007, p. 298). Why private 
regulation emerged over alternatives demands explanation. 
 
Approaches to explaining the rise of private regulation for addressing supply-chain labour 
conditions can be loosely grouped into two categories (Cutler et al., 1999, p. 336; Keohane, 1988). 
The first category focuses on individual actors as the unit of analysis. These explanations attribute 
the rise of private regulation to the preferences and capabilities of individual actors (mainly firms) 
as they seek to increase competitive advantage. The second category of explanations focuses on 
deeper structures, and systemic or social factors. These approaches explain the rise of private 
regulation as a result of the political context, resulting power imbalances, and historical trends. The 
boundaries between these two categories are not absolute. Indeed, one explanation offered by Cutler 
et al (1999) bridges both.
9
 For this analysis, I outline two contending explanations which do fit 
within the category divisions above. The following explanations are based on the market-based and 
political approaches delineated by Bartley (2007). As I supplement Bartley‘s market-based 
approach with other authors, I use the title ―competitiveness approach‖ to distinguish it from his 
original work. Both approaches are necessary to explain the rise of private regulation. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 In the outlier case discussed above, Levi Strauss contacted the Chinese leadership, asking it to more strongly regulate 
labour standards (Emerson, 2000, as cited in Pun, 2006). 
9
 They offer ―power dynamics‖ as one explanation for the rise of private authority (of which private regulation is one 
element). As they show, power operates in two ways. Firms pursue private authority for the power benefits likely to 
result (a competitiveness explanation). Existing power also affects firms‘ ability to pursue private regulation (a political 
explanation). While interesting to consider separately, power dynamics play a significant role within both 
competitiveness and political approaches. I cover the contribution of power within the other explanations. 
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The Competitiveness Approach: Private Regulation as a Defence or Pursuit of Competitive 
Advantage 
 
A number of authors explain the emergence of private regulation as the result of actors seeking to 
maximise competitive advantage, either by reducing costs and uncertainty in the market or by 
proactively pursuing power or a favourable market position (Cutler et al., 1999; Gunningham & 
Rees, 1997; Potoski & Prakash, 2005; Spar, 1998; Spar & Yoffie, 2000 in Bartley, 2007, p. 299).
10
 
In the context described above, businesses face risks and uncertainties, all of which threaten their 
competitive position. They also face an opportunity to improve their power, and pursue market 
leadership. From the perspective of businesses, cooperation in private regulation schemes can bring 
collective benefits (Bartley, 2007, p. 299).  
 
In Bartley‘s market-based approach, businesses are the dominant actors, and the rise of CSR is seen 
as an inevitable market solution to the problem of the regulatory gap (Bartley, 2007). In this view, 
businesses have shaped an institutional response to preserve their reputations and market positions, 
and to minimise market disturbance from activist activity. (Firms‘ adoption of social responsibility 
norms, and the promotion of these by industry associations, can be seen as part of this strategy.) 
Private regulation is therefore a rational response to incentives, risks and uncertainties in the 
market. Other authors offer similar explanations. Cutler et. al (1999, p. 336) argue that private 
authority is pursued to reduce costs and uncertainty for private actors. Gunningham and Rees (1997, 
p. 380) note that the uncertainty created by activist pressure was influential in sparking private 
regulation in the forestry sector.  
 
An uncertainty for businesses that Bartley hints at, but does not elaborate upon, is the threat of costs 
of binding regulation. Several authors note that this threat increases businesses‘ willingness to 
pursue private regulation (Aalders, 1993, p. 75, in Gunningham and Rees, 1997, p. 401; Purchase, 
1996, p. 3, in Gunningham and Rees, 1997, p. 401; Rowe, 2005; Shamir, 2004). The risk of state 
action may have provoked private regulation in the wake of crises in the chemical and nuclear 
industries (Gunningham & Rees, 1997, p. 380; Vogel, 2008, p. 267). The modern CSR movement 
may even have been provoked by the threat of binding codes of conduct on TNCs sparked in the 
1970s (Rowe, 2005). Under certain circumstances, pursuit of binding regulation may be beneficial 
for competitive advantage. Businesses advanced in social responsibility may seek Government 
assistance to create a level playing field, to protect their competitive advantage being undercut by 
                                                 
10
 Cutler et al use the language of ―efficiency‖ rather than competitive advantage. 
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irresponsible competitors. (This may explain the Levi Strauss case mentioned in Note 8). 
Businesses may also pursue binding regulation for reputational benefits. However, these cases are 
rare. For most businesses, the costs of binding regulation would hinder competitive advantage, and 
is therefore to be avoided. In many cases, risk of regulation is low (Vogel, 2008, p. 268); yet, where 
this risk is present, firms pursuing CSR can be seen to be acting to minimise disturbance (and costs 
arising) from binding regulation. This is a useful addition to Bartley‘s approach. 
 
A further factor is firms‘ pursuit of private regulation for the anticipated benefit of increased power. 
Power is a significant benefit to competitive advantage. Cutler et al. argue that anticipated power 
benefits arising from private authority (of which private regulation is one element) is a more 
significant motivation than efficiency gains (ie. reduced costs) (1999, p. 338-44). Businesses may 
undertake CSR either to strengthen their power, or to defend it. Acknowledging the pursuit and 
defence of power further strengthens Bartley‘s market-based approach for explaining the rise of 
private regulation.  
 
A final addition is the proactive pursuit of market leadership. Businesses‘ pursuit of competitive 
advantage can be proactive as well as defensive, as businesses undertake CSR to position 
themselves favourably in social responsibility markets. With these additions I refer to this 
explanation as the competitiveness approach.  
 
It is important to note the role of the business case for CSR in underpinning the competitiveness 
approach. Despite the dubious connections between CSR and profits, the business case is widely 
promulgated (De Schutter, 2008, p. 217; Shamir, 2011, p. 329). To the extent that CSR is perceived 
as profitable (and social irresponsibility perceived as costly), it is an easy assumption that CSR will 
inevitably arise due to market forces. The competitiveness approach appears compelling. 
 
Despite Bartley‘s focus on firms, the competitiveness approach could also be seen to explain 
promotion of private regulation by states. Many authors attribute states‘ pursuit of private 
regulation to their desire to reduce costs of state regulation and enforcement, reduce burdens on 
business, and thereby increase national competitiveness (Abbott & Snidal, 2000, in Vogel, 2008, p. 
264; Morth, 2004, in Vogel, 2008, p. 264; Shelton, 2000, in Vogel, 2008, p. 264). It is also possible 
that states may promote private regulation in order to gain power in international fora which favour 
liberalised trade. To this extent, the competitiveness approach appears to explain states‘ promotion 
of private regulation.  
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However, the competitiveness approach is inadequate to explain states‘ behaviour. That the state 
should be seen as a ―market actor‖ that pursues competitiveness is only one perspective on the role 
of the state. This concept of the state stems from neoliberal ideology, and the dominance of this 
perspective itself demands explanation. Indeed, at other times states‘ have pursued binding 
regulation (discussed below). Competitiveness explanations alone are therefore shallow for 
explaining the behavior of states. I therefore address the role of states in promoting private 
regulation in the political approach below. 
 
      Explanatory Power of the Competitiveness Approach 
 
The competitiveness approach goes some way to explaining the rise of CSR. It explains the 
hardening of CSR initiatives towards certification and MSIs, as businesses, seeking to maximise 
competitiveness, respond to increasing demand for social responsibility and compete for reputation, 
legitimacy and dominance in socially responsible markets. It also explains the general absence of  
CSR outside of sectors visible to consumers. The addition of other motivations, businesses‘ desire 
(in most circumstances) to avoid regulation costs, and their proactive pursuit of power and market 
position, gives the approach further strength at explaining the emergence of CSR.  
 
However, the approach fails to take into account the political context, or provide reasons for the 
influence of business actors. The approach does not explain the level of demand for social 
responsibility (the power of civil society actors). Businesses are not the only actors of relevance in 
discussions of CSR, yet this approach is silent on the actors seeking alternative routes. It does not 
explain why stronger requirements have not been imposed on business. To comprehensively explain 
the rise of CSR, these other factors must also be considered.  
 
The Political Approach: Private Regulation as a Settlement Between Competing Actors 
 
Bartley‘s political approach interprets the rise of private regulation as a settlement of conflicts 
between competing actors, in light of their differing degrees of power in the neoliberal context 
(Bartley, 2007; Dezalay & Garth, 2002). Other authors offer similar explanations. Utting depicts 
CSR as a ―compromise‖ between different groups (2005b, p. 23). Shamir (2004) describes CSR‘s 
rise in light of the power of business vis-a-vis other actors.  
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The political approach takes into account the strategic negotiation of governments and NGOs, as 
well as firms. While activists vie for strong regulation, businesses tend to favour weaker regulation. 
Private regulation schemes therefore represent a compromise between the preferences of these 
actors. However the settlement is not the result of a ―contest among equals‖ (Bartley, 2007, p. 301). 
Rather, the outcome has been shaped by the power of capital, the inability and unwillingness of 
governments to legislate binding standards, and the relative weakness of NGOs. These power 
imbalances have been shaped by the political context.  
 
      Neoliberalism and its Consequences: Redistribution of Power 
 
The context of neoliberalism provides an important backdrop for understanding political 
explanations. A central assumption of neoliberal ideology is that ―free trade‖ and self-regulating 
markets are the best means to determine the allocation of resources; capital accumulation should 
maximise growth, and the benefits eventually trickle down. The state‘s role is to create the ideal 
conditions for the accumulation of capital, by providing only the minimal requirements for the free 
functioning of the market (Harvey, 2007, p. 2). Otherwise, the state should intervene as little as 
possible.  
 
Some analysts have emphasised the difference between this ideology, ―packaged‖ for public 
consumption, and the frequently more active role of the state under neoliberal regimes. This has 
been conceptualised variously as ―roll-back‖ and ―roll-out‖ movements (Peck & Tickell, 2002). Not 
only is the state simply being rolled back, it has been transformed in its goals and methods to 
become a ―competition state‖ (Cerny, 1997). Competition states aim to reconfigure internal 
institutions to maximise involvement in trade, and to ―improve their own competitive position as an 
entity vis-a-vis other states in the global market‖ (Harvey, 2007, p. 65). For instance, states actively 
establish and defend property rights, protect free competition and in other ways craft the state to 
prioritise the full functioning of the market. 
 
Government withdrawal from many activities is an important aspect of this state reconfiguration. 
Since the 1970s, many governments have repealed regulations that impede capital mobility, actively 
undermined trade unions, environmental regulation and other barriers to capital accumulation, and 
reduced or privatised welfare and service provision, leaving these roles to be provided ―more 
efficiently‖ by the market. Liberalisation of capital mobility and international trade has been 
constitutionalised via international agreements in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
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requirements of institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. This limits the options 
available to governments. 
  
Neoliberalisation thus serves to ―dis-embed‖ the market from regulation and institutions 
constraining them to provide social and environmental protections. The promise of neoliberalism is 
that a free-functioning market will most efficiently provide (and maximise) these social goods. This 
has often failed (George, 1999; Harvey, 2007, p. 17-25).
11
 Nevertheless, for reasons that will be 
discussed, the ideology has grown to become ―hegemonic as a mode of discourse‖ (Harvey, 2007, 
p. 3). 
 
The primary consequence of neoliberalism (or perhaps its primary goal [Harvey, 2007, p. 201]) has 
been a marked redistribution of power to those who own and control capital (Dumenil & Levy, 
2001, in Harvey, 2007, p. 16; George, 1999). This has resulted in concentrations of wealth and 
power on a scale last seen in the 1920s (Harvey, 2007, p. 119). Neoliberalism has also meant a 
redistribution of wealth and power to businesses, which exist as vehicles for capital accumulation. 
Privatisation allows wealth to be accumulated in the private sector. Heightened competition 
prompts states to provide improved conditions for capital accumulation. In a deregulated 
environment, businesses relocate with minimal obstacles. 
 
The resulting power of business is used to perpetuate conditions that further entrench their power 
(Harvey, 2007, p. 72; Peck & Tickell, 2002, p. 392). This occurs in three ways (Fuchs, 2005; Fuchs 
& Lederer, 2008). First, growing resources and access to policy-makers have increased the ability 
of business to lobby and campaign to influence policy output (instrumental power). Second, 
business has gained power in agenda and rule setting (structural power). This occurs through 
passive ―exit power‖ as regions compete for the investment and jobs businesses offer (Cox, 1987, in 
Fuchs, 2005, p. 6). This competition can cause a ―race to the bottom‖ on environmental and social 
standards, as regulations that would hamper competitiveness are removed or forgone. Business has 
also gained avenues to actively contribute to agenda- and rule-setting, seen in rising involvement in 
policy discussions, public-private partnerships and self-regulation (Fuchs, 2005, p. 20).  
 
                                                 
11
 Rising inequality has been a feature of neoliberalisation in nearly every case, as poor majorities have received meagre 
improvements, or have been adversely affected (Harvey, 2007, p. 17).  For instance, during the 1980s, while the top one 
percent of US families increased their income by 50 percent, the bottom 10 percent lost 15 percent of already meagre 
incomes (George, 1999). Real wages in the US have declined since 1990 despite rising gross domestic product, 
reflecting increasing accumulation of wealth in the top strata (Harvey, 2007, p. 25).  
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Third, business has also grown in its ability to influence societal norms by constructing the 
discourses that undergird them (discursive power) (Fuchs & Lederer, 2008, p. 8). The perceived 
legitimacy of business actors has grown with the belief in decentralised governance and the ability 
of market actors to solve complex problems. Business investment in the research sector and 
involvement in public debate and social marketing has also built this legitimacy. As a result, 
legislators increasingly seek their expertise (Cutler et al., 1999, p. 16; Fuchs, 2005, p. 22-23; Vogel, 
2008, p. 265-6). From this base, business actors have been increasingly capable of influencing 
discourses in their own favour. There have been rising numbers of business statements on policy 
issues, media campaigns, business-funded conferences, research institutes, and even business-
established NGOs, designed to influence public opinion towards policies favourable to business 
(Fuchs, 2005, p. 31). Given the competitive advantage of the business sector in resources and 
channels for influence (Fuchs & Lederer, 2008, p. 11; Harvey, 2007, p. 3), the business sector is 
more able than ever to influence what is discussed, and what is said about it. All these channels are 
used to tout the benefits of neoliberalism, control policy in this direction, and discredit opposing 
voices (Harvey, 2007, p. 113, 156).  
 
According to the political approach, these elements of the political context are essential for 
understanding the rise of CSR over alternatives. While businesses, civil society actors and states all 
vie for different outcomes with regard to labour regulation, the resulting ―settlement‖ is determined 
by their relative power and constraints in the political environment.  
 
      Impacts of the Political Context: Constraints on National Policy-Makers 
 
The hegemony of neoliberalism and rise of business power have created legal or quasi-legal and de 
facto constraints on policy-makers that limit their options to protect workers and the environment.  
The crystallisation of neoliberal discourses in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
and in subsequent agreements of the WTO prohibits states from enacting binding regulations that 
would act as trade barriers. Apart from situations listed in Article XX of the GATT (General 
Exceptions), WTO member states are prohibited from discriminating between trading partners or 
erecting trade barriers, even to protect workers or the environment.
12
 In one case in 1992, Austria 
was forced to revise a law banning imports of non-sustainable timber, after timber-exporting 
                                                 
12
 Article XX allows states to enact measures ―necessary to protect public morals... to protect human, animal or plant 
life or health...relating to the products of prison labour‖ or ―relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources‖ (GATT, 1947).  
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countries threatened to challenge it as a trade barrier under GATT rules (Bartley, 2003, p. 447).
13
 
Austria instead funded private regulation, which avoided the constraints.  
 
States also face de facto constraints: a drive for economic competitiveness, a climate favouring 
liberalised markets, and a growing corporate lobby. At a national level, the drive to become 
competition states makes states unwilling to impose even regulation allowable under WTO rules, as 
this might harm their competitiveness and cause capital flight to states which do not implement 
such protections. Widespread belief in neoliberal ideology, and a corporate lobby opposing 
regulation add to this unwillingness. The pursuit of competitiveness deters developing states from 
enacting and enforcing basic protections. It also deters developed states from mandating that their 
businesses operate in a socially-responsible manner overseas. 
 
      Constraints on Social Movements: Failed Attempts to Impose International Regulation 
 
The hegemony of neoliberalism and rise of business power have also blocked social movements‘ 
attempts to fill the regulatory gap at the international level. In high points of backlash against 
economic globalisation (1970s and 1990s), social movements have called for binding international 
labour standards, the inclusion of labour standards in international institutions, and enforceable 
―social clauses‖ in bilateral agreements (Bartley, 2003; Haufler, 2001; Johns, 1993, in Cutler, 1999, 
p. 295-7; Lipschutz & Rowe, 2005, p. 32). It should be noted that these efforts have been motivated 
by dual agendas, the humanitarian imperative and the desire to protect industries in developed 
states. From the perspective of developed states, developing countries that undermine labour and 
environmental conditions receive an unfair competitive advantage. To remedy this perceived 
―distortion of trade‖, developed states have at times sought avenues to require standards of trading 
partners (Aaronson, 2007b, p. 28). 
 
Since the 1970s, there have been attempts through numerous international institutions to develop 
legally-binding codes of global business conduct, including clauses on working conditions. 
Attempts to regulate TNCs have been made in the UN Economic and Social Council, the European 
Union (EU), the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Labour Organisation (ILO), 
the World Bank, the OECD, the UN Conference on Trade and Development, the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organisation, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), and the 
Japanese business council, among others (Johns, 1993:897, in Cutler, 1999, p. 297; Vogel, 2008, p. 
                                                 
13
 Australia is currently debating a similar bill.  
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267). However, these efforts have been opposed both by business sectors and by developing states 
who argue that binding standards constitute harmful trade barriers. While many declarations and 
guidelines have been produced (for instance the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning 
Multinational Enterprises, 1977, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 1976), 
they have fallen short of enforceable instruments. (While the OECD Guidelines have been updated 
to include an enforcement mechanism, this provides only for a consultation process, and is thus 
ultimately non-binding.)  
 
In the most recent example, the UN attempted to create a binding code of conduct for TNCs, known 
as the UN Norms on the Responsibilities of TNCs and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to 
Human Rights (UN Economic and Social Council, 2003). However, the 1999 draft met strong 
opposition. The proposed sanctions for non-compliance were opposed on the grounds that existing 
voluntary mechanisms were sufficient (Utting, 2005b, p. 16). The UN was diverted from this 
strategy and instead hired a Special Representative, John Ruggie, who proposed the Protect, 
Respect and Remedy framework, another voluntary instrument. 
 
Attempts through the ILO provide a further example of the barriers to creating enforceable labour 
standards. A 1996 attempt to push the ILO to administer a social labeling system was opposed as a 
breach of WTO rules and eventually rejected (Bartley, 2003, p. 450). The ILO has developed non-
binding international conventions on numerous areas of labour conditions, most notably, the 1998 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Aaronson, 2007b, p. 28; Alston, 2004). While these 
conventions are helpful for norm-setting, there are no real sanctions even for serious breach. 
According to the American Federation of Labour and Congress of Industrial Organisations, the 
ILO‘s ―efforts to remedy even the most blatant violations of workers‘ rights [have been] isolated 
and ineffective‖ (as cited in Alston, 2004, p. 496). 
 
There have also been efforts to incorporate labour standards into international trade institutions, and 
to reduce the constraints on national policy-makers. From as early as 1948 the US, Canada and 
European countries have sought to incorporate labour standards into GATT (Aaronson, 2007b, p. 
28). In the 1990s, the US and French Governments again pushed for social clauses to be 
incorporated (Aaronson & Zimmerman, 2008, p. 16; Bartley, 2003, p. 450; Nadvi & Wältring, 
2001, p. 22). These efforts were unsuccessful. A 2002 suggestion by the WTO Director General 
himself that a code of conduct be linked to WTO agreements was rejected (Aaronson, 2007a, p. 3). 
So too was an attempt to incorporate social responsibilities into an international investment 
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agreement (Aaronson, 2007a, p. 3, 10). While at times labour standards have been required as 
conditions of WTO accession (Aaronson, 2007b, p. 13-15), attempts to impose ongoing 
environmental or labour standards on WTO members have failed. Developing countries have 
argued that such ―trade barriers‖ are inappropriate in institutions designed to facilitate trade 
(Aaronson, 2007b, p. 25; Aaronson & Rioux, 2008, p. 2; Alston, 2004, p. 472-5). These voices have 
consistently won. To date, international trade institutions have no mandate to promote labour 
standards. Social concerns have been left to the ILO despite its inability to enforce standards.  
 
Attempts to allow trade discrimination on social and environmental grounds also meet strong 
opposition, though states continue to test these boundaries. For instance, Australia is currently 
debating a ban on imports, similar to the Austrian law that was challenged under WTO rules and 
eventually overturned. Some states have explored national social labels. However, the threat of 
challenge under WTO rules remains a constraint.  
 
States have achieved some success at incorporating social clauses in regional and bilateral 
agreements (Aaronson & Rioux, 2008, p. 2). Since the 1990s, labour and environmental agreements 
have been signed alongside the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Central 
American Free Trade Agreement, and agreements between the US and Singapore; Jordan and 
Chile; Canada, Chile and Costa Rica; and New Zealand and China, among others (Alston, 2004, p. 
499; Greven, 2005). (It is important to note that some recent free trade agreements, such as that 
between the US and Vietnam, have no such provisions [Greven, 2005, p. 31]). Some labour 
agreements include sanctions, such as fines, mediation or trade sanctions (Greven, 2005, p. 25, 29). 
  
While these labour agreements are a positive step (and reflection of the strength of domestic labour 
movements), they are widely criticised for having next to no impact in improving labour conditions 
(Alston, 2004, p. 500; Greven, 2005, p. 36). Many agreements merely formalise cooperation. Those 
that do include enforcement provisions are limited by vague language, a high threshold before 
complaints are considered and the reluctance of participating governments to create diplomatic 
frictions (Greven, 2005, p. 27, 36). In most agreements, labour issues are less enforceable than 
commercial disputes. Existing sanctions therefore bring few tangible benefits for workers. For 
instance, in the first nine years of the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation, the side 
agreement to NAFTA, only 25 complaints were filed, and none led to fines or sanctions (Alston, 
2004, p. 501). Even these weak instruments are opposed within developed states from quarters 
promoting liberalised trade.  
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As suggested by the political approach, the political context is thus a vital background to 
understanding the emergence of CSR. While numerous social movements have pressed for 
enforceable instruments, they have failed to overcome business opposition, states‘ reluctance (and 
inability) to impose trade barriers, and pervasive belief in the effectiveness of market mechanisms. 
A settlement at binding regulation has not been achieved. Instead, the ruling consensus persists that 
the social good is maximised through liberalised trade (―dis-embedding‖ markets from social 
concerns), not through protecting vulnerable interests. It is in light of these failed attempts that 
states and NGOs have increasingly turned to private regulation initiatives.  
 
      The Influence of Business Power 
 
The power of business toads to the constraints on states and social movements.  Businesses have 
used every aspect of their power to reduce the costs arising from confrontational groups‘ pressure. 
Lobbying power has been used not only to oppose binding regulation directly, but also to tout 
CSR‘s effectiveness in order to prevent future attempts. In one example, relative lobbying power 
allowed business actors to frame the EU social responsibility agenda so that it promoted private 
regulation rather than any form of public enforcement (Shamir, 2011, p. 324). 
 
 
Business has also deterred binding regulation by mobilising to control the agenda and discourses of 
the CSR movement (Utting, 2005a, p. 375). Business first positions itself as expert in social 
responsibility and establishes legitimacy to govern itself. From this platform it promotes discourses 
touting the effectiveness of self-regulation (Utting, 2005a, p. 380; 2005b, p. 14). The channels of 
this discursive power are numerous. CSR conferences position business actors as social 
responsibility ―experts‖, and publicise successful case studies. Social marketing promotes business 
as caring and capable. Cooperation with NGOs increases the legitimacy of self-regulation 
initiatives, and co-opts many groups to promote CSR. Proliferating CSR classes and education 
institutions promote the business case. There has even been the emergence of NGOs set up by 
business, which specialise in defending the voluntary approach (Utting, 2005a, p. 378). Gramscian 
understandings of power help to explain this activity: business is creating consensus around its own 
version of CSR (Utting, 2005a, p. 380; 2005b, p. 14). This version touts CSR‘s effectiveness and its 
inevitable growth under market pressures.
14
  
                                                 
14
 It should be noted that these activities contribute to the perceived explanatory power of the market-based approach. 
As the business sector promotes CSR as effective for improving labour conditions, and also good business strategy, it 
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The strength of this consensus has reduced the perceived need for binding regulation. Governments 
and the wider public believe social marketing and popular research, and are won over by a 
preponderance of positive case studies. In particular, the spread of the business case for CSR has 
been a crucial element in resisting regulation. So long as there is widespread belief that market 
forces will encourage the spread of CSR, there is the perception that states need not regulate 
(Shamir, 2011, p. 331). CSR has ―won the battle for ideas‖ (AMRC, 2011b).  
 
Nevertheless, the continued pressure from social movements has prevented a settlement at even 
weaker efforts (Bartley, 2003, p. 446), and requires more action from businesses than they would 
prefer. At times, NGOs have had victories vis-a-vis business power and the balance of power has 
tipped to allow enactment and use of binding measures. In 1996, activists for the first time applied 
existing legislation in the US to hold a TNC to account for a violation of international human rights, 
starting a raft of similar litigation (Shamir, 2011, p. 320). In 2003, the WTO banned trade in 
conflict diamonds, despite this violating GATT rules (Aaronson, 2007a, p. 3, 25; Woody, 2006, p. 
336). Pressure from social movements has at times led to social clauses accompanying free trade 
agreements, as described above. Even within the spectrum of private regulation, business actors 
have been pressured towards harder measures (Utting, 2005b, p. 15). As NGOs continue to 
challenge the inadequacy of firms‘ efforts, this settling point continues to be contested.  
 
      Explanatory Power of the Political Approach 
 
The approach to the rise of CSR as a political settlement thus has strong explanatory power. The 
lack of binding regulation can be explained by de jure and de facto constraints on policy-makers at 
the national level. It can also be explained by the failure of attempts at the international level due to 
social movements‘ and states‘ relative weakness vis-a-vis the business sector. Private regulation has 
emerged as a compromise between those seeking binding regulation (for humanitarian or 
protectionist goals) and those seeking to avoid it.  
 
This view also demonstrates that the emergence of private regulation is not inevitable. Indeed, at 
times, the balance of power has tipped to allow enactment and use of binding or harder measures. 
This indicates that power imbalances can be altered to create alternative settlements. In light of this, 
the question is not only what mix of public and private regulation would enable the best governance 
                                                                                                                                                                  
appears more compelling that businesses will pursue it for competitive advantage. It therefore seems natural that CSR 
will arise as a result of market pressures. 
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(Vogel, 2008, p. 276), but in a neoliberal context, how can power structures be altered to enable 
pursuit of this ―best mix‖ for labour standards? Without this restructuring, is it the goal of 
advancing social goods, or the goal of retrenching business power that determines the mix of public 
and private regulation that eventuates? These debates inform what it would take for trading partners 
to contribute to improving labour conditions in developing countries.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a broad background in which to view the issue of private regulation for 
improving labour conditions in developing countries. The rise of private regulation, and CSR in 
particular, are an important backdrop to the emergence of supply-chain labour initiatives. In the 
case study of New Zealand, the CSR movement has historically focused on environmental issues, 
and businesses have only recently turned to supply chain labour initiatives. These remain poorly 
developed. It is also relevant to consider the arguments of pro-sweatshop authors, who contend that 
any action on labour conditions is detrimental to workers. These arguments do not withstand 
scrutiny. 
 
Two debates on private regulation—its effectiveness for improving labour conditions, and reasons 
for its emergence— shed significant light on its use as a means of regulation. While advocates of 
CSR argue it can effectively improve supply-chain labour conditions, critics argue it is 
fundamentally limited due to its reliance on market forces. Some even argue CSR has the potential 
to bring harmful effects. The first explanation for the emergence of CSR, the competitiveness 
approach, attributes the rise of CSR to businesses‘ pursuit or defence of competitive advantage. The 
political approach provides a more holistic view, explaining CSR‘s emergence as a result of power 
imbalances and constraints in the political context. Before using the case study of China to explore 
the debates on the effectiveness of CSR, and examining the New Zealand case to analyse reasons 
for its emergence, it is necessary to explore the current labour conditions in China and the factors 
that contribute to them. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Labour Conditions in China 
 
Two contrasting incidents of labour unrest in 2010 demonstrate divergent prospects for improving 
labour conditions in China‘s export manufacturing plants. The first was the Foxconn suicides and 
attempted suicides described in Chapter One. The suicides provided a focal point around which 
international media exposed the low wages, harsh discipline, excessive overtime and lack of 
independent union representation at Foxconn, but also pervasive throughout China‘s manufacturing 
industry. To quell the outrage, Foxconn offered wage increases, among a range of other measures. 
However, soon after, Foxconn began moving substantial parts of its production to inland provinces, 
where wages are 30 percent lower than those in Shenzhen (Li, Zhang, & Li, 2010). The systematic 
problems which contributed to the suicides were not addressed. Foxconn continues to attract a 
steady flow of migrant workers, and provincial governments vie for its investment (Chan & Pun, 
2010, p. 17).   
 
The second was a series of automobile industry strikes. From May 17, a wave of strikes broke out at 
automobile plants in Guangdong, sparked by an initial strike at one Honda parts factory in Foshan 
(AMRC, 2010b, p. 5; China Labour News Translations, 2010b). More than 1500 workers at this 
factory led a two-week strike for higher and fairer wages. Highly unusually, they also demanded 
democratic union elections, and the reinstatement of the two initial strike organisers, who were fired 
five days into the strike (Globalisation Monitor, 2010, p. 22). Initially, the trade union tried to 
coerce the strikers back to work. However, when they refused to back down, even after being 
attacked by thugs wearing trade union uniforms, the Government urged the workers and 
management to undertake collective bargaining (AMRC, 2010b, p. 5-6). These negotiations 
eventually won the workers substantial wage increases, as well as other concessions. The workers 
were later granted a democratic election of their enterprise trade union, which has since negotiated 
further wage increases (International Trade Union Confederation [ITUC] Hong Kong Liaison 
Office, 2011). 
 
Both of these cases demonstrate worker dissatisfaction with conditions in China‘s export 
manufacturing plants. The outcomes demonstrate the sources of both discouragement and hope for 
the improvement of labour conditions in China. The Foxconn suicides can be interpreted as the 
ultimate act of submission, as the workers‘ actions could not be further from challenging capital by 
asserting their rights.
15
 The company took only token steps to address the problems. A 2012 survey 
                                                 
15
 The suicides have also been interpreted as the ultimate act of protest: a permanent withdrawal of their labour (Chan & 
Pun 2010). 
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of 35,000 Foxconn workers nearly half reported working 11 days without a break, and nearly two 
thirds considered their salaries too low to live on (Fair Labour Association, 2012b, p. 8-9). In 
contrast, through collective action, Honda workers were able to demand significant improvements. 
While such cases remain in the minority, they offer proof that organisation of workers provides 
hope for advancing labour rights in China.  
  
Building on the themes raised in these cases, this chapter will give an overview of labour conditions 
in China, and the pressures causing them to improve, deteriorate or remain entrenched. I first look 
at different aspects of labour conditions in turn, to address the questions: What are labour 
conditions currently like in the Chinese factories producing for New Zealand supply chains? To 
what extent are the true costs of production externalised? This will establish the need for action on 
labour conditions. I then discuss four factors affecting the improvement of labour conditions: the 
labour supply, economic pressures, political barriers to workers‘ representation, and the 
development of the labour movement. All these factors must be considered in any response from 
trading partners.  
 
Current Labour Conditions in China  
 
There is wide variety in working conditions in Chinese factories. Standards vary with workplace 
size, sector, region and the nationality of ownership and management. In many large, foreign-
invested or state-owned factories, wages are above legal minimums and conditions appear 
comparable with counterparts in industrialised nations. However, further down supply chains, poor 
conditions are prevalent and have drawn international criticism (see for instance Alston, 2004, p. 
474). The focus of this chapter are conditions faced by migrant workers, predominantly those in 
export manufacturing plants making consumer products. Migrant workers form the bulk of China‘s 
manufacturing workforce, 68 percent in 2006 (China Labour Bulletin, 2008).  
 
China‘s Migrant Workers  
 
A number of factors make China‘s migrant workers particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Migrant 
workers number at least 130 million (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 23),
16
 and are characterised 
by their youth and transience. Most migrate in their mid-late twenties, then after three to five years, 
return home to marry (Pun, 2005b, p. 5, 48). The vast majority have low levels of education. In 
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 CLB puts the figure at 130 million, or over 200 million if migrants employed in towns closer to home are included. 
Other authors estimate 140 million (O‘Rourke & Brown, 2003) or 200 million (Pun & Lu, 2010).  
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2006, only 10 percent had received education beyond middle school (China Labour Bulletin, 2008). 
Migrant workers also face language barriers, as China has hundreds of regional dialects in addition 
to the national language Mandarin.  
 
Migrants suffer institutionalised discrimination as a result of the hukou system, under which they 
are excluded from enjoying welfare benefits in their region of work, and are subject to considerable 
control. The hukou is China‘s system of household registration, used to control internal migration. 
The system has been likened to the ―pass‖ system in South Africa under apartheid, though with a 
markedly different ideology (Chan, 2003, p. 5-6; Smith, 2003, p. 341-2; Solinger, 1999). Migrants 
from rural areas have a rural hukou and thus can only reside in cities by obtaining a temporary 
residence permit (Smith, 2003, p. 342). Without the relevant urban hukou, migrants cannot access 
subsidised healthcare or other benefits and cannot settle in the cities (Amnesty International, 2007; 
Pun & Lu, 2010, p. 499).
17
 Migrants are thus second-class citizens in their regions of work, and 
often face abuse. Under the guise of enforcing the hukou system, arbitrary beatings, fines and 
detentions of migrants at the hands of police have been noted to be a regular occurrence in 
Guangdong (Chan, 2003, p. 9).  
 
In China‘s industrial heartland, workers on temporary residence permits can vastly outnumber 
permanent residents. In 2002 in Guangdong, only 19 percent of the population were permanent 
residents (Smith, 2003, p. 342). Yet workers on temporary permits can stay only while their labour 
is valued (Pun, 2005b, p. 46). Migrants unable to work due to injury or sickness may not have their 
permits renewed (Chan, 2003, p. 6). The granting or withholding of residence permits allows 
officials to control the supply of labour to any region. While the extent of this control varies 
between regions, the system can have significant impacts on working conditions (Chan, 2003, p. 6). 
Bulut and Lane argue that the hukou turns the population into a ―reserve army of labour‖ (2011, p. 
48), a labour force that is readily exploitable. 
 
Wages 
 
While average wages have risen in China, wage levels of the most vulnerable workers have not 
necessarily followed this trend. Regional minimum wages were instituted in the 1990s and have 
generally risen every two years to keep pace with inflation and rising average wages (Chan, 2002; 
China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 10). Several scholars use official statistics to show that migrants‘ 
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 Reforms have enabled a ―‗blue hukou‖‘ which provides more benefits, but this comes at a high fee and applies only 
in specific regions (Smith, 2003, p. 342). 
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wages have risen along with these trends. Banister and Cook note a steady real rise in compensation 
in urban manufacturing units between 2002 and 2008 (2011, p. 45). A study by Knight, Deng and 
Li (2010) found that real migrant wages increased annually from 2006 to 2009. Zhao and Wu, using 
data from the Ministry of Agriculture‘s rural household survey, found migrant workers‘ average 
wages to increase 3.9 percent annually in real terms between 2003 and 2006 (Zhao & Wu 2007, as 
cited in Knight et al., 2010, p. 13).  
 
However, official data do not necessarily reflect what workers actually receive. Other scholars 
contend that migrants‘ real wages have remained stagnant or even declined (Chan, 2003, 2005; 
China Labour Bulletin, 2009b). Chan reports that migrant workers‘ incomes progressively fell in 
real terms during the 1990s to early-2000s period, as minimum wage increases failed to keep pace 
with rising living expenses (Chan, 2003, p. 41-49; 2005, p. 2). In 2004 the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Security reported that migrants‘ wages in the Pearl River Delta had increased only 68 yuan 
in 12 years, far outpaced by rising living costs (as cited in Chan, 2005, p. 2). Another study found 
that real wages for uneducated migrants declined over the period 2001-2005 in Shanghai, Fuzhou, 
Wuhan, Shenyang and Xian (Du & Pan, 2009, as cited in Knight et al., 2010, p. 12). Two studies of 
small numbers of workers in Guangdong found wages to have barely increased (Chen and Feng, 
2008, as cited in China Labour Bulletin, 2009b, p. 29; Meng & Bai, 2007, as cited in Knight et al., 
2010, p. 7). These findings suggest that despite China‘s rapid economic growth, migrant workers in 
many regions face increasing hardship.   
 
Low wages remain among the highest sources of unrest among migrant workers (AMRC, 2005). In 
2011, the minimum wage in many parts of Guangdong was 850 yuan per month, equating to 
$NZ160 per month or well under NZ$1 per hour (Fair Wage Network, 2011). Minimum wages are 
well below a living wage, and insufficient to support a worker without overtime (China Labour 
Bulletin, 2009b; SACOM, 2010c, p. 7). Many workers fail to receive even the legal minimums, as 
piece-rate systems, fines and deductions reduce already-meagre incomes. A 2006 study found that 
the majority of migrant workers fail to receive minimum wages (ICFTU, 2006, as cited in Bulut & 
Lane, 2011, p. 48). Overtime is frequently not adequately compensated. One survey by the 
Guangdong trade union found that 35 percent of workers were not paid proper overtime wages 
(Harney, 2008, p. 49). 
 
Non-payment of wages is also a serious problem, responsible for nearly half of labour disputes in 
some provinces (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 14). In recent years, the practice has become so 
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prevalent that it is regarded as ―normal‖ (Chan, 2004a). Factory closures also end with unpaid 
wages, as companies can easily default by closing one factory and opening another (Chan, 2011, p. 
3). High levels of unpaid wages and the frequency of related disputes have forced the Government 
to intervene. For instance, in 2008 labour departments helped 6.98 million workers recover 8.33 
billion yuan in back pay (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 15). Anecdotal evidence indicates these 
interventions may have improved the situation (Chan, 2011, p. 46). 
 
In addition to low absolute incomes, workers are well aware that the income gap is growing in 
China (Pun & Lu, 2010, p. 493). Wages have declined as a proportion of GDP (AMRC, 2010a, p. 
3). Average migrant workers‘ wages have also declined in relation to average incomes (Knight et 
al., 2010, p. 14). Despite a Government directive that minimum wages be pegged between 40 and 
60 percent of average wages, most regions‘ minimum wages are well below this threshold (Chan, 
2003, p. 3; 2004b). In Beijing and Shanghai, the minimum wage in 2006 was approximately 20 
percent of the average wage (China Labour Bulletin, 2009b, p. 29). In many provinces, the 
proportion of minimum to average wages is declining (Chan, 2003, p. 3). This indicates that 
workers, particularly migrants and those on minimum wages, are receiving a declining share of the 
benefits of economic growth. 
 
Occupational Safety and Health (OSH)  
 
China has been described as the world‘s deadliest manufacturing centre (Leung, 2002). In 2009 the 
Ministry of Health reported that 200 million workers in China work in hazardous workplaces (as 
cited in Yu et al., 2012, p. 1). While systems to address occupational accidents and diseases are 
improving, relevant laws go widely un-enforced (Pringle & Frost, 2003). Government inspections 
are understaffed and underfunded. In 2003, there was approximately one OSH inspector per 35,000 
workers in China, compared to one per 4,000 in Hong Kong (O'Rourke & Brown, 2003, p. 380). 
Migrant workers feature disproportionately in occupational accident and disease statistics. In 2004, 
over 80 percent of fatalities were migrant workers (People's Daily, 2004, as cited in Li, Meng, & 
Wang, 2006, p. 6). Ninety percent of victims of occupational disease are believed to be migrants 
(Harney, 2008, p. 65). 
 
Conditions are significantly better in state-owned and former state-owned enterprises (Chen & 
Chan, 2010). Some foreign-invested enterprises and large domestic factories also have relatively 
well-developed systems. However, many factories flout health and safety obligations. As a result, 
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workers face widespread, uncontrolled exposure to chemicals, noise, and radiation as well as to heat 
stress, and ergonomic and safety hazards (Brown, 2003). Workplace safety systems, including fire 
evacuation, are often lacking. Some hazardous chemicals do not yet have regulatory limits (see for 
instance, Brown, 2003, p. 329).  
 
The worst conditions occur in small, domestic private enterprises (Chen & Chan, 2010, p.44; Ma & 
Yuan, 2009, p. 1043). A 2000 Workers‘ Daily article described conditions in small-scale plants as 
―abominable,‖ and ―devastating‖ to workers‘ health (as cited in Brown, 2003, p. 328). These 
conditions persist. While far from the spotlight, small domestic factories provide components and 
sub-contracting work to larger factories and foreign-invested enterprises. They thus constitute a 
significant part of export production chains.  
 
China‘s rate of fatalities from occupational injuries is the highest in the world in absolute terms, and 
among the highest rates per capita (Hamalainen, Takala, & Saarela, 2006; Liu, Zhong, & Xing, 
2005, p. 508). According to the State Administration of Work Safety (SAWS), in 2005, 728,000 
accidents caused 127,000 fatalities (as cited in Chen & Chan, 2010, p. 44), figures likely to be 
underestimates (see Hamalainen et al., 2006, p. 147; Jin & Courtney, 2009). SAWS data from 2008 
suggests that one quarter of fatalities are from the manufacturing industry (He & Song, 2011, p. 3). 
An independent survey of more than 3,000 frontline manufacturing workers in Shenzhen found 
more than half to report musculoskeletal disorders (Yu et al., 2012, p. 3). A survey of hospitals in 
the Pearl River Delta revealed that about 40,000 attempts were made in one year to re-attach 
severed fingers (Chen & Chan, 2010, p. 45). Obtaining compensation for injuries is a time-
consuming process, in 2007, taking an average of 1,070 days (China Labour Watch, 2007, p. 3). 
However, compensation payouts are increasing, which appears to be incentivising greater 
investment in health and safety (Harney, 2008, p. 82).  
 
The occupational disease situation is ―grim‖, and becoming increasingly severe (Ministry of Health, 
2007, as cited in Harney, 2008, p. 83). In 2005, there were 665,000 recorded cases of occupational 
illness (figures likely to be understated) (Harney, 2008, p. 57). Roughly 90 per cent of cases were 
pneumoconiosis— a group of lung diseases, caused by exposure to certain dusts— which has grown 
to become one of the most serious social problems in rural China (p. 57). According to state media, 
in 2007 all occupational disease was estimated to cost the country $US13 billion per year, and costs 
were rising by $US79 million annually from pneumoconiosis alone (Harney, 2008, p. 83). 
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Occupational disease is still under-recognised in China. While reforms are increasing access to 
compensation (Caixin Online, 2012), many victims remain ineligible.  
 
Work Hours 
 
Excessive overtime is pervasive in export factories. By law, workers have a 40 hour week, overtime 
hours are capped at 36 per month, and workers are required to have one rest day in seven (Harney, 
2008, p. 200). These limits are systematically violated. A 2002-2003 Verite survey found 93 
percent of enterprises to be in excess of legal limits (Harney, 2008, p. 49). In 2003, 10-16 hour 
workdays were common, and 18 hour days and seven-day weeks also frequently reported (Brown, 
2003, p. 329). These conditions have not changed. In a 2011 report on the electronics industry, all 
10 factories investigated required their workers to work between 36 and 160 hours of overtime per 
month (China Labour Watch, 2011). 
 
Excessive overtime is facilitated by dormitory regimes. The vast majority of manufacturing workers 
live on-site, creating an incentive for employers to hire fewer workers on longer hours. Workers can 
be called up at any time, and become susceptible to management control over all aspects of their 
lives (Smith, 2003, p. 334). Workers‘ apparent willingness to work long hours is related to their 
extremely low base wages (China Labour Watch, 2011; Pun, 2006). Overtime may also be 
effectively enforced by management tactics, for instance, setting impossibly high quotas.  
 
Excessive overtime negatively impacts workers‘ physical and mental health. Long hours contribute 
to social isolation. Aloneness is a theme repeatedly articulated by migrant workers (Pun, 2005b, p. 
9). Long hours are particularly devastating to the prevention of occupational accidents and disease. 
Tiredness increases the likelihood of accidents (Yu et al., 2012, p. 1). Long exposure to chemicals 
and other hazards increases the likelihood of disease. Safe exposure limits, designed for 40-hour 
weeks, are rendered useless (Brown, 2003, p. 329). 
 
 
High Labour Intensity, Discipline and Abuse 
 
Other aspects of the work environment also affect workers‘ health. An authoritarian management 
style is common in export factories (Lee Ching Kwan, 1998, as cited in Pun, 2005b, p. 108), and 
workers are subject to high labour intensity and strict discipline (SACOM, 2010c). Assembly line 
workers perform repetitive, monotonous tasks for hours without breaks, often while standing (China 
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Labour Watch, 2011). Breach of factory rules frequently involves fines which add stress and can 
bring wages below legal minimums. In some cases, discipline borders on militaristic. Chan reports 
visiting factories where workers were marched to and from meals in tight squads (Chan, 2003, p. 9). 
A SACOM investigation into conditions at Foxconn found workers were punished for any failure to 
give absolute obedience to management staff (SACOM, 2010c, p. 13-14). In 2003, physical abuse 
was common in Taiwanese, Korean and Hong Kong-owned factories (Chan, 2003, p. 9). While this 
has not been reported in recent investigations of large factories, it is still likely to occur at factories 
away from the media spotlight. 
 
Bonded and Forced Labour  
 
Actual or effective bonded labour is widespread in export factories, despite authorities‘ attempts to 
crack down on the practice. Migrants are reliant on employment to renew their temporary residence 
permits. Migrants without a job risk being arrested and deported (Chan, 2003, p. 5-6). They are also 
desperate to recoup travel expenses. They therefore face pressure to ―choose‖ or remain with an 
unsafe employer. 
 
In more severe cases, the ―bonding‖ of labour is outright. Employers may charge deposits at the 
start of employment, or withhold wages to ensure the worker sees out a contract. Previously, it was 
common for employers to hold workers‘ identity cards or documentation (without which, migrants 
can be arrested on the street) (Pun, 2005b, p. 46), though authorities have increasingly cracked 
down on this practice. To the extent that bonding practices persist, migrants are even more 
vulnerable to all other forms of exploitation.  
 
State-sanctioned forced labour occurs in prisons and re-education through labour camps (a form of 
detention for minor offenses) (ITUC, 2010, p. 14-15). Some prisoners are contracted out to non-
prison enterprises. While Chinese law supposedly prohibits the export of prison-labour products 
(Laogai Research Foundation, 2011, p. 15), there are no effective controls to prevent this (ITUC, 
2010, p. 14). There have been reports of prison labour products getting into export supply chains 
(Laogai Research Foundation, 2011, p .5-6).
 
 
Child Labour  
 
There is scant research documenting child labour in China. Cases in export manufacturing plants 
appear isolated, suggesting government enforcement has to some extent reduced the problem. 
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However cases do occur, calling into question the stringency of enforcement methods. Employment 
of children under the age of 16 has been prohibited since 2002 (ITUC Hong Kong Liaison Office, 
2007, p. 1). Despite this, in one county particularly notorious for child labour, authorities returned 
home 115 child workers in 2004 (China Labour Bulletin, 2007a, p. 13). In 2007, state media 
reported that nearly 1000 children had been abducted into forced labour at a Shanxi brickyard (p. 
3). In 2012, Apple revealed finding six active and 13 historical cases of underage labour at five of 
its direct suppliers (Apple, 2012, p. 9). While in most areas Government inspections and fines 
appear to have curbed the problem (China Labour Bulletin, 2007a, p. 9-10), the above cases 
demonstrate the importance of vigilant monitoring. There are concerns that in some regions 
monitoring may be lenient, allowing cases to become increasingly frequent (China Labour Bulletin, 
2007a, p. 4). 
 
Systematic use of child labour is documented in ―work-study programmes‖, in which school 
students work during vacations to earn money for tuition fees or for their school (ITUC Hong Kong 
Liaison Office, 2007, p. 3). Work-study programmes are legally ambiguous (p. 2). They are well-
documented in cotton production in Xinjiang province (Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China, 2011, p. 204; Radio Free Asia, 2005), but have also been reported in manufacturing 
industries. China Labour Bulletin reports ―large groups‖ of 11 to 15-year-old students were sent to 
factories in the coastal regions during summer vacations (2007a, p. 6). Cases have been documented 
at a stationery factory in 2007, a shoe factory and an electronics factory in 2006, a toy factory in 
2004, and a connector component factory, all in Guangdong (ITUC Hong Kong Liaison Office, 
2007). In addition, at least one case has been reported at a canning factory in Ningbo, Zhejiang, 
involving up to 200 middle-school students (China Labour Bulletin, 2007b). The ITUC reports that 
work-study programmes occur in ―many schools‖ (2007, p. 2), however it is uncertain how many 
schools and factories are affected. The products of this labour may contribute to export supply 
chains. 
 
Core Labour Rights: Freedom of Association, Collective Bargaining and the Right to Strike 
 
The rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining are systematically denied in China. 
The sole legal union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), does not support 
workers to undertake confrontation with management. Elections of workplace unions are unusual 
and heavily supervised. Collective bargaining is largely unknown, with the exception of a few 
cases.  
 55 
 
 
The right to strike was removed from the People‘s Republic of China Constitution in 1982 (China 
Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 36). It is now not mentioned in law, making it neither legal or illegal 
(Chan, 2011, p. 43; see also China Labour News Translations, 2011). In practice, however, the 
ACFTU considers strikes ―unlawful‖ action, and does not support striking workers. Strikes are 
suppressed, sometimes violently (Chan, 2011, p. 43). Nevertheless, strikes frequently occur, 
accounting for nearly half of labour disputes (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 36-37).
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 The denial 
of core labour rights in China presents fundamental a barrier to the improvement of labour 
conditions.  
 
Factors Influencing Labour Conditions 
 
Labour Supply 
 
The backdrop to China‘s labour conditions is its surplus-labour, developing economy with high 
levels of poverty. These factors have not always meant downwards pressure on conditions. In the 
Maoist era (1949-1976), labour was not viewed as a commodity. The state assigned employment 
and set wages, and surplus labour was absorbed through over-staffing, or in critical periods, sending 
youth to work in the countryside (Leung, 1995, p. 139). However, since the 1980s shift to 
commodified labour and reduced state involvement, working conditions have become subject to the 
pressures of labour market supply and demand (p. 142). The prevalent labour surplus has given 
employers the advantage.  
 
According to the Lewis model (Lewis, 1954), incomes rise generally only when a developing 
economy moves from a labour surplus to a labour shortage (the ―Lewis turning point‖). Up to this 
point, the benefits of economic growth accrue in the absorption of surplus labour (Knight et al., 
2010, p. 3). Beyond this point, the model suggests that economic growth will be manifested in 
improved wages and conditions, as labour scarcity puts pressure on employers to offer better 
conditions. In fact, as discussed in Chapter Two, economic growth alone is insufficient to improve 
conditions. Nevertheless, as surplus labour is absorbed, labour shortages do create pressures to 
improve conditions. 
 
                                                 
18
 China Labour Bulletin documents collective actions that receive media attention on an online map, see China Labour 
Bulletin 2011-2012. 
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Labour shortages in select areas are creating some benefits for workers. Some argue that China has 
reached the Lewis turning point, noting rising nominal wages and labour shortages in coastal cities 
(Cai et al. 2007,  Park et al. 2007, and Wang 2008, as cited in Knight et al., 2010, p. 7; Zhang, 
Yang, & Wang, 2010). Labour shortages have been reported in these regions since 2004 and 
became a major concern during 2005-2007 (Chan, 2005, p. 2; Harney, 2008, p. 124). Though 
concerns were muted by lay-offs during the economic crisis (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a), 
shortages again surfaced, leading some manufacturers to raise wages and improve conditions to 
attract workers (Banister & Cook, 2011, p. 46). However, other manufacturers have shifted 
production inland, where there remains an estimated labour surplus of 100-200 million unemployed 
and underemployed in the countryside (Harney, 2008, p. 143-144). Workers‘ lack of bargaining 
power in these regions means that employers face little incentive to improve conditions.  
In fact, the economy is only in the early stages of its shift towards labour scarcity and away from 
labour-intensive, export-oriented production. While regional shortages drive up some aspects of 
conditions, national surpluses allow extremely poor conditions to persist elsewhere (Knight et al., 
2010).
 
 
Labour shortages in coastal cities are an aberration caused by a variety of factors. First, constraints 
on labour mobility (caused by the hukou system) prevent surplus rural labourers from filling the 
labour shortages (Banister & Cook, 2011, p. 47). Second, rural migrants have increasing choices of 
destination, allowing them to flock to regions with better conditions, and creating shortages in less-
favoured areas (Harney, 2008, p. 123-124). Third, rural labourers face less incentive to move far 
away to work. Policy changes have increased rural incomes (Pun & Lu, 2010, p. 505). Increased 
awareness of poor conditions in the cities makes leaving the countryside less attractive. 
Furthermore, as production moves inland migrants also have the option to work closer to home. 
These factors pull migrants away from coastal regions, creating localised shortages.  
 
Future demographic trends may bring advantages for workers. China‘s leadership anticipates a 
population decline from 2013, and correspondingly is shifting the focus of its development towards 
higher skilled production (Global Times, 2011). The population decline will create a strain on the 
labour supply. A further strain will be workers‘ delayed entry to the workforce, as students remain 
longer in education (Harney, 2008, p. 145). These factors have potential to give workers greater 
advantage in the job market.  
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However, it would be wrong to be too optimistic about these trends. Labour scarcity alone will not 
improve every aspect of labour conditions. Due to political barriers, workers have been denied core 
labour rights even where there are acute labour shortages (discussed below). As seen in US labour 
history, described in Chapter Two, political struggle will be needed to overcome these barriers. 
Furthermore, labour scarcity may not benefit all workers. Rising wages do not necessarily filter 
down to migrant workers. On the contrary, the accompanying shift towards higher-skilled 
production may reduce demand for unskilled workers, and further weaken their bargaining power. 
Finally, the pace of poverty alleviation shouldn‘t be overestimated. The pool of unemployed and 
underemployed rural labour is vast. The persistence of this reserve army of labour will enable the 
exploitation of vulnerable workers for some years to come.  
 
Thus, while regional shortages may improve some aspects of conditions, they cannot be relied on to 
improve all aspects. The labour surplus and manufacturers‘ option to move inland allow employers 
to ignore pressure to raise conditions. Other factors also affect to what extent regional labour 
shortages in fact lead to better conditions for migrant workers.  
 
Economic Pressures  
 
China has chosen a development path in which it has opened itself to world markets and modeled 
itself into a competition state (Bulut & Lane, 2011, p. 46; Cerny, 2000, p. 117). In doing so, China 
has opened itself to vastly heightened competitive pressures. This creates incentives to weaken 
regulation and enforcement to maintain competitive advantage (the ―race to the bottom‖). It also 
creates incentives for the state to maintain its reserve army of labour.  
 
      Pressure to Weaken Labour Regulation and Enforcement 
 
China‘s drive for competitiveness occurs at the levels of the state, local government and the 
individual enterprise. At every level, this drive puts downwards pressure on labour conditions. The 
effect at the enterprise level is well documented (Association for Sustainable and Responsible 
Investment in Asia, 2002; Barrientos & Howell, 2006; Chan, 2001; Hong Kong Christian Industrial 
Committee, 2001; Pun, 2005a; Yu, 2008). Without law enforcement from the state or the ability of 
workers to organise, enterprises achieve cost-competitiveness at the expense of labour conditions. 
Factories that follow laws are ―handicapped‖ (Harney, 2008, p. 11). Foreign buyers contribute to 
these competitive pressures. Their purchasing practices can also exacerbate the competitive 
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pressures, for instance if they demand prices or lead times that are impossible for suppliers to meet 
while complying with the law. While suppliers are technically free to refuse these demands, in 
reality, the burdens are passed on to workers.   
 
Local governments‘ own competition to attract investment creates incentives for officials to weaken 
labour regulations (Brown, 2003, p. 332).  In 2002 local governments stopped receiving central 
funding and dividends from state-owned enterprises (SOEs), leaving them to survive on tax income. 
As Brown describes, this makes regulatory enforcement ―economic suicide‖ (p. 332). Local 
authorities have been quoted explaining that regulations would not be implemented for fear that 
investment would relocate to other areas. In addition, in some areas, some local residents have 
become a ―rentier class‖ leasing to foreign factories (Chan, 2011, p. 41). These locals therefore 
benefit from their governments allying with foreign investors. As a result, local governments have 
blocked unionisation efforts, and served the economic interests of their locals rather than workers 
who come from out of town. Government departments responsible for enforcing labour conditions 
have little power and are frequently overruled (AMRC, 2005; O'Rourke & Brown, 2003, p. 379).  
 
Weak enforcement is also due to local officials‘ personal incentives. Bureaucratic promotions are 
frequently linked to economic goals, rather than multidimensional criteria that include workplace 
safety (Li et al., 2006, p. 12). This disincentivises law enforcement. Officials may also have 
financial interest in the enterprises they supposedly regulate, through taxes, fees and bribes (Brown, 
2003, p. 332).
 
 
Competition also works against improving labour conditions on the national level. Although the 
central Government is generally more willing than local governments to protect workers‘ interests, 
it still faces competition with other low-wage economies. The Government has also been subject to 
foreign corporate lobbying. For instance, a strong American and European corporate lobby opposed 
China‘s 2008 Labour Contract Law (Pun, Chan, & Chan, 2009, p. 25). A weakened version of the 
legislation eventually passed (Swift, 2011). The central Government‘s prioritisation of economic 
interests is clear in the extent to which it under-resources enforcement, for instance the low number 
of labour inspectors mentioned above (Brown, 2003, p. 380). The central Government has also 
failed to rectify the incentive schemes preventing enforcement at lower levels.  
 
The central and local governments are aware that workers‘ grievances will create instability if not 
addressed, and at times this has led to ―pacifying concessions‖ in favour of workers. Since the mid-
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1990s, the Government has developed labour legislation and an arbitration system through which 
workers can raise complaints (Lu, 2007, p. 3; Pun et al., 2009, p. 143). The Government has made 
social insurance mandatory (Pun et al., 2009, p. 138). It also tentatively tolerates labour NGOs. 
While to some extent these concessions may impact negatively on potential profit and economic 
growth levels, they also prevent unrest. The constantly adjusted ―economic growth-worker 
protection tradeoff‖ means that worker unrest can at times lead to positive developments. However, 
concessions are often bare minimums, as seen in the vast array of much-needed protections which 
are not provided.  
 
     Maintenance of a Reserve Army of Labour 
 
China‘s pursuit of competitive advantage is assisted by maintaining a large pool of vulnerable 
workers which is achieved through the hukou system. The vulnerable labour force attracts investors 
seeking cheap labour, and bears many of the externalised costs of production.  
 
As described above, the state has not paid the price to provide migrant workers with social welfare 
necessities (Pun et al., 2009, p. 145-146). By a Government estimate, it would take 80,000 yuan to 
provide each migrant worker with the access to the schooling, health and welfare benefits available 
to urban counterparts, a huge sum when multiplied by the roughly 150 million migrant workers 
(Development Research Centre of the State Council, 2011, as cited in Anderlini, 2011). Instead, 
migrant workers are prohibited from settling permanently in cities, or accessing the benefits 
enjoyed by their urban counterparts. While migrants have the option of returning to the countryside, 
less than nine per cent choose to do so (Development Research Centre of the State Council, 2011, 
as cited in Anderlini, 2011). A huge proportion of China‘s workforce thus labours in cities without 
rights or social protections. 
 
This underclass of migrant workers is attractive to employers for many reasons. As described 
above, migrant workers cannot organise to demand better conditions. Their insecurity and 
dependence on employers makes them susceptible to bonded labour, and forces them to tolerate 
poor work environments. The hardships, discrimination and lack of dignity migrants face makes 
them particularly unlikely to assert their rights. The Government has failed to alleviate these 
problems, and thus facilitates migrant workers‘ exploitation for the sake of competitive advantage. 
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The arrangement perpetuates severe inequalities between urban and rural residents. The costs of 
social reproduction of labour are borne by rural areas, despite the constraints of relative poverty. 
Migrants cannot register births or marriages in cities, and face higher costs for education there; they 
thus raise children in their hometowns (Swift, 2011). Injured migrants, unable to work, may no 
longer reside in cities (Chan, 2003, p. 6). The costs of injuries and disease, some of the many 
―externalities of production‖, therefore also fall to migrants‘ hometowns (Pun, Chan & Chan 2009, 
p. 137). The system thus sacrifices migrant workers for the sake of urban residents‘ enjoyment of 
economic development. While a minority of urban residents (those with the relevant urban hukou) 
enjoy the benefits of developed cities, migrants are excluded from these benefits, despite having 
laboured to achieve them. Meanwhile, the true costs of industrial development are borne by these 
migrants and their home communities.  
 
China‘s choice of a development path thus has profound implications for working conditions. 
Rejecting more equitable alternatives, the state has succumbed to competitive pressures that prevent 
the protection of workers. The Government‘s choice of development path is thus one which 
sacrifices workers for economic growth and contributes to a ―sharp rise of migrant worker 
struggles‖ (Pun et al., 2009, p. 145-146). This path has been pursued virtually unchallenged, 
because of the nature of the Chinese state and the relative weakness of workers‘ bargaining power.  
 
Political Barriers to Core Labour Rights 
 
Another vital backdrop to China‘s working conditions is the state‘s dual priorities to maintain 
political stability and pursue economic growth. Controlling workers has always been a major 
concern to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (China Labour Bulletin, 2009b, p. 9; Perry, 2002). 
The Government treats industrial disputes as an inherent threat to social and political stability 
(China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 38). As a result, the state has obstructed the development of core 
labour rights, and has co-opted China‘s sole legally-sanctioned trade union, the ACFTU, to 
maintain control over workers. Since the reform period, the goal of economic growth has created 
the additional need to control workers to serve the interests of capital. The ACFTU has been 
employed for both. 
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      China‘s Union: A State Tool for Stability and Economic Growth 
 
The ACFTU is very different from a typical union in most capitalist countries. In countries where 
unions can operate independently, unions‘ primary role is to regulate wages and conditions by 
representing workers‘ interests against management through collective bargaining (Ebbinghaus, 
2004, p. 574; see also Yu, 2008b, p. 292). This role is inherently confrontational. As competition 
drives firms to cut costs, opposition from organised workers is vital to prevent the devaluing of 
labour. The dispute-resolution mechanism of collective bargaining, assisted by the right to strike, is 
considered in many countries to be necessary for stable labour relations. Workplace unions also 
serve a feedback role, for instance on health and safety (O'Rourke & Brown, 2003, p. 382). In 
addition, in many countries unions advocate for workers in policy discussions. In some countries 
this role is formalised in tripartite negotiations, in which unions and their confederations represent 
workers in discussions with employers‘ associations and the state (see Avdagic, 2005, p. 26).  
 
China has not developed a confrontational union able to represent workers‘ interests. The ACFTU 
is a bureaucratic organisation of over 200 million members (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 53), 
with branches at the levels of province/autonomous region, municipality, county and enterprise. 
There are also rural township and urban-district unions in some areas, and seven sectoral unions 
(China Labour Bulletin, 2009b, p. 20-21). Independent (non-affiliated) unions are illegal, and 
organisers are dealt with harshly. By law, the ACFTU has a triple role, to protect employees‘ legal 
rights and interests; to support the state‘s policies and represent the overall interests of the entire 
people; and to promote enterprise development (China Trade Union Constitution, 2003, Art. 29, as 
cited in Yu, 2008b, p. 280).
 
These roles fundamentally conflict. In practice, the worker protection 
role is subsumed to the needs to assist in economic reform and maintain social stability.  
 
The union‘s ineffectiveness at representing workers is partly due to its historical role. In the Mao 
years when workers were employed in SOEs, the union was in charge of social and recreation 
activities, welfare functions, health and safety, and production-boosting and morale. As workers 
were guaranteed the ―iron rice bowl‖ (job for life), protecting laid off workers was not necessary 
(Walker, 2005).  
 
Nowadays, even though 75 percent of the urban workforce are employed in the private sector 
(Brady, 2012, p. 189), these reactive, non-confrontational roles continue. Enterprise branches of the 
ACFTU primarily provide social activities and welfare functions. Some even organise birthday 
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parties, partner-matching events and laundry services for their members (Lee, 2003, p. 81). District 
level unions have set up worker welfare centres, helped workers recover wages in arrears and 
collated complaints from worker hotlines (China Labour Bulletin, 2009b, p. 21, 28-31). They have 
arranged petitioning letters and provided workers with legal aid (p. 19). These activities are almost 
entirely reactive. Not only do they blur the union‘s role with that of other state departments, they 
are ―pacifying‖ roles that alleviate the most likely causes of disruptions from worker dissent. These 
roles do not challenge the root problems. Enterprise unions also provide a means of Party 
supervision in the enterprises, to replace the danwei (work unit) system which has been dismantled 
during the reforms (China Labour Bulletin, 2009b, p. 29).
19
 Among workers, there is little 
awareness of the confrontational roles of a union necessary in a market economy (see, for instance 
Chan, 2009, p. 303).  
 
      Barriers to Confrontational Roles 
 
The high-level ACFTU has not allowed genuine union independence at the grassroots level. 
Enterprise unions are established by negotiations between the ACFTU and management (China 
Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 68). By law, unions should be established by democratic election 
(China‘s Trade Union Law, Art. 11, as cited in AMRC, 2005). In practice, the candidates, if not the 
representatives themselves, are hand-picked by management (Yu, 2008b, p. 280). In the majority of 
cases, union chairs are Party members, civil servants, or management staff, and union behaviour is 
supervised (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 55; 2009b, p. 26; Pun, 2005a). Unsurprisingly, these 
unions do not champion workers‘ concerns. Some have even been known to represent management 
during arbitration and court hearings (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 68). In many cases, workers 
do not even know they have a union, do not know whether they are members, or do not know who 
the officials are.
 
 
Even recent movements towards union elections show evidence of the state‘s tight control. In 2008, 
the ACFTU introduced new measures on ―direct elections‖ of enterprise unions (China Labour 
Bulletin, 2009a, p. 57). This was a revamp of a system introduced nearly 10 years previously. Many 
elections were held in the early 2000s, including at more than 300 enterprises in Hangzhou (Chan, 
2005, p. 7), and the renewed focus may have seen these rolled out to more regions. However, at the 
same time as acknowledging its ―commitment to democratic elections,‖ the ACFTU made it clear 
                                                 
19
 Prior to the reform and opening up period, each work unit had a Party representative, responsible for supervision 
among other functions. To some extent, enterprise unions have replaced this role in private enterprises, as union 
officials are often concurrently party members, or at least share their sympathies (China Labour Bulletin, 2009b, p. 29).  
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that elections should be supervised by the Party and higher levels of the union (China Labour 
Bulletin, 2009a, p. 57). It also restricted the candidates eligible to stand. 
 
 
The union has also failed to provide collective bargaining. The ineffective workplace unions do not 
pursue collective negotiations. While in 2008, higher levels of the union initiated a campaign to 
establish collective contracts through ―collective consultation,‖ this was merely a rubber stamping 
exercise. The Chinese term for ―collective consultation‖ (jiti xieshang) is deliberately distinct from 
the more confrontational ―collective bargaining‖ (jiti tanpan). ―Collective consultation‖ does not 
include consultation with workers, but merely a ceremony in which management and a 
management-controlled union sign documents provided by the district union. Collective contracts 
do not reflect contentious issues. Even this imperfect model ceased during the economic crisis, as 
the union was co-opted to focus on economic goals (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 21). Genuine 
dispute-resolution mechanisms remain obstructed due to the fundamental risk they pose to 
economic growth.  
 
The state‘s obstruction of core labour rights can also be attributed to the CCP Government‘s 
misunderstanding of the nature of industrial disputes, which it interprets as an inherent threat to 
stability. The state responds to industrial disputes as ―mass incidents‖ requiring government 
intervention and control, rather than seeing them as naturally-occurring conflicts between labour 
and capital (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 38). It is therefore unsurprising that the Chinese state 
opposes genuine workplace dispute-resolution mechanisms. Ironically, the denial of collective 
bargaining is in fact a barrier to stability and economic growth, as it leaves workers with few 
alternative channels but to protest to resolve their problems. Workers often escalate disputes on the 
perception that officials will ―only step in when things have got out of hand‖ (China Labour 
Bulletin, 2009b, p. 8). 
 
Some hope of confrontational union activity may exist in China‘s system for tripartite consultations. 
Since 2001, China has had a National Tripartite Consultative Committee, as well as counterparts at 
lower administrative levels (Chan, 2005, p. 8). Currently, the tripartite mechanism falls far short of 
a role as a neutral mediator, as both the ACFTU and its counterpart for representing employers, the 
China Enterprise Confederation, are subordinate to the state (Shen & Benson, 2008, p. 245). 
However, representatives at various levels have shown commitment to developing the mechanism 
(Chan, 2005, p. 8). The ACFTU has also been the most active proponent. To the degree that the 
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ACFTU is able to escape its co-option for state purposes, the tripartite mechanism may offer a 
forum for greater worker representation, at least at the peak level. 
 
      Legal Channels: Deterring Collective, Interests-based Claims 
 
Instead of providing much-needed collective bargaining, the Chinese Government has attempted to 
regulate labour disputes through legal channels (Chan, 2011, p. 44; Lu, 2007). Since 1994, China 
has passed numerous labour laws (see Bulut & Lane, 2011, p. 47-48),
20
 and developed an 
arbitration system for worker complaints (Pun et al., 2009, p. 143). The changes have led to a 
torrent of cases being filed, providing workers with compensation and putting pressure on 
enterprises to abide by the law (Harney, 2008, p. 82). However, while workers have won the 
majority of cases that get to court (Harney, 2008, p. 76), there are many administrative problems. 
The courts are slow. Some cases drag on for years, posing many barriers to migrant workers (see 
also Huang, 2007, p. 2; Harney, 2008, p. 75). The legal system is also subject to corruption and 
political interference (Pun et al., 2009, p. 145). Many workers turn to protests due to the 
deficiencies of this system.  
 
This state focus on legal channels can be seen as a further means of pacifying workers (Chan, 
2004a, p. 2; Pun et al., 2009, p. 133). The provision of legal avenues as a sole lawful option leads to 
perceptions of violations as individualised cases, rather than systemic abuse. This deters collective 
actions (Chan 2004a). In addition, legal complaints address solely reactive, rights-based claims 
(Chan, 2011, p. 49). Workers with interest-based demands have no opportunity for redress. 
Workers do not typically bring demands for collective rights through the legal system, such as 
claims against management for obstructing collective bargaining, or against the trade union for 
failing to protect their rights.
21
 Therefore, despite the development of legal channels, workers 
remain barred from challenging fundamental problems. At the same time, the option to seek 
individual compensation distracts workers from seeking stronger alternatives. 
 
The state focus on stability and growth has thus almost completely obstructed core labour rights. 
While the ACFTU performs ―pacifying‖ functions, it has been barred from pursuing independent 
                                                 
20
 These include the Labour Law 1994 (which set out basic protections for workers), the Work Safety Law 2002 and the 
Prevention of Occupational Disease Law 2002, the 2008 Labour Contract Law (which tightened regulations of 
contracts, and provided more secure employment), and the 2008 Labour Dispute Conciliation and Arbitration Law 
(reducing barriers to the arbitration process). See Bulut and Lane, 2010, for a more thorough overview. 
21
 However, there has been at least one case in which a worker sued the Labour Bureau for failure to handle their labour 
dispute properly (Pun & Lu, 2010, p. 511).  
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workplace elections or collective bargaining, as these are perceived to threaten state goals. To 
address the growing number of labour disputes, the state has provided legal channels. However, 
legal remedies are inadequate replacement for core labour rights, and have further obstructed their 
development. The ongoing barriers to labour rights are evident in the growing number of labour 
disputes. As these incidents threaten political instability and economic disruption, they are essential 
in creating pressure towards improvements.   
 
Labour Resistance 
 
The labour movement in China is growing from a very low base. While strikes were common in 
SOE restructuring in the 1980s and mid 1990s, the first generation of migrant workers in the private 
sector (those who migrated in the 1980s and 1990s) largely internalised their discontent (Pun & Lu, 
2010, p. 499). However, the second generation of migrant workers is far more prone to collective 
action (Chan & Pun, 2009; Pun et al., 2009, p. 136; Pun & Lu, 2010). This group entered the labour 
market in the late 1990s and 2000s. Enjoying greater legal protection, higher rights awareness, and 
with high expectations of consumerism, job prospects and urbanisation, these workers experience 
severe discontent. 
 
Labour disputes have increased dramatically since the 1990s (Chan, 2004a; Lee, 2003, p. 80), by 
one estimate rising from 19,000 in 1994 to 317,000 in 2006 (Chan, 2011, p. 44). Worker protests 
occur on an almost daily basis in the Pearl River Delta alone (Pun et al., 2009, p. 138). These take 
the form of strikes, work stoppages, blockades, sit-ins, protest marches and letter petitions to the 
Government (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 36-37). While there have been a number of strike 
waves, for instance across 73 factories in 2010 (Chan, 2011, p. 39), protests are usually isolated 
incidents. Government supervision and censorship prevent the development of nationwide 
networks. Protests are generally repressed, sometimes violently (Chan, 2011, p. 38). Nevertheless, 
protests have been an increasingly effective means of gaining concessions. In 37 of 100 cases 
analysed by China Labour Bulletin, workers demands were fully or partially met (2009a, p. 50). 
 
Workers‘ demands are typically reactive, and rights- (not interests-) based. Their expectations are 
low. According to Chan‘s analysis, the ―great bulk‖ of workers‘ demands are for the minima 
provided by law (2011, p. 50). China Labour Bulletin also found the majority of 2007-2008 
incidents to be reactive, rights-based claims (2009a, p. 24). This is in part due to the relatively high 
standards of Chinese law, which promises a lot which is not delivered. In one case, workers even 
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demanded the reinstatement of illegal overtime hours in order to retain sufficient income, instead of 
demanding a wage increase (Chan, 2011, p. 36). While workers make demands of their employer, 
they do not make proactive demands of the state.  
 
      Labour NGOs 
 
The Government has obstructed the development of an independent workers‘ movement. Labour 
activists are supervised, and media coverage of strikes is limited. Despite this, in some locations 
workers are supported by fledgling labour NGOs, the majority concentrated in South China. 
According to a government document, there are approximately 50 offering advisory services in 
Guangdong (Guangdong Provincial Committee on Politics and Law of the Chinese Communist 
Party, 2009, p. 1).  
 
Labour NGOs face constraints and harassment. Activists risk arrest and sentencing to re-education 
through labour camps (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 40-41). They also risk violence from 
employers (China Labour News Translations, 2007). Networking with other organisations is 
prohibited, as are confrontational activities. As a result, the majority of NGOs self-censor away 
from sensitive issues. Many operate worker assistance centres, providing legal advice or offering in-
factory training on labour law or health and safety (Huang, 2007). Some individual activists, known 
as ―citizens‘ agents‖, focus on providing legal assistance (Zhang, 2007). These activities are 
generally tolerated, some even welcomed for their contribution to social stability (China Labour 
News Translations, 2008). However, NGOs constantly risk their centres being closed down, due to 
a change in policy or opposition from local commercial interests (Huang, 2007, p. 3). Mainland 
NGOs are supported by a lively network of labour NGOs in Hong Kong, which play advocacy, 
resourcing and coordination roles.
22
 Mainland NGOs also receive funding from overseas groups, 
which is a further source of concern for the Government (Huang, 2007, p. 6-8). Foreign funders 
include European and US NGOs, and US Government departments (Harney, 2008, p. 126).
 
 
The state‘s tradeoff between economic growth and worker protection is demonstrated in its strategy 
towards labour NGOs. Government strategy varies between tolerance, attempts at co-option 
(control) and harsh clampdowns. In 2006, two Shenzhen NGOs were closed down due to their 
lobbying for lower arbitration fees (Harney, 2008, p. 135).  In 2007, however, the Shenzhen City 
                                                 
22
 Hong Kong NGOs supporting the mainland labour movement include Asia Monitor Resource Centre, SACOM, 
Globalisation Monitor, China Working Womens‘ Network, Labour Action China and Labour Education Solidarity 
Network, among others.  
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trade union offered more than 10 NGOs the option of working under local governments on 
condition that they stop receiving foreign funding (China Labour News Translations, 2008). State 
action on NGOs appears to be the result of ongoing struggles between government departments 
(China Labour News Translations, 2010a). In 2009, a state investigation of NGOs in Guangdong 
led to a report describing them in very harsh terms (naming individuals, and even claiming that 
NGOs pose a threat to national security). However, this did not lead to a crackdown on NGOs. 
Apparently, other departments‘ did not see them as a threat, or perhaps even considered their 
services valuable (China Labour News Translations, 2010a). As NGOs‘ services inherently threaten 
economic interests, they remain very vulnerable. For NGOs to be tolerated by the Government 
relies on them being perceived to offer a net benefit to social stability.  
 
      Recent Developments in the Labour Movement 
 
There are indications that workers are making more proactive, interest-based demands. In a handful 
of cases, workers have demanded participation in existing enterprise unions, or have tried to 
establish ACFTU-affiliated unions at their workplace (Chan, 2011, p. 49). While these are 
anomalies, the growing rights awareness, labour shortages and increasingly supportive media are 
allowing workers to become more assertive, particularly in Guangdong. While the majority were 
rights-based, nationwide China Labour Bulletin found as many as 35 of 100 cases in 2007-2008 to 
be beyond redress for rights violations (China Labour Bulletin, 2009a, p. 24). These included 
demands for higher wages, shorter working hours and reductions in workload. 
 
The development of interest-based demands (and the growing frequency of strikes over legal rights) 
demonstrates the failure of the state‘s attempt to regulate solely through legal channels. The unrest 
has forced the state to make other responses. On the enterprise level, protests have forced local 
governments to intervene and mediate. This occurred in the case of the Honda strike, and in four of 
the 100 cases analysed by China Labour Bulletin (2009a, p. 50). In other cases, local governments 
have paid wages in arrears themselves (p. 50). On a regional level, unrest has provoked minimum 
wage rises and the ―partial fix‖ of further legal developments (Beja, 2011, p. 3). Such cases 
demonstrate the potential of worker unrest to counterbalance the economic competition that puts 
downwards pressure on labour conditions. If labour unrest threatens stability, the balance will be 
tipped in favour of worker protection, and concessions granted.  
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Conclusion 
 
Trading partners buying from China enjoy labour costs that do not reflect the true cost paid by 
China‘s workers. While China does have some world-class factories, migrants in the majority of 
export factories continue to work in dangerous environments. They face authoritarian management 
systems, excessive overtime and are highly susceptible to becoming bonded labour. Wages are 
dissatisfyingly low and not necessarily paid. These conditions are perpetuated by the almost 
complete denial of core labour rights, which prevents workers organising for improvements. 
Instead, the externalities of production are borne by the workers themselves, and their rural 
communities. A minority of urban residents, and foreign trading partners, enjoy the benefits. 
 
There are multiple factors for trading partners to consider, if they seek to contribute to 
improvements. Current conditions are in part due to China‘s labour surplus in impoverished rural 
areas, which for some time will reduce pressure on employers for improvements. However, 
eventual labour scarcity will not solve all problems. China has chosen a development path in which 
workers are sacrificed for economic growth. Chinese employers and officials have neglected the 
enforcement of labour laws in their bid to win external investment. Trading partners contribute to 
these competitive pressures. The Government has also maintained migrant workers as a reserve 
army of labour through its perpetuation of the hukou system. Trading partners have benefited from 
this arrangement.  
 
China‘s sole legal union, the ACFTU, has been co-opted for stability and economic growth. It has 
been prevented from playing confrontational roles. Instead, the state has promoted legal channels as 
a sole avenue for redress, which prevents workers challenging fundamental problems. However, 
worker protections can only be sacrificed so much before worker resistance threatens stability and 
growth. At times the level of workers‘ resistance has made workers‘ improvements necessary for 
political stability, or to prevent economic disruption. These cases remain rare. However, they do 
demonstrate that workers‘ resistance can tip the ―economic growth-worker protection tradeoff‖ in 
favour of workers. While the workers‘ movement is weak in China, the hope for future concessions 
lies in its development.  
 
Trading partners have a responsibility to address these conditions, as beneficiaries of, and 
contributors to current standards. In formulating their response, they should consider potential 
avenues offered by all the factors contributing to conditions. New Zealand falls far short of meeting 
its responsibility in this area. Its activities are the subject of the next chapter. 
 69 
 
Chapter 4: Social Responsibility in New Zealand: Why the Trend Towards 
Private Regulation? 
 
The development of New Zealand initiatives to address supply-chain labour conditions has not kept 
pace with the growing imports from China and other developing countries. There is minimal 
binding regulation to incentivise socially-responsible behaviour by New Zealand businesses 
operating offshore. Bilateral cooperation avoids the most pressing of labour concerns. When the 
issue of supply-chain social responsibility has been raised in New Zealand, CSR has been 
advocated. While CSR is poorly developed, it is becoming the primary means of addressing 
offshore labour standards.  
 
In this chapter, I explore and seek to explain these trends. I first outline areas of New Zealand 
attention to supply-chain social responsibility, to assess to what extent private regulation has 
emerged as a preferred method. The extent of binding regulation, bilateral cooperation and CSR are 
analysed. Examples relating to China are offered where possible. It is argued there are few 
measures in New Zealand to incentivise socially responsible behaviour, or to contribute to 
improved labour conditions in China. While currently at a very low level of development, private 
regulation is the preferred strategy. I then analyse explanations for the growing trend towards CSR. 
It is argued that the competitiveness approach offers some explanation, as New Zealand actors 
address social responsibility in relation to their need to defend or pursue competitive advantage. 
However the political approach is far more comprehensive, explaining the rise of CSR in light of 
the political context, civil society demand for social responsibility and the reluctance of the 
Government to pursue alternatives.  
 
Existing Approaches to Supply-Chain Social Responsibility in New Zealand  
 
Domestic Legislation 
 
New Zealand has minimal legislation requiring New Zealand businesses to operate in a socially 
responsible manner when sourcing or manufacturing offshore. Unlike counterparts in other 
countries, New Zealand businesses are not required to report on their social and environmental 
impacts (Chapman & Milne, 2004, p. 37). Businesses are not required to undertake any due 
diligence processes, such as taking ―reasonable steps‖ to prevent adverse effects on stakeholders. 
New Zealand importers face only one restriction based on the labour conditions under which goods 
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were made: goods must not be produced by prison labour (Street, 2009). Schedule 1 of the Customs 
and Excise Act 1996 states that imports ―manufactured or produced wholly or in part by prison 
labour‖ are prohibited. This law is enforced in that where Customs ―becomes aware of these 
goods… by examination, baggage search or whatever means, then such goods are seized under the 
relevant Act‖ (New Zealand Customs Service, personal communication, March 27, 2010).  To 
detect such items, they rely on ―information, indicators and the goods in hand, on a case by case 
basis‖. Given the difficulty of detecting goods produced under prison labour, this law is unlikely to 
be effective. Meanwhile, the import of goods produced by processes using bonded labour, child 
labour, causing environmental destruction, or perpetuating conflict, is not prohibited. New Zealand 
businesses are required to follow domestic laws in the countries where they operate. However, as 
discussed above, weak enforcement in developing countries means that in reality, many businesses 
operate in a regulatory gap.
 
 
In one attempt at reform, in July 2009, Parliament discussed the Customs and Excise (Prohibition of 
Imports Made by Slave Labour) Amendment Bill, which proposed a ban on the import of goods 
produced by slave labour (see Customs and Excise [Prohibition of Imports Made by Slave Labour] 
Amendment Bill- First Reading, 2009). This Member‘s bill, introduced by Labour‘s Maryan Street, 
was in response to a 17,000-strong petition brought by Geoff White of Trade Aid (Street, 2009). 
Proponents hoped to allow prosecutions of businesses under this legislation, giving teeth to NGO 
efforts (Geoff White, personal communication, September 2009). While the bill only addressed 
goods produced under one aspect of unsatisfactory conditions (slavery), the question at stake was 
whether the Government would act decisively to protect offshore workers. The Government 
opposed the bill and was able to defeat it in Parliament. The Government instead advocated that the 
private sector assume responsibility for regulating offshore labour conditions through voluntary 
codes (Groser, 2009).  
 
In theory, New Zealand courts may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction to hold businesses 
accountable for abuses of workers offshore. There are few procedural barriers to overseas victims 
filing proceedings in New Zealand against any company incorporated in New Zealand. Should 
victims file proceedings, the New Zealand High Court will have jurisdiction (High Court Rules 
1908, s 6.12). However, in practice, offshore victims seeking redress through extraterritorial 
jurisdiction face formidable barriers to success (Day, 2010).  
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First, New Zealand‘s jurisdiction in cases occurring overseas is highly likely to be challenged. It is 
arguable that the offshore jurisdiction is more appropriate,
23
 which moves the claim back into the 
regulatory gap. Second, the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction is politically and economically 
unfavourable. It may generate accusations of treading on the sovereignty of another nation or be 
seen to undermine trade. With a lack of consensus over its use, it also has the potential to cause 
uncertainty for New Zealand businesses. Finally, while procedures are straightforward, offshore 
victims often face language, knowledge and resource barriers preventing them from bringing their 
case in a foreign country. In reality, the possibility that offshore victims may successfully bring a 
case in New Zealand courts is so slight as to provide next to no deterrent of socially irresponsible 
behaviour. 
 
New Zealand businesses can further escape liability by incorporating subsidiaries— deemed a 
―separate corporate personality‖— or purchasing through subcontractors. By operating in this way, 
New Zealand businesses also ―subcontract‖ responsibility for labour rights. They can then claim 
ignorance of abuses and escape liability, even if their economic influence is sufficient to impact 
their suppliers‘ activities (for instance demanding prices too low to enable suppliers to pay 
minimum wages). Some argue that the ability to escape legal liability is precisely the reason for 
operating through subsidiaries or subcontracting networks (Muchlinski, 2010). 
 
The law provides little incentive for company directors and shareholders to consider supply-chain 
social responsibility. As is standard in Western nations‘ company law, in New Zealand the 
convention of ―limited liability‖ legally separates shareholders from the company (Muchlinski, 
2010, p. 915-6). Shareholders cannot be held personally liable for abuses. Company directors are 
not under any duty to consider impacts on offshore stakeholders. There is thus no direct economic 
or legal incentive for shareholders or directors to monitor their company‘s behaviour with regard to 
social responsibility. 
 
Legal mechanisms in New Zealand to incentivise socially-responsible behaviour offshore are 
therefore extremely limited. Those mechanisms that do exist are weak, and unlikely to deter 
irresponsible behaviour or provide redress for victims.   
 
 
                                                 
23  The defence of forum non conveniens. Jurisdiction is decided on matters such as which has most real connection to the action, (eg. 
where the TNC has headquarters), the resources available to the plaintiff, adequacy of justice systems, and in which jurisdiction 
justice is most likely to be done. 
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International Instruments 
 
New Zealand businesses are theoretically encouraged to comply with voluntary international 
instruments addressing social responsibility. These include the 1977 Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, produced by the ILO 
(International Labour Organisation, 2006), and the 2008 UN Protect, Respect, Remedy Framework 
(UNHRC, 2009). These instruments are seldom publicised in New Zealand. Both are voluntary, and 
neither has a grievance mechanism. They are therefore weak in their ability to deter irresponsible 
behaviour.  
 
A third international mechanism has received more attention in New Zealand, and may have some 
impact over the actions of New Zealand businesses operating offshore. As New Zealand is a 
member of the OECD, New Zealand businesses are expected to comply with the 1976 OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD, 2011a). The Guidelines are voluntary 
recommendations for socially responsible business practice, endorsed by New Zealand and over 40 
other governments. Complaints about business conduct can be made to National Contact Points 
(NCP) in any adhering country, which are responsible for encouraging implementation of the 
Guidelines. If allegations are considered serious, the NCP will intervene by offering mediation. The 
Guidelines have received some attention in New Zealand, for instance being publicised on the 
websites of the Ministry of Economic Development and Sustainable BusinessNZ (Ministry of 
Economic Development, 2012; Sustainable BusinessNZ, 2011a). 
 
While the NCP mechanism could lead to allegations about New Zealand businesses‘ violations 
offshore, this is unlikely to happen. Only two complaints laid to date have had any link to New 
Zealand businesses, both concerning the same banking company (OECD, 2011b, p. 7, 32).
24
 Neither 
complaint progressed past initial assessments. Offshore victims attempting to lay a complaint face 
the same knowledge, language and resource barriers that would prevent them bringing legal cases in 
New Zealand. In addition, the Guidelines fail to provide a solution to businesses shedding 
responsibility through the subsidiary structure. A 2005 complaint raised to the Italian NCP appears 
to have been limited by this. The complaint concerned an industrial relations dispute in China, and 
was rejected on the basis there was ―no connection between the accused firm and an Italian firm‖ 
(OECD, 2011b, p. 23). A further limitation is that complaints can only be pursued concerning 
activity in a country which has endorsed the Guidelines. Many trading partners, including China, 
                                                 
24 Two complaints have been laid against the operation in Papua New Guinea of Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) banking group, a 
company headquartered in Australia (OECD 2011b, p.7, 32).  
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have not done so. Finally, the Guidelines are voluntary. The strongest sanctions are a damaged 
reputation and non-binding mediation. While these sanctions may assist victims, they are unlikely 
to be devastating to a company. The slim possibility of these sanctions is unlikely to deter 
irresponsible behaviour. 
 
Bilateral Trade Agreements: Memoranda of Understanding on Labour Cooperation 
 
The above mechanisms concern the liability of New Zealand businesses operating offshore. 
However, New Zealand has also undertaken measures to address labour conditions in its trading 
partners generally. One method is through its bilateral trade agreements. Since 2001, New Zealand 
has had a policy of incorporating labour and environmental standards into trade agreements 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade [MFAT], 2001). This has led New Zealand to negotiate side 
agreements on labour alongside free trade negotiations with Thailand (2005), the P4 (2005), 
Malaysia (2009) and Hong Kong (2010) (MFAT, 2012b). However, these mechanisms bind parties 
only to ongoing cooperation. They do not require parties to improve conditions. Examination of the 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) with China reveals what can and cannot be expected of 
these agreements. 
 
New Zealand pushed to negotiate a side agreement on labour cooperation alongside negotiation of 
the 2008 FTA with China (New Zealand Department of Labour and Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security of the People‘s Republic of China, 2008). China had previously entered into 
one other such agreement, a cooperation-only Memorandum of Understanding on Labour and 
Social Security Cooperation with Chile. However, the stronger agreement proposed by New 
Zealand was ―novel for China‖, and New Zealand negotiators worked hard to persuade them of its 
necessity (David Walker, personal communication, October 17, 2011). According to one union 
interviewee: ―it was amazing [the MoU] even got in. It only got in because the Labour Government 
of the time insisted on it‖ (Robert Reid, personal communication, May 30, 2011). The most 
significant contention was over the form of the agreement (MFAT, 2007). While New Zealand 
pushed for an inter-governmental agreement, the result was an agreement signed at agency level, 
though this was still binding. 
 
The MoU was aimed at improving dialogue and facilitating cooperative activities on labour issues 
(MFAT, 2010). The parties agreed on shared trade and labour principles, reaffirming their 
obligations as members of the ILO (Article 1.1). They agreed that ―it is inappropriate to encourage 
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trade or investment by weakening... domestic labour laws,‖ or to use labour laws for protectionist 
purposes (Articles 1.4 and 1.3). They also agreed on a framework for cooperation in areas of mutual 
interest and concern, and on a consultation process should disputes arise. As part of this, the parties 
agreed to meet once in the first year, then regularly, at least every two years. The MoU is linked to 
the FTA itself through Article 177, which binds the parties to enhance cooperation through the 
MoU. The MoU is therefore described as ―legally binding‖ (New Zealand Foreign Affairs Defence 
and Trade Committee, 2008). 
 
However, the MoU binds the parties to little beyond formalised discussions, likely to be about 
peripheral issues. While parties have recognised the inappropriateness of weakening labour laws to 
encourage trade, there are no measures to prevent this from occurring, save negotiations between 
the parties (which will always be tainted with other political considerations). Parties are not bound 
to any standards, or to improve their conditions. Like labour provisions in other FTAs 
internationally, the MoU imposes no new duties on the parties (except regular meetings), sets no 
timelines for improvements, and does not require that prior international commitments are in fact 
met. The MoU is not a regulatory measure that will ensure progress or assure any minimum 
standards. 
 
Neither has the MoU enabled discussion of sensitive issues. As the publicised intent of the MoU is 
to promote ―better...observance of the principles of the ILO Declarations,‖ (New Zealand MFAT, 
N.Y., p. 13), observers would be forgiven for expecting that the MoU would at least bring about 
discussion of non-adherence to these standards. Indeed, the official FTA website promotes the MoU 
as helping to ―reinforce the objectives of raising working standards‖ (MFAT, 2010). However, 
nowhere in the negotiations or subsequent implementation have issues of non-compliance been 
discussed. Disregarding submissions such as that from Amnesty International (Amnesty 
International, 2008a, 2008b), MoU negotiations did not touch on China‘s (or New Zealand‘s)25 non 
adherence to ILO conventions, instead taking as given both parties‘ commitment to abide by these.  
 
Topics of non-compliance have not come up in subsequent implementation. Since the first 
implementation meeting in December 2009, the parties have undertaken two projects. The first, on 
youth employment, was conducted through APEC (see Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
[APEC], 2009). The second, on labour market forecasting, is underway. These projects steer clear 
                                                 
25 New Zealand has yet to ratify all key ILO conventions, for instance ILO Convention 87. Therefore, while an ideal outcome of the 
MoU negotiations would have been for both parties to commit to all goods meeting ILO Conventions, neither China nor New 
Zealand currently meet this standard (Peter Conway, personal communication, June 3, 2011).  
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of any sensitive issues. As Peter Conway, Secretary of the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
(NZCTU) described, in implementing the MoU the Government has been ―very, very cautious‖ not 
to get involved in sensitive areas (personal communication, June 3, 2011). 
 
While at face value, the MoU appears a legally-binding agreement to improve labour standards, 
(thereby assuaging some concerns about the impacts of liberalised trade), it is highly unlikely to 
broach the most pressing issues. Inarguably, long-term cooperation has potential to advance labour 
standards. However, couched within the need to maintain positive trade relations, it is unlikely the 
MoU will lead to cooperation in any areas of any sensitivity, which include the most pressing 
labour rights violations in China. New Zealand therefore lacks any binding measures that can be 
relied on to improve offshore labour conditions in its supply chains. 
 
Governmental and Non-Governmental Bilateral Cooperation on Labour Issues 
 
Bilateral cooperation with trading partners has also been pursued to address labour conditions. In 
recent years the New Zealand and Chinese Governments have begun cooperative activity in this 
area. Prior to the MoU, there was no formal programme for cooperation;  however, according to 
Department of Labour staff, New Zealand agencies received a ―constant flow‖ of at least five visits 
from Chinese agencies per year, most on the regional and provincial level (Michael Hobby, 
personal communication, October 17, 2011). Most visits entailed brief discussions on specific 
disciplines, for instance OSH. However, it is likely that many of these trips are little more than 
official tourism (guangfang luyou), a means of rewarding loyal staff, funded by the Chinese 
taxpayer. (A number of union and NGO interviewees noted the frequency of this practice). There 
has been one instance of a more substantial effort of bilateral cooperation. In 2007 the New Zealand 
Government co-sponsored a joint project in the mining industry, an area in which China is keen to 
improve its performance.  
 
The MoU formalised cooperation. However, as mentioned, the two official initiatives steer clear of 
any sensitive issues. New Zealand unions have suggested the Government undertake a joint project 
to research conditions in the largest three sectors each way (Peter Conway, personal 
communication, June 3, 2011). The suggestion was not taken up. There is potential for other 
projects in the future, but they rely on funding, which has been limited.  
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Bilateral cooperation has also been undertaken through union links. New Zealand unions have taken 
a pioneer role in engagement with China. The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (NZCTU) 
was among the first in the ITUC to engage with China, despite icy controversy in the international 
movement about whether to engage with or disregard the ACFTU. In 2001, a NZCTU delegation 
was the first to meet with the ACFTU President (Ross Wilson, personal communication, July 14, 
2011).  
 
The NZCTU has aimed to develop a relationship through which they could challenge the ACFTU to 
become more accountable to its members. Ross Wilson, former head of the NZCTU notes that 
many ―frank discussions with their leadership‖ have been held (personal communication, July 14, 
2011). Since the 2001 delegation to China there have been a number of visits in both directions. The 
NZCTU made an official visit to the ACFTU in 2007. Union staff have also visited China under the 
banner of the Global Union Federation. In addition, there have been a number of unofficial or semi-
official visits, for instance New Zealand union staff meeting union officials while on personal trips 
to China, or attending research seminars organised by the ACFTU (Robert Reid, personal 
communication, May 30, 2011). One visit included a discussion with the Suzhou Federation of 
Trade Unions (Voxy News Engine, 2010).   
 
Like delegations of Government labour officials, Chinese union delegations to New Zealand are 
frequent, estimated at six to seven groups per year (Robert Reid, personal communication, May 3, 
2011). These visits are predominantly by low-level officials, and appear to be focused around 
tourism. NZCTU receives one ACFTU delegation per year (Helen Kelly, personal communication, 
November 3, 2011).  
 
The relationship has allowed exchanges in technical expertise. New Zealand unions set up a 
framework for discussions between Chinese and New Zealand unions in the mining industry. This 
included a Chinese delegation visit to Huntly, New Zealand, for a two-week seminar on coal-mine 
safety in April 2007, followed by a seminar with a Chinese company in Inner Mongolia in June 
(Feickert, 2007, p. 4).
26
 The project was later picked up by the EU (Helen Kelly, personal 
communication, November 3, 2011). The initial project was enabled largely through the work of 
Dave Feickert, a New Zealand mining expert with a long history of experience with China.  
 
                                                 
26 This was coordinated by NZCTU and the Engineering, Manufacturing and Printing Union, and supported by Solid Energy (the 
New Zealand state-owned coal corporation) and the New Zealand Government (Feickert 2007, p. 4). 
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In other cases of interaction, the NZCTU has provided assistance on employment laws, collective 
bargaining and health and safety. On at least one occasion, NZCTU has raised to the ACFTU the 
issue of human rights abuses in Burma (Helen Kelly, November 3, 2011). New Zealand unions also 
sought assistance from Chinese counterparts to increase pressure for their preferred outcome in the 
FTA negotiations. The 2007 New Zealand union delegation to China aimed to get ACFTU support 
for the New Zealand unions‘ stance on the FTA, which favoured a gradual transition to zero tariffs. 
The NZCTU believed the ACFTU would be more receptive to their views than New Zealand 
negotiators (Robert Reid, personal communication, May 30, 2011). While it is unknown whether 
the ACFTU did assist in providing pressure, gradual transitions were included in the eventual 
agreement. 
 
The potential of the MoU for facilitating joint union or NGO projects, or for raising disputes, has 
not yet been tested. According to Peter Conway, unions‘ only use of the MoU to date has been their 
reference to the MoU as a way of getting New Zealand Government support for the bilateral 
cooperation in the mining industry, mentioned above (personal communication, June 3, 2011). The 
MoU could enable further projects. Unions could also use the MoU to raise a dispute. During MoU 
negotiations, unions pushed for a process through which they could spotlight exploitative working 
conditions in China in situations where these may be the ―competitive advantage‖ which result in 
Chinese products or services being purchased in New Zealand (Ross Wilson, personal 
communication, April 30, 2012). There is room to explore the effectiveness of this dispute process. 
While New Zealand unions are keen to avoid perceptions that they ―pick on China‖, China‘s rise to 
become New Zealand‘s second largest trading partner means greater attention is justified. 
 
There is potential for bilateral cooperation from non-union groups, such as OSH organisations. 
Individuals may also spark cooperation, as demonstrated in the case of the mining project above. 
The MoU may enable individuals or groups to appeal for official support.  
 
The potential of bilateral cooperation as a means of contributing towards improved labour 
conditions has yet to be fully tested. Resources for joint government and union projects are limited. 
With the exception of the mining project, non-governmental groups have yet to pick up the MoU as 
a mandate under which to initiate cooperative projects, or to initiate a dispute. Government 
cooperation has not approached sensitive issues. Nevertheless, there is opportunity for improved 
cooperation, which will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
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Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
In the absence of binding legislation, and with only limited bilateral cooperation to address labour 
conditions, New Zealand has increasingly relied on CSR to address supply-chain labour issues. 
However, as noted in Chapter Two, the CSR movement in New Zealand is at a low level of 
development, and historically has focused on environmental sustainability (Eweje & Bentley, 2006, 
p. 6). In recent years, more businesses have undertaken social initiatives, including some steps to 
address supply-chain labour conditions. This remains the ―pinnacle‖ of CSR practice, attempted by 
only a minority of companies.  
 
Supply-chain labour initiatives have been very rare in New Zealand, and patchy data has only 
recently become available. When businesses were asked about initiatives to address ―social 
responsibility in the supply chain‖ for the first time, fourteen of 30 respondents reported having 
some form of audits in place (Massey University, 2005, p. 29). However, the survey did not probe 
into what social criteria were addressed, what audits entailed, or what proportion of suppliers were 
covered. By 2007, ―a few‖ of the fifteen respondents to the Massey leaders survey had some form 
of ethical purchasing policies (2007, p. 25-26), although initiatives were poorly monitored. 
 
Recent surveys suggest roughly a third of New Zealand businesses are engaged in some form of 
ethical purchasing initiatives (Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 10; ShapeNZ 2011, as cited 
in Gibson, 2011a). However, no studies document what these policies entail, or enable any ranking 
of businesses. It is likely that far fewer than one third of businesses conduct labour-focused 
initiatives. As quantitative research to fill this gap is outside the scope of this thesis, case studies 
and personal correspondence provide some insight into the nature of labour-focused supply-chain 
initiatives. 
 
The Warehouse, a retailer with annual sales of NZ$1.46 billion, is frequently cited as a New 
Zealand leader in ethical purchasing (Association of Chartered Certified Accountants, 2011, p. 12; 
Gibson, 2011a; NZBCSD, 2003b). In 2011, 61 percent of its products were made in China (The 
Warehouse, 2011, p. 7). The Warehouse expects suppliers to comply with its own code of conduct 
on labour issues, and annually audits about 100 factories (p. 19). Auditing covers roughly 20 
percent of direct suppliers (Gibson, 2011a). Of suppliers audited between 2007 and 2010, 11.4 
percent of suppliers failed to meet minimum standards and were discontinued (The Warehouse, 
2010, p. 15). Forty-five percent were in ―probationary‖ status, meaning that trade continued despite 
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non-conformances awaiting rectification. The majority of factories showed improvement between 
audits.  
 
The Warehouse has begun a register of factories from whom it sources indirectly, allowing 
consideration of conditions at these sites (The Warehouse, 2011, p. 19). As of 2011, nearly 500 
suppliers to the Warehouse had provided details of their source factories for this register. The 
Warehouse has also maintained FTSE4Good supply-chain criteria, an international standard which 
certifies that its efforts are achieving minimum levels of compliance (p.28). The Warehouse ethical 
sourcing programme is highly unusual among New Zealand businesses, in terms of number of 
audits, the degree of transparency and for its international certification, though these practices are 
not uncommon among international brands. 
 
Another example of advanced CSR activity is ABS Logistics (Stenger, 2007). This New Zealand 
company led the adoption of CSR practices in its greater supply chain dealing with China. After 
adopting its own CSR policy regarding labour conditions, ABS Logistics also convinced its 
customer, Woodward Laundry Products, to adopt a similar policy. These firms then worked 
together to negotiate compliance from their Chinese supplier, Conghua Metals. 
 
My own correspondence with roughly 30 New Zealand manufacturers and retailers revealed no 
examples more developed than the Warehouse and ABS initiatives. Eleven companies I approached 
had some forms of monitoring in place. In six of these companies, supply-chain labour issues were 
addressed by overseas parent companies. Excluding The Warehouse, the four other businesses that 
undertook monitoring conducted this through self-auditing. These four companies purchased from 
only one or two offshore factories, in which they were the sole or primary buyer. Their checks of 
compliance with codes of conduct were done alongside quality checks or other factory visits, by 
non-specialist staff who may or may not have high awareness of Chinese labour issues. Given the 
difficulties even qualified auditors have in detecting problems (discussed in the next chapter), the 
effectiveness of informal checks is dubious.  
 
Two further companies had considered labour conditions but did not conduct audits. Of these, one 
was a small apparel company that conducted no audits themselves, but instead purchased only from 
suppliers to big brands, and relied on the brands to conduct audits. This was possible because the 
company was in high-end apparel and could afford to follow high-quality overseas brands. The 
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other was a shoe retailer that reported to have a code of conduct which they asked suppliers to sign. 
They did not monitor compliance.  
 
The majority of companies I approached had no codes of conduct or auditing in place. Some 
claimed to have inspected premises when conducting quality checks. Two companies refused to 
provide any information on their sourcing, stating the information was ―commercially sensitive‖. 
No companies I approached were members of multi-stakeholder initiatives (with the exception of 
one company whose parent company was a member of the Ethical Trading Initiative). Transparency 
was extremely poor among companies I approached, with TBL disclosure largely ad hoc. While a 
few issued TBL reports, the majority had only limited information available on their websites. None 
disclosed audit results or suppliers, or had complaint mechanisms in place. Only a minority (The 
Warehouse, ABS Logistics, and one other) had undertaken any proactive steps. Even the 
Warehouse, a New Zealand leader in ethical sourcing, has a number of areas needing improvement. 
Audits cover only a minority of direct suppliers, are pre-announced, and largely self-audited. Audit 
findings have only a limited impact on purchasing.  Based on this brief investigation, New Zealand 
supply-chain labour initiatives appear very shallow in scope. However, they are gradually 
developing. 
 
Explaining the Emergence of CSR in New Zealand 
 
It is evident there is a trend in New Zealand towards using CSR to address supply-chain labour 
issues, even if efforts remain poorly developed. Binding measures remain minimal, and where 
existing, are weak. Bilateral cooperation does not yet address the most pressing offshore labour 
concerns. CSR supply-chain labour initiatives, while undeveloped, are an area of growth. The 
remainder of this chapter will examine what explains the trend. Both the competitiveness and 
political approaches are necessary. 
 
The Competitiveness Approach 
 
The competitiveness approach explains the promotion of CSR initiatives as a result of individual 
actors‘ defence or pursuit of competitive advantage. CSR can be seen as a business effort to reduce 
risks and uncertainties in the market (such as the threat of costs from activism or government 
regulation). CSR can also be seen as a means to attain power or pursue a favourable market 
position. In New Zealand, the approach can help to explain both the slow but increasing 
development of supply-chain labour initiatives, and also the existence of some advanced cases. 
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      CSR as a Defence of Competitive Advantage 
 
 New Zealand businesses have faced minimal need to take up supply-chain labour initiatives to 
defend their competitive advantage. There has been next to no demand from consumers, civil 
society and the Government for business to address their impact on stakeholders. As recently as 
2010, the majority of businesses surveyed felt no internal or external pressure to adopt 
environmentally- or socially-responsible practices (Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 15, 
19). This was especially true among small businesses. The Government has demonstrated its 
unwillingness to impose regulation for supply-chain social responsibility. The threat of 
Government-imposed costs is therefore minimal. 
 
Pressure from New Zealand consumers for any sustainability practices is very low. Consumer 
attitudes to environmental and social responsibility have been documented— therefore publicised to 
businesses— only since 2007 (2009 for social issues) (ShapeNZ, 2007; Mandow, 2009). While 
consumers increasingly consider environmental and social factors, price remains their primary 
consideration (Colmar Brunton, 2010; ShapeNZ 2011, as cited in Gibson, 2011b; ShapeNZ 2010, as 
cited in NZBCSD, 2010a; ShapeNZ, 2007). Only four in 10 consumers would pay a premium for 
sustainable and ethical products (Colmar Brunton, 2010). When supply-chain social responsibility 
issues are considered, the figures are even lower. In 2010, 55 percent of consumers reported that 
they consider fair trade when selecting a product, and 37 percent that they consider ―social 
responsibility‖ (ShapeNZ 2010 as cited in NZBCSD, 2010a). However these issues would trump 
price for only seven percent of consumers. Unsurprisingly given these low figures, in 2010, only 11 
percent of companies reported being motivated by consumer pressure to implement social practices 
(Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 19).  
 
New Zealand faces a lack of confrontational groups
27
 to critique corporate activity and demand 
attention to supply-chain social responsibility. New Zealand does have a ―strong and outspoken 
conservation movement,‖ for instance the Forest and Bird Society (Bebbington et al., 2009, p. 597). 
National tourism marketing that promotes New Zealand as a ―100 percent pure‖ destination and 
―clean and green‖ are also likely to raise consumer awareness of environmental issues. In recent 
years, conservation groups and the Green Party have led attention to supply-chain environmental 
                                                 
27
 As defined in Chapter Two, confrontational groups are non profit organisations that ―function as corporate 
watchdogs, blacklist ‗irresponsible‘ corporations, arrange for public shaming campaigns, take corporations to court, and 
lobby for the taming of [TNCs] through national and transnational governance structures‖ (Shamir, 2004, p. 647). In 
short, they are critics of corporate activity. 
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issues, with campaigns for an end to the use of palm oil in chocolate (New Zealand Herald, 2009), 
and non-sustainable timber in toilet paper production (Fairfax NZ News, 2011). However, in 2010, 
only five percent of businesses reported pressure groups as a source of motivation towards 
environmental activities (Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 15). For social practices, the 
figure was three percent (p.19).  
 
There are very few groups addressing supply-chain labour issues specifically. NGOs Trade Aid and 
Oxfam do this to some degree. In 2010, public pressure led two large New Zealand chocolate 
companies to pursue fair trade certification in some product lines (Stock, 2010). This followed 
similar activity in these companies in the UK. However, the focus of Trade Aid and Oxfam is on 
producer conditions and returns in selected agricultural supply chains (primarily coffee, cocoa and 
banana production). They have no initiatives in China.  
 
New attention to a select area of supply-chain labour issues was sparked in 2011. Research from 
Auckland University revealed extremely poor conditions for migrant workers aboard foreign-owned 
vessels fishing for New Zealand companies (Skinner, 2012; Stringer, Simmons, & Coulston, 2011). 
The revelations provoked widespread media criticism in New Zealand, and spurred action from the 
Christchurch Indonesian Society, the Anglican Church and the Salvation Army, among others. The 
Salvation Army is now working to establish a New Zealand branch of the NGO Stop the Traffik to 
target human trafficking and slavery on an ongoing basis.  
 
There remains, however, an almost complete absence of groups regularly demanding attention to 
labour issues in offshore manufacturing. During the New Zealand-China FTA negotiations, 
submissions regarding labour standards were made by the Green Party and Amnesty International 
(Amnesty International, 2008a, 2008b; Norman, 2008). Pressure from high-level union staff, and 
their involvement in negotiations, was instrumental in maintaining attention on labour issues. The 
Customs and Excise bill 2009 also provoked discussion. Aside from these periods, the issue of 
labour conditions in offshore manufacturing has seldom been raised. Neither have there been 
groups educating consumers about these issues. Regarding New Zealand activity to address 
offshore manufacturing conditions, an email from Geoff White, general manager of Trade Aid, 
paints a bleak picture:  
 
I am not aware of any New Zealand initiatives dealing with either work conditions or 
slavery in offshore manufacturing supply chains. I am not aware of any other individual or 
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organisation that has this concern and is taking steps to address it... There is a lot more that 
can be done in this area. (Personal communication, April 30, 2012.) 
 
In light of these low levels of demand from consumers, civil society and Government, businesses 
have not needed to implement or improve supply-chain labour initiatives to defend competitive 
advantage. Neither have they needed to pursue stronger measures for this purpose. Given the low 
development of social responsibility in New Zealand, there are few businesses advanced in CSR 
initiatives, and therefore few that would benefit from regulation to require social responsibility of 
businesses. There do not appear to have been any moves from the business sector to defend 
competitive advantage in this way.  
 
However, demand for supply-chain social responsibility is growing. Some businesses already risk 
losing position in foreign markets which place a greater emphasis on social responsibility (see the 
EU examples in Chapter Six). This may explain the rise of CSR in certain companies. Awareness of 
social responsibility issues is also growing in New Zealand. The 2010 and 2011 ShapeNZ surveys 
document increasing attention to social responsibility and fair trade among New Zealand consumers 
(ShapeNZ 2011, as cited in Gibson, 2011b; ShapeNZ 2010, as cited in NZBCSD, 2010b). The 
Waikato surveys report that businesses expect pressures to rise in the next five years (Collins, 
Lawrence, & Roper, 2010, p. 488). The increased costs and risks businesses anticipate could be 
motivating the gradually-increasing attention to supply-chain issues. Businesses may be acting to 
pre-empt activist attention and forestall a need for regulation. 
 
Given the low number of confrontational groups in New Zealand, the trend towards growing 
awareness can primarily be attributed to the work of business-led sustainability organisations 
(BSOs).
28
 Until January 2012, there were three BSOs in New Zealand. These included the 
Sustainable Business Network, a forum of roughly 450 members, predominantly SMEs; the New 
Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development (NZBCSD), whose roughly 45 members‘ 
annual sales comprise about 43 percent of GDP; and Sustainable BusinessNZ, an initiative of 
BusinessNZ, New Zealand‘s largest business lobby. Sustainable BusinessNZ therefore represents 
14,000 direct members and 76,000 associate members. These organisations have provided 
resources, training and research and have run projects to encourage business sustainability. They 
have also contributed to policy development. In January 2012, Sustainable BusinessNZ‘s forum of 
                                                 
28
 Informal networks of individuals, such as Green Drinks and Sustainability Matters, also raise awareness about the 
responsibility of business. These groups focus on environmental issues. 
 84 
 
10 members joined with the NZBCSD, and the merged body was named the Sustainable Business 
Council (Sustainable BusinessNZ, 2012).  
 
BSOs have primarily focused on environmental sustainability in New Zealand, but have also led the 
limited attention to supply-chain labour issues. The NZBCSD Business Guide to a Sustainable 
Supply Chains remains the foremost New Zealand-produced document promoting supply-chain 
social responsibility (NZBCSD, 2003a). In 2006, NZBCSD required its members to introduce 
sustainability criteria into procurement from six of their top 10 suppliers (Collins, Lawrence, & 
Roper, 2007, p. 16). The NZBCSD initiative ShapeNZ is responsible for the majority of the surveys 
to date into consumer attitudes towards social responsibility. In addition, Sustainable BusinessNZ 
has led the strongest New Zealand effort towards motivating supply-chain initiatives currently 
underway, discussed below. (These initiatives are the full extent of New Zealand efforts to promote 
supply-chain social responsibility.) 
 
BSOs are likely to maintain the growing trends towards demand for social responsibility, and CSR 
as the defensive response. BSOs‘ activities directly and indirectly raise consumer awareness. BSOs 
promote the business case for CSR, advocating initiatives as a means to defend or enhance 
competitive advantage (see for instance, Sustainable Business Council, 2012). They also 
communicate perceptions of consumer demands to their members (Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 
2010). As a result, BSOs not only generate increasing demand for social responsibility (raising the 
costs and risks of inaction), but also promote CSR as an effective means of reducing these costs and 
risks. The competitiveness approach is therefore useful in the New Zealand case. CSR can be seen 
to correlate to low but growing consumer demand (therefore growing costs and risks of inaction), 
businesses‘ perception of these risks, and their growing awareness of CSR as means of defending 
competitive advantage. Pursuing stronger measures to defend competitive advantage is 
unnecessary. 
 
The competitive approach also appears to explain the emergence of the most advanced voluntary 
effort to promote supply-chain social responsibility in New Zealand. Sustainable BusinessNZ is in 
the process of establishing a national database into which businesses can upload environmental and 
social responsibility information. The information would then be available to prospective 
customers, and possibly to the general public. The initiative is a direct response to the ―steadily 
increasing‖ disclosure requirements faced by New Zealand businesses (Sustainable BusinessNZ, 
2011, p. 1). The database will save businesses the costs of preparing the information separately for 
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multiple tenders. It would also streamline the selection of socially-responsible suppliers. The 
initiative has therefore arisen as a means to reduce costs and increase businesses‘ competitive 
advantage. In this case, the depiction of CSR as a means to defend competitive advantage appears 
to have strong explanatory power. 
 
      CSR as a Proactive Pursuit of Market Rewards 
 
Given that pressures for supply-chain labour initiatives are only recently emerging in New Zealand, 
the relatively high level of commitment by companies such as the Warehouse demands explanation. 
―Reputation and Brand‖ was cited in the Waikato surveys as among the leading motivations for 
CSR activity in New Zealand (Collins, Dickie, & Weber, 2009, p. 52). Given that pressure groups 
were not a strong motivation, it is likely that this concern for reputation was proactive, not 
defensive. The market for socially-responsible products is newly developing in New Zealand 
(Colmar Brunton, 2010). Given its current low level of development, any demonstrated 
commitment to supply-chain labour issues positions the company as a leader in this market. Some 
businesses may undertake advanced CSR to attain these leadership positions. As these rewards can 
be attained through voluntary initiatives, there is certainly no motivation to pursue stronger 
measures. 
 
However, it is unclear why companies that invest in genuine supply-chain labour initiatives choose 
these over ―easier‖ CSR methods. The low level of public attention means that positive reputation 
may in some cases be ―bought‖ with minimal investment. For instance, a company may derive 
reputational benefits simply by devoting a website page to offshore labour conditions, which in 
reality are poorly monitored. Such greenwash currently receives no critique. Furthermore, supply-
chain labour initiatives are among an array of avenues to attaining leadership in socially-responsible 
markets. In the Colmar Brunton survey 2009-2010, consumers cited ―improving the supply-chain‖ 
as only third of six ways in which businesses could improve their reputation (Colmar Brunton, 
2010). Businesses can therefore improve their market position through a range of easier 
alternatives. 
 
It is possible that in certain sectors, supply-chain labour initiatives are particularly useful for 
branding. Advanced companies may also pursue supply-chain initiatives as a point of difference, as 
other CSR initiatives become more common. However, many forms of CSR remain rare, and 
supply-chain labour initiatives are complex and expensive compared to these alternatives. 
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Therefore, where supply-chain labour initiatives are pursued, market position is unlikely to be the 
sole motivator. It is likely that other factors, such as anticipation of future risk, also contribute. 
 
The range of easier alternatives is likely to contribute to the low take-up of supply-chain labour 
initiatives among the general business population. There are next to no initiatives aiming to build 
business capacity on implementing supply-chain labour initiatives. While BSO provide resources 
on many areas of CSR, their programmes on supply-chain labour initiatives are limited to the above 
examples, and are therefore minimal. The Government does not appear to have initiated any 
programmes to encourage supply-chain social responsibility. This lack of resourcing may further 
explain the low spread of these initiatives: most businesses remain ill-equipped to ―add value‖ in 
this way. 
 
There are not yet many market rewards for businesses to undertake supply-chain labour initiatives 
for proactive reasons. Consumer demand, while increasing, remains low. Additional incentive 
schemes largely focus on environmental sustainability. BSOs run CSR awards, such as the 
Sustainable Business Network annual awards and the Sustainability 60 Series, however the awards 
criteria do not emphasise supply-chain social responsibility. Businesses can succeed in these awards 
with no attention to supply chain issues. The Government has endorsed an Environmental Choice 
eco-label to create market rewards for CSR leadership (Environmental Choice New Zealand, 2012), 
but this too focuses on environmental sustainability. There are thus few additional incentives for 
businesses to undertake supply-chain labour initiatives specifically. 
 
The Government is also missing an opportunity to promote supply-chain social responsibility 
through its procurement, an estimated NZ$14-20 billion annually (Australian Procurement and 
Construction Council, 2007, p. 4). As significant customers, Governments can model socially-
responsible purchasing. They can also create market rewards for socially-responsible business, by 
requiring disclosure and favouring socially responsible companies in their tendering processes. 
These market rewards incentivise social responsibility by making this a criterion on which 
businesses compete for contracts.  
 
Under the Labour Government (1999-2008) there was a strong push to promote social responsibility 
in this way. In 2003 the Government initiated the Govt3 programme to encourage sustainability in 
Government departments. Drive for sustainable procurement was also seen at the level of local 
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government. In 2003, the Christchurch City Council established a Sustainable Supply Chain policy 
(Christchurch City Council, 2003).
29
  
 
In 2006 the Labour Government produced a national framework on sustainable procurement, which 
included the goal to ―support suppliers to government who are socially responsible and adopt 
ethical practices‖ (Australian Procurement and Construction Council, 2007, p. 10). As a result of 
this national Framework, suppliers to Government are required to declare social and environmental 
performance during tenders for all-of-government contracts. Furthermore, in 2007, the Government 
centrally mandated minimum environmental standards for certain goods (Ministry for the 
Environment, 2008, p. 5-6). Supposedly, timber, travel and light fittings purchased by the 32 core 
agencies must meet the specifications given, or instance, using only certified products (p. 57-58).  
 
While these are significant steps towards creating a market for social responsibility, implementation 
has been poor. The Government does not appear to monitor or audit the sustainability performance 
of its suppliers. Procurement staff in the Ministry of Economic Development did not know of 
anyone checking through the supply chain (personal communication, October 19, 2011). Minimum 
environmental standards do not appear to be enforced. While they do offer guidance for 
departments, and act as a precedent for a Government-set minimum social responsibility standard, 
their impact is uncertain. 
 
In recent years, momentum on sustainable procurement appears to have waned (MED staff, 
personal communication, October 19, 2011). The Govt3 programme was disbanded under the 
National Government (2008-2014). Without a focused programme to encourage government 
agencies to implement the Framework, efforts are disparate and there is little incentive for 
improvement. The drive for supply-chain social responsibility appears particularly weak. As MED 
staff put it, ―It‘s very hard for us to know [the extent of supply-chain initiatives]. Agencies each do 
their own thing. No reporting mechanism would tell us if they were‖ (personal communication, 
October 19, 2011). Despite the early progress toward sustainable procurement in New Zealand, the 
Government is missing an opportunity to create market rewards for businesses that purchase 
responsibly.  
 
                                                 
29 The policy states that where possible, the Council will seek to give preference to suppliers/contractors who can show they are 
working towards supply chain sustainability, including social responsibility. In 2010, the Tauranga City Council established a similar 
policy (Tauranga City Council, 2010).  
 88 
 
Market rewards for supply-chain labour initiatives therefore remain undeveloped. In light of the low 
consumer demand for supply-chain labour initiatives, the low resourcing, and the lack of additional 
incentives such as awards or preference in Government contracts, it is likely that supply-chain 
labour initiatives do not appear a viable or rewarding option to most businesses. There is no 
motivation for stronger initiatives. While some advanced cases may benefit from pursuing supply-
chain labour initiatives specifically, in most cases similar market rewards can be derived from 
easier alternatives.  
 
      CSR as a Proactive Pursuit of Power 
 
Within the competitiveness approach is the possibility that businesses pursue CSR for the 
anticipated benefits to their power (this in turn benefiting competitive advantage). Pursuit of power 
has been acknowledged by Roger Spiller, previous Executive Director of the NZBCSD, as a 
motivation for membership of BSOs ( as cited in Milne, Tregidga, & Walton, 2009, p. 15-16). The 
power benefits that derive from implementing supply-chain labour initiatives specifically are harder 
to identify. These initiatives bring no obvious instrumental or structural power benefits. However, 
they may bring some benefits to discursive power. The complexity of supply-chain labour 
initiatives may afford those businesses that undertake them a higher degree of legitimacy as a 
socially-responsible business. This reputation, in turn, could translate into greater ability to shape 
discourses about social responsibility, as they are seen to ―walk the talk‖. However, as with 
positioning in socially-responsible markets, businesses could accrue similar power benefits through 
easier CSR initiatives. 
 
Some businesses may perceive an advantage in developing authority in the area of supply-chain 
labour issues specifically. Given the current low threat of regulation or reputation damage, there is a 
low likelihood of discussions on supply-chain labour issues, and therefore little need for businesses 
to establish authority in this area. However, just as businesses may act pre-emptively to defend their 
market position, they may also proactively establish authority in preparation for future 
developments. Demonstrating a commitment to supply-chain labour initiatives may earn businesses 
the right to speak in future media or policy discussions. This gives them power to shape discourses 
in a way that enhances their competitive advantage. 
 
It is therefore possible that businesses pursue supply-chain labour initiatives to increase their power.  
Demonstrating commitment to supply-chain labour initiatives brings businesses general credibility 
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as well as authority in discussions on supply-chain labour issues, and these in turn bring discursive 
power. However, this is an unlikely sole explanation. If authority on supply-chain issues 
specifically is not required, alternatives would more cost-effectively bring similar power benefits. 
 
      Explanatory Power of the Competitiveness Approach 
 
The competitiveness approach is thus useful in explaining the emergence of supply-chain labour 
initiatives in New Zealand. The low attention to social responsibility can be attributed first to 
businesses‘ minimal need to defend competitive advantage. Threats of binding regulation and 
purchaser pressures for supply-chain social responsibility have been weak, and businesses have not 
needed to pursue any initiatives in order to defend their market position. However, these pressures 
are gradually developing, causing increasing attention to these issues. Given the low levels of 
pressure, businesses only need to undertake CSR, not stronger measures, to allay costs and risks. 
There are few advanced businesses that would pursue binding measures to prevent their position 
being undermined. This explains the lack of activity in this area. 
 
The low development of supply-chain labour initiatives can also be attributed to the few market 
rewards, and the range of easier alternatives through which businesses can improve their reputations 
and seek discursive power (pursue competitive advantage). Rewards from consumers, civil society 
and Government (through procurement) are minimal, as are programmes to enable businesses to 
implement supply-chain labour initiatives. There are therefore few reasons why businesses would 
choose supply-chain labour initiatives as a means of adding value. There are no motivations for 
stronger initiatives. While in a few advanced cases of CSR, businesses may require supply-chain 
labour initiatives specifically in order to pursue market leadership or increase discursive power, in 
most cases, similar benefits could be derived from other initiatives. The competitiveness approach 
therefore explains the low but gradually-increasing attention to supply-chain issues. Even as 
rewards and sanctions gradually develop, voluntary initiatives remain sufficient to allay costs and 
attain rewards.    
 
The competitiveness approach offers several lessons for improving attention to social responsibility. 
The approach suggests that increasing market rewards and sanctions should increase attention to 
supply-chain labour issues. Increasing the costs of irresponsibility, improving market rewards for 
social responsibility, or building business capacity to respond to these pressures, are all likely to 
lead to greater business activity in this area. However, expecting market pressures to provoke 
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businesses to pursue binding regulation for the sake of competitive advantage is overly optimistic, 
unless in highly advanced cases. While it is possible that some businesses may pursue binding 
regulation for competitive advantage, the majority of businesses would seek to avoid these costs.  
 
However, the competitiveness approach has limitations. It provides no explanation of state 
behaviour. It is silent on the role of other actors. The approach does not explain the low level of 
demand for social responsibility, or the failure of other actors to impose restrictions on business. 
The approach therefore provides limited insight into how stronger alternatives could be pursued. 
 
The Political Approach  
 
The political approach fills many of these gaps. The approach interprets the rise of private 
regulation as a settlement of conflicts between competing actors, in light of their differing degrees 
of power in the neoliberal context. In New Zealand, the emergence of supply-chain labour 
initiatives cannot be divorced from the reluctance of the Government to impose binding regulation, 
and the severe power imbalance of business over civil society groups. These trends must be 
understood within the neoliberal context. 
 
      Constraints on Policy-makers: New Zealand‘s Unwillingness to Regulate 
 
New Zealand has frequently been called a competition state (Lewis, 2004, p. 151; 2005, p. 7; Larner 
& Walters, 2000, p. 362). Between 1984 and 1995 New Zealand embarked on ―one of the most 
notable episodes of liberalisation that history has to offer‖ (David Henderson, 1995, as cited in 
Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson, & Teece, 1996, p. 1856). Embracing key tenets of neoliberalism, the 
Government privatised state assets, deregulated financial markets, labour markets and industry, and 
liberalised international trade (Evans et al., 1996, p. 1860-61; Larner & Walters, 2000, p. 369). The 
reforms aimed to create a business environment free of political intervention, and to open the 
economy to international competition (Evans et al., 1996, p. 1883). They took New Zealand from 
the one of the most regulated economies in the OECD, to the least (Brash, 1996, p. 4). The reforms 
also signaled New Zealand‘s remodeling from a welfare state into a competition state, in which 
management of the state is aimed at promoting international competitiveness, and attracting foreign 
investment  (Lewis, 2004, p. 151). Lewis argues this shift is ―highly visible in the New Zealand 
case‖ (2004, p. 151).  
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The reforms have had a lasting impact on perceptions towards regulation in New Zealand. 
Improved private sector performance became seen as ―a powerful promoter of the public interest‖ 
(Larner & Walters, 2000, p. 370). Foreign investment became perceived as a means to ensure 
national well-being. The business community has come to support free trade, to ―an unusual degree 
by OECD standards‖ (Evans et al., 1996, p. 1895). The reforms also led to increased faith in market 
actors (Lewis, 2004, p. 150-1).  
 
The dominance of these neoliberal scripts— belief in liberalised trade and market actors to 
maximise the social good— has imposed de facto constraints on the New Zealand Government. The 
Government has proven unwilling to enact regulation that is perceived to hinder the 
competitiveness of its businesses. New Zealand remains one of the world‘s most liberalised 
economies, and in 2009 was ranked the world‘s second best place for doing business (Hong, 
McCann, & Oxley, 2009, p. 4). These reforms have paved the way for the rise of market-driven, 
private regulation (Lewis, 2004, p. 149). New Zealand has developed a model of the state that 
deploys ―self-regulation as a programme of government,‖ as seen in the examples below (Lewis, 
2004, p. 149). 
 
The international trade regime also imposes constraints. In discussions on social responsibility, 
New Zealand policy-makers have cited WTO rules as a barrier preventing regulation. In fact, there 
is opportunity to push the boundaries of WTO rules in the case of supply-chain social responsibility 
(as discussed in Chapter Six). However, there have been no efforts by the New Zealand 
Government to test these boundaries.  
 
       Impact of these constraints: Failure of the attempt to ban slave labour imports 
 
The debate over the Customs and Excise (Prohibition of Imports Made by Slave Labour) 
Amendment Bill 2009 demonstrates the influence of these neoliberal assumptions. The first 
objection to the bill was that enforcement would be unworkable. This fell flat given the existing ban 
on imports produced under prison labour, which shared all the challenges of enforcement. In an 
earlier political context, Parliament had not been constrained by this argument.  
 
In speaking to the bill, Tim Groser, Minister of Trade, argued that the solution to the problem of 
slavery was poverty reduction through economic development (Groser, 2009). He raised the 
concern that a ban on slavery imports would inadvertently harm workers in poverty, for instance if 
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their product became tainted with slavery elsewhere in the supply chain. Groser also raised the 
concern that a unilateral definition of slavery, and any import ban, would lead to opposition from 
trade partners. A report from the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee in response to the 
petition that sparked the Bill took a similar line (Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee, as 
cited in Hutchison, 2009). Proving a trade ban was not a disguised trade barrier was perceived to be 
a difficult task. These objections reflect a prevailing belief in free trade to advance the social good, 
and a reluctance to upset trading partners (which would damage competitiveness). Options for 
challenging international perceptions about acceptable grounds for a trade barrier were not 
explored. Instead, prevailing neoliberal assumptions determined the outcome. 
 
While highly likely, the influence of New Zealand‘s drive for competitiveness was not made 
explicit in this case. At no point in the debate was the objection raised that an import ban would 
impose costs (and liability) on New Zealand business. No speakers mentioned the threat the bill 
posed to New Zealand competitiveness as a result of business uncertainty, or from adding costs of 
due diligence. Groser raised concerns about the broad definition of slavery, which hints at this 
issue. (Indeed, one speaker to the bill interpreted the definition to include sweatshop labour in 
China, which would implicate a large number of New Zealand businesses [Harawira, 2009].) 
However, it is surprising that the threat to national competitiveness was not more explicitly raised. 
This omission could mean that New Zealand‘s pursuit of international competitiveness was not a 
motivation in its failure to enact regulation. It could equally suggest that competitiveness concerns 
have become so influential that they need only be implied. To oppose the bill on the basis of costs 
would blatantly expose the choice to be made between ―economic competitiveness‖ (particularly 
cheaper consumer products) and incentivising protection of offshore workers. Such an 
uncomfortable admission may not have been needed. 
 
      A similar case: Failure of the attempt to ban imports of products of illegal logging 
 
A similar case demonstrates even more clearly the influence of neoliberal assumptions on the New 
Zealand Government‘s approach to supply-chain social responsibility. In November 2009, 
Parliament considered another amendment to the Customs and Excise Act 1996, this time on the 
issue of forestry imports (Customs and Excise [Sustainable Forestry] Amendment Bill- First 
Reading, 2009). The proposed amendment would prohibit the import into New Zealand of timber 
and wood products produced illegally and unsustainably. Only forestry products with recognised 
certifications would be permitted. While the bill aimed to end the import into New Zealand of non-
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sustainably produced timbers, which voluntary initiatives had failed to do (Delahunty, 2009), the 
measure would also have brought economic benefit, as the New Zealand forestry industry was 
undermined $270 million per year by the effects of illegal and unsustainable logging. 
 
Even in this case, in which an economic benefit was clear, the bill did not make it to its first 
reading. The sector was left to continue using voluntary initiatives. The bill was opposed on the 
grounds it would add compliance costs to the forestry sector (Ardern, 2009). It was opposed for 
anticipated negative impact on trade relations (Goudie, 2009). It was also opposed due to the 
perceived general benefits of promoting free trade principles. One speaker raised the point that New 
Zealand exports are successful due to New Zealand‘s general support of free trade around the 
world. They also raised that this promotion of free trade is the ―best thing we can do for small, 
undeveloped Third World countries‖ (Ardern, 2009). In all these objections to regulation, the 
influence of neoliberal assumptions can be clearly seen.  
 
      The Influence of Power Imbalances 
 
The political approach, with its consideration of the political context, is therefore useful in 
understanding the lack of binding regulation in New Zealand. However, it is also necessary to 
consider power imbalances between contending actors, as these help to explain the compromise at 
private regulation that has eventuated. Due to a lack of data on business lobbying (instrumental 
power) in New Zealand, the following discussion is confined to structural and discursive power.   
 
A significant bias exists in New Zealand discussions of social responsibility. Lacking a strong voice 
from confrontational groups, discussions of social responsibility are dominated by BSOs. All three 
BSOs in New Zealand are funded by business, and exist to serve their members. Consequently, 
should members‘ activities conflict with the social good, ―doubts must remain‖ as to whether they 
can reconcile these tensions (Milne, Tregidga, & Walton, 2006, p. 20). The conflict of interest 
inherent in BSOs is clearest in the case of Sustainable BusinessNZ. Its parent organisation exists to 
campaign for business freedom, and is an active advocate of self-regulation (see for instance, 
BusinessNZ, 2006). Its ability to accept costs on business is therefore dubious. 
 
One case seems to provide evidence of BSOs‘ inability to overcome their inherent conflict of 
interest. A 2005 stance by the NZBCSD in favour of a carbon tax on business, appears to have 
contributed to a marked membership decline (Wright, 2011). The case of this carbon tax was one in 
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which costs had to be imposed on business for the social good. However, it appears the BSOs‘ 
attempt to accept this ―win-lose‖ outcome was not tolerated by its members. The case suggests that 
BSOs do indeed face limitations in advocating  for outcomes that impose costs on business.  
 
The dominance of BSOs means the promotion of ―pro-business‖ discourses of CSR, at the expense 
of other narratives (Prasad and Elmes, 2005, as cited in Brown & Fraser, 2006, p. 104-5; Milne et 
al., 2006, p. 19; Milne, 2005a). New Zealand BSOs promote the business case for CSR as ―the only 
discourse‖, creating assumptions that it is neutral and objective (Milne et al., 2006, p. 19). CSR is 
promoted as effective. There is an underlying assumption that any business can become sustainable, 
and there is distraction from outcomes in which business has to make sacrifices for the sake of 
social responsibility (Milne et al., 2006, p. 14, 19). 
 
As the only players in the market, BSOs have grown to positions of considerable power. The 
NZBCSD has become particularly influential because of its promotion of a pragmatic ―middle way‖ 
between the Business Round Table and Parliamentary Commission for the Environment (Milne et 
al., 2006, p. 10). (This position may shift following NZBCSD‘s merger with the Sustainable 
BusinessNZ forum.) NZBCSD has formed ―extremely close links‖ with the Government (p. 19). 
Sustainable BusinessNZ has significant credibility as a representative of mainstream business, and 
has close ties to the Ministry of Economic Development. These relationships equate to avenues for 
structural power. BSOs also promote discourses that reinforce economic logic, expert control and 
business superiority, which further strengthens their position (Milne et al., 2006, p. 20). These 
discourses are likely to be reinforced should mainstream business (through Sustainable 
BusinessNZ) play a growing role on the newly-formed Sustainable Business Council. This would 
make the dominance of BSOs increasingly difficult to challenge. 
 
The relative lack of consumer and confrontational groups leaves only tertiary institutions and trade 
unions to critically analyse the role of BSOs and their prominent business-case discourses. Tertiary 
institutions and the few existing confrontational groups lack resources compared to business 
associations, and face an uphill battle to compete. The prominence of pro-business discourses of 
CSR also reduces the perceived need for critique, or indeed for any confrontational activities 
(naming and shaming, boycotts, or lobbying for binding social responsibility requirements). 
Somewhat ironically, one result of the dominance of BSOs is that awareness is low about the 
shortcomings of CSR and the desperate need for stronger alternatives. There is also low awareness 
of the dangers of business power and the need for more balanced debate. Critique of attention to 
 95 
 
supply-chain social responsibility is particularly lacking. With the exception of this thesis, there has 
not been any academic critique of supply-chain labour initiatives in New Zealand.  
 
In light of these power imbalances, it is unsurprising that BSOs are successful in directing the New 
Zealand public and policy-makers towards voluntary CSR as a means of addressing supply-chain 
labour conditions. However, why any form of regulation has emerged, given the weakness of 
demand for attention to supply-chain labour standards, demands explanation. Through the political 
approach, the gradual emergence of supply-chain labour initiatives, rather than no regulation at all, 
could be explained in several ways. For businesses that sell to offshore markets, it could be a result 
of the relative power of activists overseas. For businesses selling to New Zealand markets, the 
emergence of private regulation could result from the (even weak) pressure there has been towards 
binding regulation on supply-chain social responsibility in New Zealand. While confrontational 
groups are weak, there has been sufficient pressure to see two bills before Parliament (though not 
for several years). This may be sufficient power to provoke a settlement at private regulation.  
 
The emergence of supply-chain labour initiatives among businesses selling to the New Zealand 
market could also be a result of the observation of overseas experiences. As New Zealand 
businesses and BSOs witness increasing activism overseas, they may anticipate similar activism at 
home. New Zealand consumers may therefore possess ―latent power‖ from their very potential to 
raise concerns about supply chains. This may be proving sufficient to ensure a settlement at 
voluntary regulation rather than none at all.  
 
      Explanatory Power of the Political Approach 
 
The political approach is therefore highly useful to explain the emergence of supply-chain labour 
initiatives in New Zealand. The lack of binding regulation can be explained by the de jure and de 
facto constraints on policy-makers as a result of the dominance of neoliberal discourses. These 
constraints are seen in the debates on the failed Customs and Excise Act amendments. The portrayal 
of supply-chain labour initiatives as a political settlement also has strong explanatory power. The 
dominance of BSOs in New Zealand, and lack of critique, has led to a dominance of perceptions 
that CSR is effective. This reduces the perceived need for alternatives, both within Government and 
wider society. However, some demand for social responsibility does exist in New Zealand. The 
existing and latent power of consumers may be sufficient to pressure a settlement at voluntary 
private regulation, and make inaction by businesses no longer an option. 
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The political approach offers important lessons for improving social responsibility. Most 
importantly, the approach suggests that the current settlement at private regulation is not inevitable. 
Should neoliberal assumptions be challenged, or power balances altered, alternative settlements 
would be possible. These lessons are incorporated into the recommendations in Chapter Six. 
The political approach also has limitations. It does not explain the presence of advanced ―outlier‖ 
cases, which have arisen despite minimal pressure. Advanced cases could only be explained by the 
political approach if these businesses had unusually high levels of information about overseas or 
domestic activism, and therefore had higher perceptions of consumers‘ latent power. An 
investigation of motivations in these advanced companies is outside the scope of this paper. From 
this necessarily limited discussion alone, the competitiveness approach appears to better explain 
advanced cases. 
 
Conclusion: Explaining the Extent and Emergence of Private Regulation in New Zealand 
 
New Zealand efforts to address supply-chain social responsibility are tending towards reliance on 
private regulation. There are minimal legally-enforceable instruments to incentivise socially-
responsible behaviour. Bilateral agreements on labour conditions do not bind parties to 
improvements or ensure problems will be discussed. Bilateral cooperation largely avoids the most 
pressing labour concerns. CSR has been advocated by BSOs and the Government. While only a 
minority of New Zealand businesses undertake CSR to address supply-chain labour issues, CSR 
appears to be the area of growth. 
 
To explain the trend towards private regulation in New Zealand, both the competitiveness and 
political approaches are helpful. The competitiveness approach attributes the emergence of CSR to 
businesses defence and pursuit of competitive advantage. In light of the low level of demand, 
businesses have not needed to pay attention to social responsibility in order to defend competitive 
advantage. Neither have businesses been offered market incentives for action, equipped with 
resources or given additional incentives, to encourage them to choose supply-chain labour 
initiatives as a means of pursuing competitive advantage. While demands for social responsibility 
have increased, CSR remains unusually progressive. There are no motivations for stronger 
initiatives. Therefore, aside from a few advanced cases, which may derive market benefits from 
supply-chain labour initiatives specifically, the majority of businesses have not yet faced significant 
market incentives to undertake supply-chain labour initiatives. The competitiveness approach thus 
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has some explanatory power in the New Zealand case. However, the approach is silent on the role 
of non-business actors, the reasons for current demand and the capabilities of actors pursuing 
alternatives. Its explanation for the emergence of CSR is therefore limited. 
 
The political approach fills this gap, explaining the level of supply-chain labour initiatives as a 
settlement resulting from business organisations‘ relative (but not absolute) power over other civil 
society actors in New Zealand. This approach also offers a thorough explanation for the 
Government‘s failure to regulate, in light of de jure and de facto constraints arising in the neoliberal 
context. Consequently, the political approach is far more comprehensive in explaining the New 
Zealand case. It offers significant lessons for how social responsibility could be improved.  
 
These explanations assist understanding of the current attention to supply-chain labour issues in 
New Zealand. Most importantly, they show that the current levels of attention are not inevitable. 
The competitiveness approach sheds light on the need to increase market rewards for social 
responsibility, or the perceived costs of irresponsibility, to generate greater spread and depth of 
CSR. The political approach suggests what is required to move beyond voluntary initiatives. 
Confrontational groups could challenge the political constraints preventing binding regulation. They 
could aim to alter power balances. A strong effort to strengthen confrontational groups, and 
challenge the dominance of BSOs, could therefore shift the settlement towards more effective 
alternatives. These possibilities are the subject of Chapter Six. Before turning to these possibilities, 
it is necessary to explore the effectiveness of CSR in the case of China. This sheds light on the 
consequences of the current trend towards CSR.  
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Chapter 5: The Effectiveness of Corporate Social Responsibility in China: What 
Can and Cannot be Expected of Supply-Chain Labour Initiatives? 
 
New Zealand is one of many trading partners attempting to use corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) to regulate labour conditions in its Chinese supply chains. Among foreign multinationals 
operating in China, CSR is a growing phenomenon (Chahoud, 2011, p. 158). The earliest codes by 
foreign multinationals emerged in China in the early 1990s. As the social auditing industry has 
boomed in China and NGOs have proliferated offering consultancy on CSR implementation, the 
belief has become widespread that CSR can effectively improve labour conditions. In the early 
stages of the movement, the Chinese Government viewed CSR as foreign protectionism and 
approached it with skepticism. However, after engaging in its own debates on CSR, the Chinese 
Government now views CSR as a business contribution to China‘s ―harmonious society‖ policies, 
and a measure that can supplement the enforcement of labour law (Chahoud, 2011, p. 158-160).  
 
Whether CSR is in fact beneficial for Chinese workers is a matter of considerable contention. While 
successful case studies spread the belief that CSR can assist workers in China, critics argue that its 
effectiveness is fundamentally limited. There are also strong concerns that it may be detrimental to 
Chinese workers, as it detracts from state labour law enforcement and worker organising. There are 
fears that CSR may in fact contribute to ―social harmony‖ by muting workers‘ struggles.  
 
This chapter will address these debates, seeking to determine the effectiveness of foreign 
companies‘ supply-chain labour initiatives on the ground in China. I first outline the spread and 
scope of these initiatives, and analyse the effectiveness of the most common mechanisms. I next 
explore the effectiveness of the most advanced mechanisms. Finally, I examine to what extent the 
potential risks of CSR— to labour organising, the NGO movement, government regulation and 
democratic governance— are indeed cause for concern in the China case. It is argued that while 
CSR can bring superficial improvements, there are fundamental limits to its spread and scope. 
Furthermore, both CSR practice and over-belief in its ability have the potential to cause harmful 
effects in China. If the aim is effective improvement of labour conditions, CSR should be 
considered merely a ―band-aid‖, implemented as one of many tools, and only with full knowledge 
of its limitations. It should never be prioritised above alternatives of worker organising or enhanced 
state labour law enforcement. 
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Limits to the Coverage and Scope of CSR in China 
 
Despite the spread of the CSR movement, coverage and scope of CSR initiatives in China remain 
extremely limited. China is the world‘s leading producer in the sectors most ―eligible‖ for CSR: 
apparel, footwear, toys and electronics. Yet even in these sectors CSR initiatives touch a minority 
of factories. Coverage of labour certifications and audits by multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs) is 
minimal. SA8000, one of the few certifications to include labour conditions, had certified less than 
100 apparel factories in 2006, out of an estimated 100,000 producing for the US market alone 
(O'Rourke, 2006, p. 15). By 2011, there were still less than 380 certified facilities in China (Social 
Accountability Accreditation Services, 2011). World Responsible Apparel Production (WRAP), a 
garment industry standard, had certified only 333 facilities in China by 2011 (WRAP, 2011). In 
2012, the Worker Rights Consortium listed 1,782 Chinese factories that supplied its members. It 
provided factory assessments for only two (Worker Rights Consortium, 2012). The Fair Wear 
Foundation, a US garment industry MSI, had 33 members producing in 530 factories in China in 
2011, but conducted only 25 audits (Fair Wear Foundation, 2011, p. 1). The Fair Labour 
Association conducted less than 53 audits in China in 2010, a tiny proportion of the 1,792 Chinese 
factories supplying its members (Fair Labour Association, 2010 , p. 10, 20). 
 
Auditing by industry associations also touches a mere fraction of suppliers in China. In 2009, 
members of the Electronics Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) conducted a total of 1,300 audits, 
a tiny minority of a total of 11,000 major suppliers (EICC, 2009, p. 16). In 2011, the International 
Council of Toy Industries (ICTI) had certified 1,236 suppliers in China, representing just under 1 
million workers (ICTI CARE Foundation, 2011). In 2008, China had more than 8,000 toy factories 
(Chen, 2009, p. 37). In total, China has more than 100 million manufacturing workers (Banister & 
Cook, 2011, p. 39; Harney, 2008, p. 8). Audits by industry associations therefore touch but a 
fraction of China‘s workers. While CSR also occurs outside MSIs and industry associations, it is 
haphazard and even shallower in scope (Utting, 2003, p. 22). There are almost no CSR initiatives 
into sectors hidden from consumers, or in sub-tiers of the supply chain (Business for Social 
Responsibility, 2007, p. 38). In China, as elsewhere, CSR touches only a minority of first-tier 
suppliers (Chan, 2003, p. 11).  
 
Even where CSR is implemented in China, initiatives are shallow. The vast majority of CSR 
activity in China is limited to codes of conduct, which may or may not be implemented. Many 
companies have yet to take any action to implement codes. A 2007 survey of EICC members found 
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that 20 percent of members conducted no audits and another 20 percent conducted less than 10 total 
audits per year (Business for Social Responsibility, 2007, p. 21). Due to transparency barriers 
between Northern consumers and factories in China, it is possible for businesses to pacify consumer 
concerns simply by joining an MSI or adopting a code of conduct, without any change in activity. 
 
Of the companies who do implement codes in China, the majority rely on auditing methods shown 
repeatedly to be inadequate (AMRC, 2006a, 2006c; Bhushan, Prieto-Carron, Lund-Thomsen, Chan, 
& Muro, 2006; Blackett, 2004; Business for Social Responsibility, 2007; Clean Clothes Campaign, 
2005; Harney, 2008; Jeffcott & Yanz, 2000; O'Rourke, 2002; Pun, 2005a; Utting, 2003). Auditing 
in China is severely limited by deception from factories and corruption from auditors. Workers are 
trained to lie to auditors. Many suppliers hide poor conditions in ―shadow factories‖, while showing 
model facilities to auditors. The practice of double-book keeping (hiding problems of low wages 
and excessive hours) is extremely common, and there is even software available to facilitate the 
practice (see, for instance, Harney, 2008, p. 46, 199). It is standard practice for audits to be pre-
announced audits, yet these detect only the most obvious (cosmetic) problems. Corruption among 
auditors is also a widespread problem (Clean Clothes Campaign, 2005, p. 25). In a survey of 
supplier factories audited by the ICTI Foundation, 14 percent reported being solicited by an auditor 
with inappropriate benefit requests during 2010 (ICTI, 2010, p. 2). Even the most advanced MSIs 
are still establishing auditing methods to address these deficiencies. However, whether it could ever 
be feasible to resource the ―extensive‖ approaches necessary is highly questionable (Utting, 2005, 
p. 9). Critics of CSR argue that reliance on deficient methods can be intentional. Many foreign 
companies prefer not to learn of violations, and therefore hire auditors who will seldom detect 
problems (Chan, 2009; Pun, 2005a). 
 
When auditors do uncover problems, action to remedy them is poor. Standard practice is to cease 
trade only in the event of egregious non-compliances. It is common for foreign companies to 
identify problems in the majority of their suppliers, yet to continue trade while problems await 
rectification. Requests to remedy problems may or may not be enforced. For instance, in 2009, less 
than half of EICC members provided follow-up audits to check problems had been remedied 
(EICC, 2009, p. 16-17). (This was despite an average of 6 major non-compliances per facility.) 
Follow-up audits share all the above problems. While there is a spectrum of stringency, even the 
best methods are subject to serious shortcomings. 
 
 101 
 
There is next to no commitment from foreign companies to resource improvements in their 
suppliers. While to varying degrees TNCs divert value to auditors, they do not redirect value to 
suppliers (Bulut & Lane, 2011, p. 45). As one manager of a shoe manufacturer factory put it: ―If 
you‘re looking for the same working environment as developed countries, then you have to pay for 
it‖ (as cited in Harney, 2008, p. 184). Instead, buyers ―paradoxically‖ expect improved compliance 
levels at the same time as lower costs and shorter lead times (Sum & Pun, 2005; see also Yu 2008a, 
p. 520). Suppliers often lack capacity to achieve both. It is standard practice for the foreign 
company to make no contribution.  
 
Common CSR Methods in China: What do These Achieve? 
 
Despite these limitations, in the sectors they touch, the common CSR methods are generally agreed 
to have brought some positive developments in China (AMRC, 2005; Chan, 2005; Chen, 2009; 
Clean Clothes Campaign, 2005; O'Rourke & Brown, 2003; Pun, 2005a). Improvements brought by 
audits tend to address violations that are easily detectable, cheap or economically beneficial to 
remedy, or particularly abhorrent to consumers (see, for instance, Yu, 2008a, p. 517). An 
investigation of code implementation at two ―typical‖ Chinese factories reports that all workers 
were given contracts, there was no bonded labour, and disciplinary and wage systems were closer to 
legal requirements than factories without codes (Pun, 2005a). A survey of 240 workers at 12 toy 
manufacturers, including suppliers to Disney, Mattel, McDonalds and Wal-Mart, also found that 
factories with codes of conduct had higher standards of workshop safety and food, and fewer 
serious labour violations than those without (Chen, 2009, p. 5, 21). In a 2005 survey of workers in 
40 factories, some in China, it was found that audits can bring partial improvements in reducing 
child labour and forced labour, and improving workers‘ health and safety situation (CCC, 2005, 
p.29). Foreign companies‘ own data (limited by auditing methods as noted above) documents 
gradual improvements in individual factories, and between initial and follow-up audits (Apple, 
2012, p. 4; Hewlett Packard, 2010; The Warehouse, 2009, p. 15). These improvements naturally 
rely on a certain degree of stringency. CSR initiatives reliant on infrequent or poor quality audits, or 
with merely un-audited codes, are highly unlikely even to bring cosmetic improvements. 
 
Codes and audits fail to address systemic problems. The Clean Clothes Campaign found that 
auditing fails to bring ―significant improvements in freedom of association and right to collective 
bargaining, non-discrimination, wages, working hours, employment relationship, and abusive 
treatment of workers‖ (2005, p. 29). In the case studies of ―typical factories‖ above, codes and 
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auditing failed to prevent illegally underpaid wages, or excessive overtime (Pun, 2005a, p. 14, 17). 
The survey of toy workers found serious violations at factories with codes of conduct, and the 
author notes that codes do not improve freedom of association and collective bargaining (Chen, 
2009, p. 31-32). A further study into toy manufacturers in China found that over two thirds did not 
comply with the majority of the studied code criteria (Egels-Zandén, 2007, p. 11-12). A survey of 
workers at suppliers of Wal-Mart, which conducts the largest number of audits of any company, 
found that audits consistently failed to achieve compliance in wages and working hours (Chan & 
Siu, 2009). Even TNCs themselves acknowledge that issues of wages and working hours remain 
pervasive problems (Apple, 2012, p. 6-7; Hewlett Packard, 2010; The Warehouse, 2009). The 
Apple 2012 Supply Responsibility Progress report concedes that of 229 factories audited, at least 
108 did not pay workers according to legal requirements. Only 38 percent complied with Apple‘s 
code of conduct on working hours, which itself violates legal limits (Apple, 2012, p. 6-7). Freedom 
of association clauses are frequently ignored. Furthermore, auditing is incapable of solving the 
problem of suppliers subcontracting ―as a means of shedding social responsibility,‖ (Utting, 2003, 
p. 23), a major concern in China.  
 
To some extent, audit-reliant CSR has had positive effects on labour consciousness. Ironically, even 
suppliers‘ efforts to trick auditors by teaching workers ―model answers‖ in line with labour law can 
in fact educate workers about their rights (AMRC, 2005; Clean Clothes Campaign, 2005, p. 49). 
Research by Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee estimates that the level of migrant worker 
consciousness about labour law and codes of conduct rose approximately 20 percent between 2001 
and 2003 (AMRC, 2005). This indicates CSR initiatives have made a contribution in this area. 
 
Common CSR methods have thus had some positive impacts in China. However, given their 
minimal coverage and effectiveness only in addressing cosmetic problems, CSR in China has made 
only a ―slight dent‖ in the problem of poor working conditions (Utting, 2003, p. 24). Despite this, in 
a handful of highly-advanced cases, CSR initiatives have achieved more impressive outcomes. 
 
Exceptional Cases of CSR in China: What Can These Achieve? 
 
In the best cases of CSR in China, initiatives have been deep in scope and addressed systemic 
problems. Some foreign companies have been pressured to increase transparency, and to seek NGO 
involvement. They have undertaken projects to address wages and working hours. TNCs have even 
sought to establish worker representation mechanisms that would not otherwise have been provided. 
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These rare examples demonstrate the potential effectiveness of advanced CSR initiatives. However, 
even these ―best-case scenarios‖ show their own limitations, as they still work within market 
pressures. The majority of New Zealand companies fall far short of these standards. 
 
Increased Transparency 
 
In most common CSR practice internationally, there is minimal commitment from TNCs to 
transparency about their initiatives in China. Audit results, and supplier factory names are almost 
never published. However, in a minority of cases, TNCs have been pressured to provide greater 
transparency. In 1995, Nike and Levi Strauss disclosed their supplier lists (Doorey, 2005, 2011). A 
handful of others have since followed, including Hewlett Packard in 2007 and Dell in 2009 (Dell, 
2011; Hewlett Packard, 2008). In January 2012, Apple also disclosed a list of 156 of its suppliers 
(Apple, 2012, p. 3). Some MSIs have disclosed factory locations and audit reports for some time. 
For instance, since 2002, the Fair Labour Association has published 32 investigations into third-
party complaints, four of these in China (Fair Labour Association, 2012a). Disclosure of suppliers 
and conditions remains far from common practice, as these are usually considered commercially 
sensitive. However, norms of greater transparency are gradually developing and raising 
expectations of what qualifies a CSR leader, even if the current levels are extremely low.  
 
Where disclosure does occur, it equips activists with greater ability to monitor conditions in TNCs‘ 
supply chains (O'Rourke & Brown, 2003, p. 381). Activists can then more easily expose 
shortcomings and pressure towards improvements. However, this disclosure comes with limitations. 
TNCs whose CSR is poorly developed (those most needing to be targeted) do not equip activists in 
this way. This leaves activists torn over whether to applaud TNCs for their disclosure, or to use this 
information for criticism, effectively punishing the TNC for publishing its suppliers. To use the 
information for criticism may deter transparency from others. 
 
Incentives for greater transparency remain extremely weak. The commercial risks associated with 
inviting scrutiny of conditions are perceived to outweigh the benefits of improved reputation from 
social responsibility. Buying structures also present barriers. A large proportion of buyers from 
China purchase through sourcing agents, for instance Li & Feng Ltd. (Cheng, 2001), making their 
supply chains particularly opaque. TNCs themselves may be unaware of their own suppliers. 
However, steps can be taken to require suppliers to disclose subsequent tiers of the supply chain, as 
seen by The Warehouse‘s initiative to form a supplier register (The Warehouse, 2011, p. 19). 
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Activism could encourage others to pursue similar initiatives. To the extent that great disclosure 
eventuates, activists are enabled to push for more effective CSR. 
 
Projects on Wages and Work Hours 
 
A small number of initiatives have attempted to address the systemic problem of excessive overtime 
hours and low wages, and have had some effectiveness. These are among a few cases 
internationally (ETI, 2009; United Nations Global Compact Human Rights and Business Dilemmas 
Forum, 2012). In one example in China, a collaborative effort between Chinese organisations and 
eleven UK companies helped reduce excessive overtime and raise wages in their suppliers‘ factories 
(Association for Sustainable and Responsible Investment in Asia, 2005; Ramaswamy, 2005). 
Through negotiations and training to increase productivity, the most successful factories reduced 
hours by 20 to 37 per cent, and wages rose in four out of five factories (Ramaswamy, 2005, p. 20-
23). These success rates are comparable with a similar project at suppliers to a UK fashion retailer 
in Bangladesh. In the first year of the project, wages of the lowest level of workers increased by 24 
percent, and overtime rates dropped by 46 percent (ETI, 2009). These cases demonstrate that it is 
possible for advanced CSR initiatives to increase wages and lower working hours. 
 
However, the potential spread of such projects in China is extremely limited. The above project was 
intended as an investigation only. It relied on heavy involvement from stakeholder organisations, 
long-term relationships with suppliers, and unusual cooperation and trust between participants. It 
also necessitated significant investment of time (three years). This investment and cooperation 
would seldom be available. The applicability of lessons from the project is also limited. The project 
was framed around productivity gains and promised economic benefits for suppliers. Addressing 
systemic problems is not always economically beneficial. In the majority of situations, market 
forces incentivise the opposite behaviour. It is therefore unlikely that CSR initiatives would produce 
the above outcomes on a widespread basis. 
 
In-depth projects of this nature are extremely rare. In more common attempts, TNCs have sought to 
adapt their own purchasing practices to reduce overtime hours. Steady purchasing practices and 
long-term relationships with suppliers are known to reduce overtime (ETI, 2007, p. 5, 8). This issue 
has been pushed by the ETI, and some members have undertaken to improve purchasing practices 
(Buttle, Hughes, & Wrigley, 2007, p. 20). One New Zealand manager I interviewed also reported 
considering the impacts of their purchasing practices on suppliers. However, competition often 
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necessitates quick changes of orders or suppliers. While pressure from the ETI has put purchasing 
practices on the agenda of TNCs in the UK, as of 2007 it remained ―relatively absent as an issue‖ in 
the US (Buttle et al., 2007, p. 2). The take-up of CSR practices is again limited by commercial 
pressures. It is uncertain how many New Zealand businesses consider these issues. 
 
NGO Involvement and Access 
 
Some advanced CSR initiatives have allowed greater involvement of NGOs, which are excluded 
from the majority of CSR methods (Social Accountability International & Center for International 
Private Enterprise, 2009, p. 13). In sectors where CSR policies are criticised as being corporate-
driven, businesses can co-opt ―partner‖ NGOs as a means of increasing their own legitimacy. This 
can create problems, as discussed below. However, it does provide NGOs with access to factories. 
 
NGOs have used factory access to empower workers. In the late 1990s, the ETI invited a coalition 
of Hong Kong labour NGOs to participate in a pilot monitoring project in China (Jeffcott & Yanz, 
2000). The NGOs suggested that monitoring should instead be the responsibility of workers 
themselves, supported by training from NGOs on workers‘ rights and how to register complaints. 
This proposal was rejected. However, these methods of involvement have since become 
increasingly common. 
 
Many brand companies now invite NGOs to train Chinese workers on codes of conduct and labour 
rights, and even to establish worker participation mechanisms. A number of Hong Kong NGOs 
operate in this way. In 2008 to 2009, SACOM coordinated in-factory labour rights training 
programmes at two suppliers to Hewlett Packard in China, assisted by Labour Education and 
Service Network. They provided 1,549 workers with basic labour rights training and a guide to the 
Electronics Industry Code of Conduct and Chinese labour law (Cheng & Yi, in van Regenmortel, 
2010). Many advanced brands in the garment, toys, shoes and electronics sectors now conduct 
worker training in at least a couple of their suppliers. While there are no official figures, due to the 
large number of organisations hired, ―a fair portion‖ of the 10 million migrant workers in South 
China may well have received some awareness training (Chan, 2005, p. 5).  
 
This involvement has directly empowered workers, for instance providing skills to communicate 
with management. It has also had indirect effects. While NGOs usually sign confidentiality orders 
preventing them from exposing violations, factory access does provide them with a greater 
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understanding of problems. Furthermore, it has opened the door to worker organisation (van 
Regenmortel, 2010). Many NGOs engage in worker training in the hope of identifying and 
empowering worker leaders, who may go on to organise in their factories. While carrying risks, this 
increased NGO involvement is a positive outcome of the pressure towards more advanced CSR 
initiatives.  
 
Worker Participation and Empowerment 
 
In some of the most advanced cases of CSR in China, practitioners have pushed for worker 
participation in their suppliers. This has led to outcomes of worker empowerment not otherwise 
possible given China‘s heavy restrictions on freedom of association and collective bargaining.  
These initiatives are motivated by the acknowledgement that worker representation (or at least 
feedback) is more effective than audits at ensuring implementation of codes (AMRC, 2005; see also 
Cahn as cited in Maitland, 2002). CSR-driven worker participation mechanisms could be 
considered a response to a structural need of capital to have shop floor disputes resolved, and the 
need for an alternative to the ineffective ACFTU (see Yu, 2008b, p. 282). Worker participation 
mechanisms are also a response to growing pressure from consumer campaigns for code clauses on 
freedom of association to be implemented (AMRC, 2005). Several forms of worker participation 
mechanism are worthy of analysis. 
 
      Worker Feedback 
 
Some TNCs have responded to the inadequacy of auditing, and pressure to implement freedom of 
association clauses, with worker feedback mechanisms. In poorly implemented cases, these have 
consisted of complaint boxes, or management-controlled worker hotlines, which workers do not 
feel comfortable to use. However, in more advanced cases, workers are encouraged to raise 
complaints directly to brand representatives (AMRC, 2005; Chan, 2009). For instance, at Reebok 
suppliers, workers have been given stamped envelopes to send complaints directly to Reebok 
(Chan, 2009, p. 298). After Reebok received 1,200 complaints in one year, they pressured supplier 
management to take complaints more seriously. Worker hotlines have also proven effective. In one 
example, a Hong Kong NGO China Working Womens‘ Network set up a hotline at an electronics 
factory, and trained workers to run it themselves (Lee in van Regenmortel, 2010).  
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These CSR-driven worker feedback initiatives can be a positive step in worker empowerment, 
particularly in a culture of hierarchical authority, autocratic factory regimes and a society with no 
experience of confrontational unions. However, these mechanisms have limitations. Vital to these 
feedback mechanisms are provisions to ensure anonymity and safety for workers, and to prevent 
management control. This requires considerable expertise in implementing the system. It also often 
requires involvement from the TNC or an NGO, either of which necessitate a high degree of 
investment and economic clout over the supplier. These mechanisms are therefore possible only in 
certain buying structures. While MSIs or brands with monopoly buying power may implement 
these mechanisms in select factories, not every foreign company has the economic clout and 
resources to do so, certainly not in all suppliers. Most New Zealand companies would be incapable 
of doing so. 
 
CSR-driven worker feedback mechanisms also carry risks. They can be used for greenwash 
(misleading claims of social responsibility) and misrepresented as sufficient alternatives to freedom 
of association. Poorly implemented or intentionally inadequate measures may be a low-cost way to 
pacify consumer demands. They may even be a means of pacifying workers, by attempting to 
crowd out, or reduce the perceived need for, worker organising.  
 
      Worker Committees 
 
In light of the barriers to independent trade unions in China, some TNCs have attempted to 
implement freedom of association clauses by pressuring suppliers to create workers‘ committees 
(AMRC, 2006b; O'Rourke & Brown, 2003; Szudy, O'Rourke, & Brown, 2003). Non-union worker 
representation structures are legal in China, if recognised and supervised by the ACFTU (Yu, 
2008b, p. 283). They can take the form of health and safety committees or worker welfare 
committees. These are virtually impossible for employees to set up independently (O'Rourke & 
Brown, 2003, p. 382).  
 
Several projects have aimed to encourage suppliers to set up health and safety committees. One 
project between 2000 and 2002 brought together US and Hong Kong labour rights organisations 
and three TNCs (Nike, Adidas and Reebok). This project led to three plants creating or expanding 
health and safety committees, and to increased worker participation (Szudy et al., 2003). In another 
project, in 2003 the ETI aimed to work with Chinese suppliers to establish elected health and safety 
committees, in collaboration with nine Hong Kong groups (AMRC, 2005). The ETI has since 
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undertaken other projects to encourage the establishment of worker committees (ETI, 2010). While 
health and safety committees play too narrow a role to fulfill freedom of association clauses, they 
do empower workers and provide a feedback role, in addition to improving workplace safety. They 
can also provide a stepping stone towards more genuine forms of representation, as in the Reebok 
case below.  
 
Labour NGOs and CSR practitioners have also pushed suppliers to establish worker committees 
with broader mandates. In 2004, Social Accountability International (SAI) partnered with an 
international trade union to set up an independently elected workers‘ committee at a ‗typical‘ 
garment factory (Social Accountability International & Center for International Private Enterprise, 
2009, p. 16-21). SAI convinced the factory to participate by explaining the economic benefits of a 
worker committee. According to the project report, this committee improved working conditions, 
reduced turnover, and increased productivity and communication with management. The committee 
even achieved a small wage rise. In 2005, 74 workers were randomly interviewed, and 89 per cent 
of these believed that the committee was beneficial to workers. After the success of this project, 
another local manufacturer also decided to implement a similar initiative. Other NGOs have also 
undertaken similar projects, for instance the China Working Women‘s Network (Chan, 2006). 
 
While delivering some benefits, there are limitations to CSR initiatives to establish worker 
committees. Worker committees are incapable of making controversial demands. The SAI project 
was sold to the factory on the basis that it would prove economically beneficial. This prevents the 
committee from any activity that conflicts with the interests of management. Furthermore, 
representatives of worker committees in China have no legal protection from dismissal (van 
Regenmortel, 2010). Management may dismiss representatives, or even dismantle the committee 
should it become an economic burden. Finally, workers‘ committees depend on management for 
information. In many cases committees are integrated into the human resources department, serving 
the economic welfare of the company (as appears to be the situation in the SAI case). Management 
can easily control any disputes that arise. 
 
These aspects of workers‘ committees make them highly questionable means of implementing 
freedom of association clauses. As van Regenmortel notes,  ―all this sounds like the practices of a 
yellow union; yet - under the name of CSR – it is considered a legitimate ‗good practice‘‖ (2010). 
Yu also notes similarities between workers‘ committees and ―company unions‖ of the early 20th C 
US, which were established to boost productivity, stabilise labour relations and deter the spread of 
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the American Federation of Labour (2008, p. 286). While CSR-driven workers‘ committees are 
heralded as providing freedom of association, these efforts hinder stronger solutions. Like the 
worker feedback mechanisms above, they can distract from, and crowd out efforts for genuine 
worker organising.  
 
      Democratically-Elected Workplace Unions: the Reebok Case 
 
In the most exceptional cases, CSR departments have successfully pushed for democratic trade 
union elections at suppliers in China. However, while creating ―windows of opportunity for worker 
organising‖ (O'Rourke & Brown, 2003, p. 382), these attempts have not created lasting change. 
Close analysis of the following case demonstrates the challenges of CSR activity, even in the most 
conducive circumstances. 
 
In 2001 and 2002, Reebok facilitated democratic elections for trade unions at two suppliers, Shun 
Da and Kong Tai Shoes (KTS) (Chan, 2009; Lee, 2007; Yu, 2008a, p. 523; Yu, 2008b). Reebok had 
previously set up a ―Livelihood and Counseling Centre‖ in KTS in 1999 (Chan, 2009, p. 298). The 
new unions were affiliated to the ACFTU. The elections, facilitated entirely by Reebok, are thought 
to be the first of their kind in China (Maitland, 2002). The ACFTU has since noted other cases of 
suppliers holding direct elections to meet Western codes of conduct (Chan, 2005, p. 7).  
 
Reebok‘s situation was unusually conducive to progressive CSR activity (Yu, 2008a, p. 515). It is a 
brand company with high importance of reputation and risk of activist pressure, in a sector with 
established CSR norms. Its size and purchasing structure also made it particularly capable. Both 
suppliers were mono-client factories, which could not reject Reebok‘s demands. District level 
governments (and with them district level trade unions), also cooperated because of the importance 
of Reebok and its suppliers to their tax base. In the negotiation process, Reebok‘s economic clout 
proved vital for overcoming suppliers‘ and local governments‘ objections.  
 
Despite initial success at one factory, these unions were ultimately unsustainable. At KTS, the new 
union saw initial success (Chan, 2009, p. 305). Management was willing to work with the union, 
and the union achieved some concessions (particularly on rights-based issues). The higher-level 
ACFTU provided tacit support during this period, even naming the KTS union the district‘s ―model 
union branch‖ (p. 305). At Shun Da, however, the new union struggled from the start. Despite 
Reebok‘s attempts to involve an NGO, the district trade union insisted on training the new union, 
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and instilled the idea that unions should work closely with management. Active worker 
representatives who had other ideas became management targets; one was even forced to quit. 
Despite Reebok‘s clout and careful negotiation, it was unable to overcome the ACFTU and supplier 
in power dynamics. 
 
Later developments saw even the KTS union silenced (Chan, 2009, p. 306-307). The factory was 
sold and new management was unwilling to accommodate the union‘s demands. The factory ceased 
allowing NGO support. Reebok also withdrew assistance. This was out of belief that the union 
should fend for itself, and also to maintain good relations with the supplier. It was also a response to 
a shift in the ACFTU‘s stance. In mid 2003, a vice president of the ACFTU said publicly that 
―foreigners should not intervene in Chinese trade union affairs‖ (p. 308-9). When Reebok sought a 
second KTS election in 2003, the industrial zone union informed Reebok that ―further interference 
in the union election would be illegal‖ (p. 306).  
 
By 2003, this project had failed. Neither union had achieved independence or the strength to 
bargain with management. The election was thwarted by power dynamics between Reebok, the 
local ACFTU and management, all of which gained from the union becoming ineffective (Yu, 
2008b, p. 287-291). The local ACFTU initially accepted the elections to maintain good relations 
with Reebok (a large tax payer) and to appear active to higher levels of the union. However, the 
local ACFTU also received considerable income from the supplier factory, and therefore faced 
financial incentive to oppose a strong union, which may drive the factory out of the area. Reebok‘s 
support of the new union committee was vital in both cases, but was eventually withdrawn to 
maintain good relations with the suppliers and local government. An investigation of the Shun Da 
union five years on found that working conditions had deteriorated and the new union was almost 
entirely ineffective (Lee, 2007).  
 
The case does show that CSR-driven democratic union elections are possible in China. However, 
these initiatives are precarious, and have yet to bring lasting change. This case may have been more 
successful, had Reebok provided a longer period of support for the new unions to protect them from 
management opposition (Chan, 2009, p. 309). The case also offered learning opportunities for 
officials. However the extreme challenges (and ultimate failure) in this case show the difficulty of 
implementing progressive CSR even when brand clout and enormous resources can be brought to 
bear.  
 
 111 
 
It also remains highly questionable that Reebok genuinely sought a confrontational trade union. As 
Chan notes, ―It would have been a strange trajectory in the history of global capitalism if capital 
were to become a genuine promoter of trade unionism‖ (2009, p. 310). While a union would have 
assisted Reebok by reducing the workload of Reebok‘s CSR department, or improving productivity, 
it is doubtful that Reebok would have continued to support a union that conflicted with its own 
profitability. The very attempt to establish the union has brought Reebok considerable benefit to its 
reputation. In the eyes of consumers, this failed experiment alone may well be sufficient to 
demonstrate Reebok‘s ―commitment to workers‘ rights‖.  
 
Limits of Exceptional Cases 
 
As these cases show, there are limits of CSR even in the most conducive circumstances. While 
transparency and NGO participation have increased in some cases, there have only been a handful 
of individual projects to address systemic problems, and these have not advanced beyond pilot 
projects. Ten years after the first initiatives to create worker representation mechanisms, none have 
achieved ongoing confrontational activity.  
 
It must be stressed that these cases are the ―pinnacle‖ of CSR practice. The shift from monitoring 
labour rights to freedom of association has occurred in only ―a handful of buying companies‖ 
(AMRC, 2005), almost exclusively brands. One estimate suggests that brands produce less than five 
percent of the Chinese export market for sports footwear (Utting, 2003, p. 26). For a handful of 
these brands to implement progressive policies is indeed a drop in the ocean. Furthermore, whether 
the improvements brought by these few cases are in fact ―better than nothing‖ depends on the risks 
arising from the CSR movement. 
 
Potential that CSR is Harmful for Labour Conditions 
 
There are also fears that the CSR movement has the potential for harmful effects. Many critics 
decry the trend towards private regulation as harmful to the mechanisms truly capable of improving 
labour conditions: the labour movement and its NGO supporters and state labour regulation. There 
are also fears of the impact that CSR has on democratic governance. In the case of China, some of 
these fears are justified.  
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Impact on the NGO Movement 
 
Critics of CSR raise concerns that it harms workers by dividing the NGO movement that supports 
them (Jeffcott & Yanz, 2000; van Regenmortel, 2010). In light of the rise of CSR, labour NGOs 
must decide to what extent they should partner with corporations to make some improvements, 
versus drawing attention to the misplaced reliance on CSR and its many shortcomings, in the hope 
of securing future regulation (Labour Rights in China, 1999; Yu, 2006). Those that cooperate are 
co-opted to become ―partners‖ rather than ―watchdogs‖ (confrontational groups), thereby 
weakening the critical voice (Justice, 2001, as cited in O'Rourke, 2006). The strategies of NGOs in 
these two roles can even potentially conflict, undermining the effectiveness of both (Doris Lee in 
van Regenmortel, 2010).  
 
Division of strategies towards CSR has been a problem among Hong Kong labour groups 
supporting the Chinese labour movement. While mainland NGOs have not focused on criticising 
the shortcomings of CSR, this has historically been the role of many Hong Kong labour groups. [I 
think further background on these NGOs would be a distraction here.] For instance, in 1999 a 
coalition of Hong Kong labour groups named SA8000 (a management-system certification) a 
―global cosmetic‖ with potential to bring adverse effects to labour movements (Labour Rights in 
China, 1999). However, alongside the rise of CSR, an increasing number of Hong Kong labour 
groups have taken on partnering roles. Some have even been established for this purpose (for 
instance CSR Asia). A study interviewing seven Hong Kong and mainland NGOs demonstrates that 
there are a range of strategies in relation to CSR (Yu, 2006).  
 
This divergence has split the movement‘s efforts, and created tensions. Partnering with foreign 
companies has distracted groups from worker organising, as they instead spend time engaging with 
firms and MSIs. This is a source of tension among groups who feel the core task of worker 
organising is being neglected. In 2006, this led nine Hong Kong labour groups to withdraw from the 
ETI. After investing three years and hundreds of hours of involvement, they concluded that this had 
delivered ―almost nothing‖ (AMRC, 2006b). These groups sought to return to a core focus on 
worker organising. However, confrontational NGOs are in turn criticised for turning down 
opportunities to directly assist workers. Neither strategy is as effective without the full strength of 
the NGO movement behind it. Tensions also arise from perceptions that NGOs partner with foreign 
companies solely to chase funding, which is much easier for partner NGOs to obtain. Partner NGOs 
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can report measurable outcomes to funders, while the success of confrontational groups‘ activities 
(monitoring and critiquing businesses) is far harder to quantify.  
 
Tensions also arise where partnering and confrontational strategies conflict. Some confrontational 
groups believe that any NGO support for CSR adds to misplaced belief in ―CSR as the solution‖ 
(Yu, 2006), directly undermining their own work. They argue that NGOs are used by corporations 
to add legitimacy to corporate claims. NGOs‘ efforts to encourage progress in CSR can also directly 
conflict with efforts to expose its limitations. For instance, one CSR ranking system published by 
Oxfam Hong Kong cited Foxconn as a ―CSR leader‖, to recognise its positive steps (Oxfam Hong 
Kong, 2009). This undermined the efforts of other Hong Kong groups drawing attention to labour 
rights violations in Foxconn. Concerns about conflicting strategies are likely to rise as 
confrontational NGOs form a declining proportion of labour groups. The growth of CSR has 
brought increased funding opportunities for partner NGOs, and there are concerns that the 
confrontational voice will be drowned out entirely. Hong Kong groups are attempting to respond by 
calling for the labour movement to form a more unified position on CSR (AMRC, 2011b; van 
Regenmortel, 2010). However whether NGOs can see past the opportunities for short term benefits 
and funding offered by the CSR movement, and agree on terms of engagement with CSR remains to 
be seen. 
 
Impacts on the Labour Movement 
 
There is debate over the effect of CSR on unionisation efforts (Compa, 2001; O'Rourke, 2006; van 
Regenmortel, 2010). Commentators in Central America raise concerns that NGO monitoring of 
codes can crowd out worker organising, by taking over worker representation roles usually played 
by unions (Compa, 2001). However, others argue that NGO monitoring has assisted union 
campaigns in El Salvador and Guatemala, and that CSR initiatives can be helpful in creating space 
for this (Quinteros, 2001 as cited in O'Rourke, 2006). In the case of China, CSR initiatives can be 
argued to both assist and potentially hinder unionisation efforts. As described above, CSR 
initiatives have increased NGOs‘ access to workers, raised awareness of labour rights and brought 
about unique windows of opportunity for worker representation. Progressive initiatives such as the 
Reebok case may even fuel ACFTU action towards democratic elections for workplace unions 
(Chan, 2009, p. 311). The foreign CSR movement has been among the biggest pressures for 
workplace democracy in China (Chan, 2005, p. 26-27).  
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However, CSR initiatives may simultaneously hinder the development of the labour movement. 
First, the practice of CSR auditing may crowd out the development of effective workers‘ 
representation. NGO monitoring of codes is rare in China. Instead, private auditors have taken the 
role of delivering improved labour conditions, supposedly on behalf of workers. These auditors can 
be viewed as ―competing‖ with the ACFTU to represent workers (AMRC, 2005). Furthermore, the 
prominence of CSR auditors may present a stumbling block to worker organising, as they remove 
the perceived need, and space, for workers or the ACFTU to seek improvements themselves. 
 
Second, there is the risk that the outcomes of CSR may unintentionally discourage worker 
organising, or intentionally obstruct it. Suppliers and TNCs may implement basic CSR initiatives in 
order to pacify workers, reducing the likelihood that they will organise. CSR-driven mechanisms 
for workers representation may also remove space and perceived need for stronger alternatives (van 
Regenmortel, 2010). While workers‘ committees can give workers a thirst for greater 
representation, in the cases where they are ineffective, they may put workers off the concept of 
unionisation altogether. Furthermore, the granting of labour rights from above, as occurs in the CSR 
model, only solidifies the East-Asian authoritarian, paternalistic factory regime that is typical in 
China (Pun, 2006). Management ―protects‖ workers from exploitation, but opposes any self-
organisation. The spread of CSR perpetuates this notion that improvements are bestowed from 
above rather than sought through grass-roots organising. This reduces the likelihood of workers 
organising for improvements. 
 
These risks make it imperative that labour advocates push for CSR initiatives that promote and not 
hinder labour movement development. CSR should be developed only alongside efforts to develop 
the labour movement. In light of the transparency barriers, it is near impossible to expose CSR 
efforts intentionally blocking worker organising. However, this risk should be publicised, and CSR 
practitioners demanded to reach higher standards.  
 
Impact on State Regulation and Enforcement 
 
There are concerns that CSR initiatives undermine government regulation and enforcement (Justice, 
2001, as cited in AMRC, 1998, 2011; Bhushan et al., 2006; Jeffcott & Yanz, 2000; Nadvi & 
Waltring, 2004; O'Rourke, 2006). These are primarily concerns with the widespread over-reliance 
on CSR, rather than with its practical implementation. Investment in CSR initiatives by NGOs and 
governments can distract from attempts to improve regulation. Overinflated CSR claims may 
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reduce the perceived need to improve labour law and enforcement. There are also concerns that 
corporate entities may encourage over-reliance on CSR as a ploy to avoid regulation (AMRC, 
2011b; Shamir, 2004; van Regenmortel, 2010). These risks are ironic given that the very need for 
CSR originated in defective labour law. Critics therefore argue that CSR must be ―demystified‖ 
(AMRC, 2006c, 2011; Chang, 2004), to prevent alternatives being supplanted. 
 
At the same time, there is the potential for CSR to have positive effects on regulation and 
enforcement. In cases in Indonesia and Mexico, international pressure has been found to have 
helped state regulators do their job (Barenberg, 2003, as cited in O'Rourke, 2006). Some NGOs 
remain optimistic that CSR can be tailored to complement and reinforce the state‘s role (Jeffcott & 
Yanz, 2000). Voluntary CSR initiatives may also provide a stepping stone towards regulation 
(Gordon, 1999, as cited in Haufler, 2001, p. 3). 
 
It is very hard to assess the impacts of CSR on labour law and enforcement in China. There is a lack 
of academic analysis on this subject. However, some possible impacts can be suggested. First, CSR 
may have strengthened state regulation where it has brought state and private actors together to 
discuss labour conditions. As mentioned above, in 1999 the chief executives of several US apparel 
companies contacted the Chinese President Jiang Zemin directly over the issue of labour conditions. 
They requested a meeting to explore the possibility of working together to improve labour rights in 
China (Emerson, 2000, as cited in Pun, 2006). More recently, forums between CSR practitioners, 
businesses and government have become increasingly common. For instance, the 2011 forum 
―Establishing a Harmonious Collective Negotiation Mechanism‖  hosted by Business for Social 
Responsibility and the China Training Institute included Government, trade union, brand and 
worker representatives (Business for Social Responsibility China Training Institute, 2011b). These 
meetings serve as valuable feedback mechanisms. Such interaction may have some effect on 
encouraging the leadership to improve labour conditions. 
 
There is also the likelihood that CSR initiatives have provided impetus and learning opportunities 
that have enhanced government regulation. The development of the social auditing industry may 
enable information-sharing between auditors and law enforcement officials. The success of CSR-
driven worker committees may teach officials to look to workers as sources of information on 
factory conditions (O'Rourke & Brown, 2003, p. 382). The Reebok case was also watched closely 
by the ACFTU and local governments, and may model some practicalities. As mentioned, such 
cases may push the government and ACFTU towards providing workplace democracy.  
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However, there is undoubtedly the risk that CSR could hinder regulatory efforts in China. In 
addition to distracting NGOs and other labour advocates from calling for state regulation, the rise of 
CSR may crowd out government action and enforcement. The increasing numbers of social 
auditors, and increased faith in CSR‘s effectiveness, may reduce the perceived need for local 
governments to resource enforcement of labour law. Increasing spread of CSR auditing may also 
cause complacency among government enforcement staff. For instance, in one case, CSR 
practitioners are training factory-based ―labour relations practitioners‖ to ensure employers and 
workers are aware of their responsibilities and grievance processes under the new labour law 
(Business for Social Responsibility China Training Institute, 2011a). This may reduce the perceived 
need for the Government or union to undertake similar activities. Research would be needed to see 
whether these impacts in fact occur. Some anecdotal evidence suggests that suppliers take code of 
conduct inspections more seriously than visits from the Labour Bureau. It would be worthwhile to 
consider whether this has any impact on Labour Bureau resourcing and inspections.  
 
In addition, government support for CSR may distract it from enforceable activities. In 2006, the 
Henan local government began to survey companies on their CSR standards, and declared it would 
assist companies attain SA8000 certification (Lin, 2008, p. 363). While this involvement may have 
provided a helpful framework for the government to enforce its laws, it may also have distracted the 
government from enforcing labour law, in favour of voluntary private standards. In another case, 
the Shenzhen local government invested time to create its own corporate social responsibility 
standards (Lin, 2008, p. 363). While this may be a step towards new regulation, it may also be a 
distraction from actions that would advance compliance with existing laws. The concern has also 
been raised that the rise of CSR could distract the ACFTU, as it assists CSR development and 
certification programmes in order to promote exports (AMRC, 2005).  
 
As shown, the effect of CSR on China‘s regulation and enforcement is uncertain. However, there is 
potential for these to be undermined. A thorough exploration of CSR‘s effect on regulation and 
enforcement in China is warranted, in order to avoid these risks. 
 
Impact on Democratic Governance 
 
The final deep concern associated with CSR is that the trend towards privatised regulation is a shift 
away from democratic governance (Chang, 2003, as cited in AMRC, 2005; Bhushan et al., 2006; 
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Blackett, 2004; Pun, 2005a). Many critics decry the lack of worker and local stakeholder 
participation in CSR initiatives (O'Rourke, 2006; Pun, 2005a, 2006; Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005). 
Standard-setting, enforcement and monitoring (if any) are carried out almost entirely by business, 
NGOs and consumers in Northern countries, making the movement top-down. Aside from being 
fraught by conflict of interest, this is ―institutional capture‖ of what is arguably the job of the state 
or unions. It subjects developing countries to predominantly Northern and corporate-led standards. 
It also shifts input (standard-setting and motivation for enforcement) from citizens and local 
stakeholders to consumers (Jeffcott & Yanz, 2000). As described above, consumers‘ ability to 
influence these mechanisms is extremely limited. To whom CSR initiatives are accountable 
(consumers, workers or shareholders) is also highly questionable. 
 
CSR in China suffers from a lack of local input. The overwhelming majority of code standards and 
monitoring procedures are developed outside of China, the majority in Western countries. Workers 
are seldom even aware of code content, and do not believe codes can assist their situation. In one 
investigation of the impact of codes of conduct at Wal-Mart suppliers, the vast majority of workers 
surveyed did not even know about the code (Chan & Siu, 2009, p. 20). The motivation for 
implementation comes primarily from Northern consumers. It is therefore understandable that the 
Chinese Government at first resented CSR as a foreign imposition.  
 
However, because workers in China also lack avenues to contribute to state regulation of labour 
standards, the infliction of CSR standards in China can not be considered a step away from 
democratic governance. Rather it is a shift from solely Chinese Government-imposed standards, to 
those imposed by Northern consumers and labour advocate organisations. It is possible therefore, 
that in terms of the numbers of voices able to contribute, CSR standards and monitoring may be 
more ―democratic‖ than China‘s state monitoring of labour law, even if Chinese workers are not the 
ones having a say. Both state and private regulation methods therefore leave a lot to be desired 
regarding workers participation in China. Both should be enhanced to give workers a voice. 
 
CSR does offer one avenue for facilitating increased worker input in labour regulation. Partnerships 
could be formed between Northern groups and Hong Kong and mainland NGOs supporting the 
Chinese labour movement. These could enable the voice of Chinese workers to be channeled to 
those setting CSR standards and enforcement methods. O‘Rourke notes that the best cases of CSR 
internationally are those that involve these partnerships, however they are ―extremely labour 
intensive and expensive,‖ and are a very small minority of CSR cases (2006, p. 909). They would 
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be very difficult to achieve in China, due to government fear of foreign involvement with NGOs. 
The resources required would also arguably be better spent building workers‘ ability to contribute 
to workplace unions or state regulation, which could achieve more enforceable outcomes. 
 
Conclusion 
 
CSR in China thus offers some actual and potential benefits to workers, which carry a number of 
serious risks. Due to its reliance on market pressures there is an inevitable ceiling on CSR‘s 
effectiveness. Nearly 20 years since the first CSR initiatives in China, coverage remains extremely 
low. In the vast majority of cases, scope is confined to codes of conduct, with auditing inadequate 
to bring anything beyond cosmetic improvements. Initiatives almost never involve any transfer of 
value to suppliers. Even the minority of initiatives that do address systemic problems (low wages, 
long hours or lack of freedom of association) have yet to advance beyond pilot projects. No projects 
to date have enabled ongoing confrontational activity, and advanced projects remain couched in the 
language of ―win-win‖ solutions. In reality, improving conditions for workers inevitably comes at a 
cost to suppliers and their foreign buyers, particularly in the case of addressing systemic problems.  
This demonstrates the fundamental flaw in relying on market actors to solve systemic problems. In 
fact, many foreign companies choose low-wage manufacturing regions such as China because of 
the presence of these problems. This aspect of globalised production makes it unsurprising that 
foreign companies are reluctant to address these problems through CSR.  
 
CSR is therefore an ineffective means of bringing significant improvements. It is an attempt to ―re-
embed‖ liberalism, while relying on the market forces which are simultaneously propelling global 
production towards evermore rapid dis-embedding and liberalisation. CSR is cushioning the seats of 
economic development without questioning the direction of the ride. While CSR does bring some 
benefits, these should be considered merely a ―band aid‖. CSR cannot solve the deep-seated 
problems of devaluing of labour that is pursued under neoliberal development. 
 
Reliance on CSR is not only misled, but potentially harmful for Chinese workers. Undue belief in 
the effectiveness of CSR hampers the pursuit of more meaningful solutions. This is seen in the 
China case in the distraction of the Hong Kong NGO movement, and in critical voices being 
overpowered. It is also seen in the potential for CSR initiatives to crowd out worker organising and 
state enforcement. CSR must therefore be demystified, and acknowledged as a limited, and risky, 
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means of improving supply-chain labour conditions. Its positive impacts must be held in tension 
with the risks.  
 
Suggested “Terms of Engagement” with CSR 
 
Groups seeking to improve labour rights in China should engage with CSR cautiously, and as one 
weak mechanism among many tools. First, they should recognise the limited capabilities of CSR. 
Where CSR can fill gaps and bring cosmetic improvements, labour advocates should encourage 
initiatives. However, they should publicise its inevitable shortcomings. Any such work that exposes 
CSR‘s limitations is likely to arouse opposition from powerful beneficiaries of the regulatory gap. 
Confrontational groups would therefore need to be intentionally resourced. 
 
Labour advocates should focus on alternative means for improving labour rights in China. While 
NGO partnership with CSR can bring ―quick benefits‖ they should prioritise work that strengthens 
state regulation and enforcement, and encourages worker organising. Hong Kong labour NGOs 
should also encourage Northern actors to support alternatives to CSR. They could thereby divert 
consumer support towards more effective avenues.  
 
Given the spread of CSR, it is unrealistic for groups to focus solely on alternatives. Where it is 
necessary to be involved with the CSR movement, labour advocates should agree on conditions of 
engagement.  
• They should consistently expose greenwash and the short-comings of inadequate audit practice, 
and demand that firms move beyond this. They should publicise the best practices in auditing 
methods, but only while calling these businesses to even higher standards. 
• NGOs should refuse to partner with firms until they have demonstrated a minimum level of 
commitment to ―genuine‖ CSR, for instance, commitment to resourcing improvements, or 
disclosure of supplier lists. (NGOs‘ unity on this minimum level would prevent firms ―using‖ 
NGOs to legitimise inadequate practices.) 
• NGOs should push for more foreign companies to attempt to provide worker representation 
mechanisms. However, noting the risk that workers‘ committees can crowd out genuine worker 
organising, NGOs should consistently demand higher standards of freedom of association, and 
publicise the shortcomings of initiatives that fail to meet these standards. 
• NGOs should push for greater opportunities for worker input in CSR standard-setting and 
monitoring. 
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• In all discussions of CSR, NGOs should repeatedly list its shortcomings and the need for worker 
organisation and state regulation and enforcement. Highlighting TNCs‘ lack of commitment to 
resourcing improvements may be one way to expose rhetoric. 
• In any instances where development of CSR is seen to hinder development of worker organising 
or state regulation, the latter should be prioritised. 
 
CSR has proven a useful band-aid to bring some relief to the problem of labour rights violations in 
China. However, it must not take the place of alternatives. Wherever possible, labour advocates 
must expose CSR‘s limitations and risks, so that state regulation and worker organising, the 
measures that are capable of systematically improving labour conditions, may be advanced. How 
New Zealand can apply these lessons will be the subject of the following chapter.
 121 
 
Chapter 6: Improving social responsibility in New Zealand’s offshore supply chains and 
contributing towards improved labour conditions in China 
 
―...it pains me that sweatshop labour is the best we can do... I expect that future technology will permit 
painless child births for women... Hopefully, the same be true for future industrialisations. Unlike design 
issues associated with the human body, we have only ourselves to blame for the social design problems of 
industrialisation.‖ (Collins, 2003, p. 410)  
 
It is hard not to hope for alternatives to an economy in which foreign workers and their 
communities bear the true costs of production. The ―design problems‖ of industrialisation have a 
human cause, and can have a human cure. The previous chapters have demonstrated the need for 
attention to social responsibility in New Zealand‘s offshore supply-chains. It is necessary to explore 
what it would take to improve New Zealand‘s performance in this area. It is also necessary to 
explore how New Zealand can contribute towards improving labour conditions in China. In each of 
these discussions, I draw on lessons from the previous chapters.  
 
I first address opportunities to enhance New Zealand social responsibility. I outline the UN Protect, 
Respect and Remedy Framework, and the strategies of states that lead in implementation of these 
principles. These examples offer a direction to which New Zealand can aspire. I then discuss the 
possibilities for New Zealand, which can be thought of on a spectrum from the softest to hardest 
measures. To varying degrees, all require New Zealand businesses and consumers to assume costs 
that are currently borne by offshore communities.  
 
It is argued that to seriously address social responsibility of New Zealand businesses will take 
explicit action from Government, in the form of a National Framework towards upholding the UN 
Principles, and an institutional structure to implement the Framework. Ultimately, New Zealand 
must impose mandatory requirements and increase legal liability for their activities. These steps 
would inevitably arouse opposition, which will not be overcome until power balances are shifted in 
favour of confrontational groups. In the shorter term, New Zealand should promote and resource 
supply-chain CSR initiatives as a significant part of the National Framework. However, in light of 
the shortcomings of CSR, demands should extend beyond these measures, and challenge the 
―settlement‖ at voluntary private regulation. Such a challenge will be vital if New Zealand is to 
implement the UN Principles, and to play its part in addressing the design problems of 
industrialisation. 
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Second, I explore avenues for New Zealand to contribute to improving labour conditions in its 
trading partners more generally, focusing on the case of China. I argue that New Zealand groups 
should increase support of the Chinese labour movement and state enforcement. To do so, they 
should make greater use of opportunities for cooperation provided by MoU, and should use 
available forums to more frequently raise concerns about non-compliance. New Zealand groups 
should also consider directing development aid to improve working conditions, and create 
additional channels to support the Chinese labour movement. This would make best use of New 
Zealand‘s opportunity to partner with Chinese organisations towards improved labour conditions. 
 
Improving social responsibility in New Zealand’s offshore supply chains 
 
Explicit state action is essential to improve social responsibility. As described in Chapter Two, 
Governments can promote private regulation, increase state involvement through co-regulation, or 
enact binding measures that introduce legal liability for non-participation. As depicted in Figure 1 
(Chapter Two), policy options include informational instruments, partnering instruments, financial 
incentives, and legal or mandating instruments. All these come into play in the policy areas 
discussed below. Civil society groups (BSOs and confrontational groups) are also essential for 
demanding, enabling and incentivising social responsibility. While their roles will be described 
below, the discussion focuses on the agency of states. 
 
The International Direction of Social Responsibility: the United Nations Protect, Respect and 
Remedy Framework 
 
The UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework provides a useful overview of areas for state 
action. Not only is the Framework unique in outlining state responsibilities, the 2011 Guiding 
Principles on Business and Human Rights make it usable by breaking it into a series of actionable 
points (UNHRC, 2011). The Principles, while voluntary, have become an important reference point 
for state and corporations (European Commission, 2011, p. 6). If implemented, they would 
demonstrate a significant commitment to social responsibility.  
 
Of the state responsibilities outlined in the UN Principles, the following are relevant to this 
discussion: 
2. ―States should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises... respect human 
rights throughout their operations. 
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3c. States should provide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect human 
rights throughout their operations.    
3d. States should encourage, and where appropriate require, business enterprises to 
communicate how they address their human rights impacts.   
4. States should take additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by business 
enterprises that are owned or controlled by the State...  
6. States should promote respect for human rights by business enterprises with which they 
conduct commercial transactions. 
25. States must take appropriate steps to ensure...that when such abuses occur within their 
territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy.  
 26. States should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial 
mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, including considering 
ways to reduce… barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy.‖  
These principles suggest the need not only for enhanced private regulation, but also stronger 
measures. 
 
Institutionalising Action on Social Responsibility: Examples from the European Union 
 
Before outlining specific steps to advance social responsibility and uphold the UN Principles, it is 
helpful to explore how leading states have institutionalised this task. Some advanced cases are 
evident in the EU. Discussions on CSR began in the European Parliament as early as 1999 (De 
Schutter, 2008, p. 211). In 2002, EU states launched a multi-stakeholder forum to promote dialogue 
(De Schutter, 2008, p. 213), and in 2004 they established a High-Level Group to promote CSR 
development (Faracik, 2008, p. 6). The Group encouraged the take-up of national policy 
frameworks to promote CSR. By 2011, 15 out of 27 EU member states had such frameworks 
(Europa, 2011).  
 
The European Commission oversees the regional agenda on CSR. It released its most recent three-
year plan in 2011 (Commission, 2011). The Commission plans to create an awards programme, 
increase funding for education and training and to introduce national benchmarking for CSR 
progress. It plans to encourage the spread of international standards, to create priorities for 
implementing the UN Principles, and to bring forward mandatory reporting requirements (Bell, 
2011). Examples of implementation in individual member states are impressive, as discussed below.  
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The adoption of strategic plans allows states to monitor progress. For instance, in Belgium the 2006 
national action plan has provided a focal point for progress reports and stakeholder discussions on 
CSR implementation (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 16). In Denmark, the national action plan aims to 
increase the number of Danish companies that sign the UN Global Compact (p. 16). In the 
Netherlands, a special committee annually reports on progress on CSR issues (p. 20). These 
national action plans, along with the overarching agenda of the European Commission, enable states 
to work strategically towards implementing the UN Principles and to measure progress. 
 
European states have institutionalised social responsibility in a number of ways. Most situate a 
mandate for social responsibility in either in Ministries of Labour and Social Security (54 percent), 
or in Ministries of Economy, Trade and Industry (25 percent) (Berger et al., 2007, p. 10). Others 
locate CSR within Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Some states have set up inter-ministerial work 
groups or altogether new organisations (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 14). The UK Government appointed a 
CSR minister, although it abolished this position in 2008. The Polish Government established an 
auxiliary body of the Prime Minister‘s office on social responsibility issues in 2009, comprising of 
independent experts and business and stakeholder representatives (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 15). These 
examples demonstrate a range of avenues through which to institutionalise social responsibility. 
 
To stimulate similar activity in New Zealand, the Government should adopt a National Framework 
to uphold the UN Principles. The Government must also identify where best to situate a mandate for 
implementing the Framework. This could be within the Ministry for Economic Development 
alongside the National Contact Point of the OECD Guidelines. It could also become a role of New 
Zealand Trade and Enterprise. Alternatively, social responsibility could be the role of an inter-
departmental group or independent body. The following discussion raises numerous further 
suggestions for inclusion in the Framework. These are summarised in Box 1. 
 
The Spectrum of Options to Enhance New Zealand Social Responsibility:  
1. Developing Demand for Social Responsibility 
 
Building public demand for social responsibility is vital for real progress to be made in New 
Zealand. States with more advanced social responsibility policies have for some time had lively 
civil society movements demanding attention to supply-chain labour conditions. In the late 1990s in 
Canada, a two-year campaign pressured the Government to promote a multi-stakeholder process 
towards a voluntary code of conduct (Jeffcott & Yanz, 2000). In the UK a coalition of 130 
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organisations campaigned for social responsibility to be better recognised in the 2006 reform of the 
Companies Act (The Corporate Responsibility Coalition [CORE], 2006a). In Poland, numerous 
NGOs draw attention to supply-chain labour issues (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 22). These civil society 
communities have developed over time, and have been instrumental in the progress seen in these 
countries. The development of equivalent groups in New Zealand is essential, both to increase 
market demand for social responsibility, and to build a political force to push for a settlement at 
stronger initiatives. 
 
Fostering Consumer Demand Through Awareness-Raising 
 
Governments can play an active role in raising public awareness about social responsibility issues. 
Governments have launched multi-stakeholder CSR forums and conferences in Belgium and 
Finland, led programmes to raise consumer awareness on fair trade in Germany, Ireland and 
Austria, run seminars for consumers in Poland, and run public awareness campaigns in Italy 
(Berger et al., 2007, p. 43-48; Knopf et al., 2010, p. 23). The Irish Government contributed to a 
study of consumer awareness of CSR issues (Berger et al., 2007, p. 46). Government programmes 
on social responsibility awareness that target consumers and the general public are rare (only seven 
percent of such programmes reported in the EU in 2007) ( p. 14). However, activities targeting 
other sectors also raise consumer awareness indirectly. Numerous governments have promoted CSR 
among the private sector. The New Zealand Government should consider similar initiatives. The 
Government should also foster confrontational groups, continue to support BSOs and increase 
research funding, in order to raise consumer awareness indirectly. 
 
The non-government sector can also play a role. In Europe, BSOs partnered with government 
agencies in many of the projects listed above. In New Zealand, BSOs could branch into projects 
that raise consumer awareness on supply-chain issues. However, as BSOs usually advocate in 
favour of private regulation, awareness-raising by confrontational groups is necessary, to raise 
public awareness of the shortcomings of the current initiatives.  
 
Developing Groups to Demand Social Responsibility 
  
Activism is a key driver of voluntary initiatives (Utting, 2005, p. 10). To challenge BSOs‘ 
monopoly in social responsibility discussions, it is necessary to develop confrontational groups to 
critique businesses‘ efforts and call for deepened spread and scope of CSR initiatives. 
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Confrontational groups could also become the primary advocates for stronger alternatives to CSR, 
and monitor its risks. Some ―watchdog‖ activities, such as monitoring and critiquing current 
activities could be picked up by research institutions. However, campaigning is also needed to 
translate research findings into public awareness, pressure on businesses for change and pressure on 
the Government for binding measures.  
 
The Government could provide important support to foster groups that critique social responsibility 
efforts. The Government could encourage their development through state grants and research 
funding. A state-sanctioned ranking system or complaints mechanism (discussed below) may also 
provide an opportunity for their development. Essential to the development of confrontational 
groups is increased awareness among the public. Once these groups are established, they will raise 
further awareness, which should create a growing movement. This is a further argument for 
investment in awareness-raising initiatives. 
 
2. Improving the Spread and Depth of CSR 
 
A second step to advance social responsibility is to improve the spread and depth of CSR. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the current political climate is not conducive to imposing binding 
measures on business. This is far from an inevitable condition, and must be challenged. In the 
meantime, improving CSR is a necessary alternative, and should constitute a significant part of the 
National Framework. However, in light of the shortcomings of CSR and the risks of over-reliance 
on voluntary initiatives, it is important the Framework maintain an agenda towards binding 
measures. CSR should be considered a precursor to stronger alternatives. 
 
The discussion of the competitiveness approach in Chapter Four suggests a number of avenues to 
improve the spread and scope of CSR. According to this approach, businesses take up CSR to 
reduce costs and risks, and to pursue market rewards. Their capacity to respond to these pressures is 
also relevant. Steps to improve CSR should therefore focus on streamlining the ability of the market 
to provide greater rewards and sanctions, and supplementing the market with additional incentives. 
Consumers need to be empowered to demand social responsibility, through education, transparency 
and regulation of social marketing. Businesses need to be enabled to respond to these demands. 
Businesses also need further incentives where consumer demands are weak.  These steps would 
provoke CSR by making it more necessary, or more rewarding, for businesses‘ competitive 
advantage. 
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Empowering Consumers to Support Socially-Responsible Business  
 
BSOs and confrontational groups can provide tools that increase transparency for consumers. The 
French Observatory for CSR, for instance, has developed a web-based tool to enable CSR reporting 
(Knopf et al., 2010, p. 30). In New Zealand, the BusinessNZ Sustainable Supply Chains database 
offers similar potential to encourage transparent disclosure. So long as the content is made public, 
this tool would enable consumers to compare and act on CSR claims. The move by Sustainable 
BusinessNZ to encourage companies to upload TBL reports on their website may also facilitate 
transparency.  
 
BSOs and confrontational groups can also guide consumers, through education on certifications and 
social labels, and by comparing businesses through awards and ranking systems. Current awards 
schemes in New Zealand, such as the SBN Sustainability Awards and the Sustainable 60 Series 
should be continued, and should develop a greater emphasis on supply-chain initiatives. 
Proliferation of awards should be avoided to prevent greenwash. Ultimately, to enable comparison 
of businesses‘ efforts, a civil society group should develop a comprehensive ranking system of New 
Zealand companies‘ social responsibility. One earlier system included only 15 businesses (Massey 
University, 2007). A ranking system could compare businesses using criteria in the Sustainable 
Supply Chains database.  
 
Alternatively, a ranking system could focus on supply-chain labour initiatives specifically. To this 
end, I have developed a tool which ranks supply-chain labour initiatives according to three criteria: 
monitoring compliance, transparency and proactivity (Appendix B). Companies can be scored 0-4 
in thirteen subsections, creating a total maximum score of 36. As a quick glance shows, the majority 
of New Zealand initiatives described in Chapter Four (Corporate Social Responsibility section) 
would score very poorly. Research ranking businesses with this or another tool would assist 
consumers to identify and reward companies relatively advanced in social responsibility. It would 
also publicise areas in which they could pressure for improvements.  
 
Governments can play a role in empowering consumers to demand social responsibility. In addition 
to the awareness-raising methods above, Governments can support the education programmes, 
disclosure tools and ranking systems run by civil society groups. Governments can also establish 
their own equivalents. The Dutch Government runs a national ―Transparency Benchmark‖ scheme, 
which compares and rates participating companies‘ sustainability reports (van Wensen, Broer, 
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Klein, & Knopf, 2011, p. 21). The Czech and Austrian Governments both award a national prize on 
the basis of sustainability criteria (Berger et al., 2007, p. 4. 29). These steps should be considered in 
New Zealand. In addition, the Government should monitor the use of green marketing, and update 
advertising standards and the Fair Trading Act to prevent greenwash.  
 
The New Zealand Government could also consider endorsement of a social label, to supplement 
Environmental Choice label in the environmental sector. The Belgian Government began 
administering a voluntary social label in 2002, which is granted to products ―whose chain of 
production respects the eight fundamental ILO conventions,‖ a stringent standard (Aaronson, 
2007a, p. 21-22). The system also includes a complaints mechanism (De Schutter, 2008, p. 223). 
While the compatibility of national social labels with WTO rules has yet to be fully tested, the 
Belgian system arguably does not contravene non-discrimination rules, as both domestic and 
foreign products can apply. The New Zealand Government could consider an equivalent. A New 
Zealand social label could use similar criteria to the Belgian label, or could be awarded to 
companies that adopt a nationally-agreed code of conduct, or that participate in a complaints 
mechanism (discussed below). This measure would enable consumers to identify socially-
responsible companies. It would also represent a national commitment to exploring the limits of 
WTO rules for matters of social responsibility. 
 
Civil Society Promotion of CSR to the Private Sector 
 
In order to respond to demand for social responsibility, businesses require greater awareness of 
CSR issues, capacity to respond, and increased incentives (rewards or sanctions). In New Zealand, 
BSOs and research institutions are the primary groups that meet these needs. BSOs‘ current 
advocacy of CSR, resourcing and awards schemes should be continued. Through these initiatives, 
BSOs should develop a greater focus on supply-chain labour issues.  
 
Research on social responsibility can be a key driver of private sector initiatives. New Zealand 
research institutions should continue to survey consumer awareness and the extent of CSR 
activities, in order to publicise the potential rewards from CSR activity. In addition, they should 
increase specific research into supply-chain initiatives specifically, to raise awareness and build 
capacity in implementation. Such research should include surveys into attitudes towards ethical 
purchasing and the extent and effectiveness of supply-chain activities. Researchers should also track 
New Zealand‘s CSR development compared to international trends, to motivate businesses to keep 
up with overseas counterparts.  
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Government Promotion of CSR to the Private Sector 
 
The UN Principles suggest several areas in which governments can promote CSR to the private 
sector. These steps require governments to enable businesses to respond to market pressures. They 
also require governments to create additional incentives. 
 
      Enabling Businesses: Promoting and Resourcing CSR 
 
―UN Principle 2. States should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises... 
respect human rights throughout their operations. 
3c. States should provide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect 
human rights throughout their operations.‖ (UNHRC, 2011) 
 
Foreign governments have undertaken a range of measures to set out expectations of social 
responsibility. Governments in Brazil, Denmark and Canada have run nation-wide campaigns to 
raise awareness of CSR in the private sector (Ascoli & Benzaken, 2009, p. 5; Berger et al., 2007, p. 
4). Many states actively promote the OECD Guidelines. It is a provision in the European 
Commission‘s bilateral agreements that signatories ―jointly remind their multinational 
enterprises…to observe the OECD Guidelines wherever they operate‖ (Aaronson, 2007a, p. 18). In 
the Netherlands, the Government requires companies to declare familiarity with the Guidelines as a 
precondition to being granted export guarantees (Aaronson, 2007a, p. 19). In Italy, the OECD 
Guidelines NCP actively commissions awareness-raising campaigns (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 18). All 
these initiatives set out clear expectations that businesses should respect human rights (Principle 2 
above). 
 
Governments have also provided guidance on CSR implementation. Governments in Latvia, 
Poland, France, Sweden and Spain have promoted business conferences on CSR (Knopf et al., 
2010, p. 11, 30). The Danish Government ran a three-year CSR education programme for the 
private sector (Berger et al., 2007, p. 4). Sweden, Poland and the Netherlands have all established 
independent bodies for CSR education (Berger et al., 2007, p. 4-5; Knopf et al., 2010, p. 14). 
Numerous governments have provided guidelines to resource businesses. In Japan, the majority of 
businesses‘ reports reference government documents (Phung, 2011, p. 146). In Austria, the 
Government developed sector-specific CSR guidelines for 120,000 SMEs, a project requiring 
€100,000 (Berger et al., 2007, p. 3). The Canadian Government encourages CSR among its 
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businesses overseas by making its embassies available as venues for dialogues with local 
governments and citizens (Ascoli & Benzaken, 2009, p. 5). These examples demonstrate a variety 
of avenues through which governments can provide guidance and build capacity among businesses 
(Principle 3c). 
  
Many states have undertaken initiatives to promote supply-chain labour initiatives specifically. In 
2010, the Swedish Government announced it would create a ―Centre for Corporate Social 
Responsibility‖ at its Beijing embassy to develop dialogue with Chinese groups on CSR 
implementation (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 15). In the Netherlands, a specific council promotes supply-
chain management, and an additional committee reports annually on progress (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 
20). The Danish Government has funded a multi-stakeholder initiative to promote supply-chain 
management, which provides guidelines, dialogues and workshops (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 23). The 
UK, German, Dutch and Irish Governments fund CSR improvements in supplier states as part of 
development aid (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 21-23).  In addition, the Belgian social label and the French 
system to enable disclosure of supply-chain conditions both encourage the business sector to 
participate in supply-chain initiatives. 
 
New Zealand has a lot to learn from these examples. The proposed National Framework for New 
Zealand should include a strategy for enabling CSR and streamlining market incentives. As 
priorities, the Government should consider a national awareness campaign on the importance of 
social responsibility, including a focus on supply-chain issues. The Government should also 
commission resources and training programmes on implementing supply-chain labour initiatives. 
Beyond this, the Government could consider drafting a national code of conduct as a reference 
point for businesses. (This code could be used in Government procurement.) As seen in the 
examples above, the Government could also consider referencing the OECD Guidelines in bilateral 
trade agreements, using New Zealand foreign embassies to provide CSR training or facilities for 
stakeholder dialogues and directing development aid towards overseas social responsibility. 
 
       Financial Incentives 
 
Some states create additional financial incentives to encourage companies to take up CSR 
initiatives. Some states directly fund the implementation of CSR programmes (Ascoli & Benzaken, 
2009, p. 1). In the 2009-2010 financial years, Canada‘s Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade provided approximately CN$350,000 towards 50 corporate social responsibility 
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initiatives in over 30 countries (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 2010). The Polish 
Government subsidises some CSR certifications (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 20). In the Netherlands, 
businesses are only granted export access when they declare familiarity with the OECD Guidelines  
(Aaronson, 2007a, p. 19). Other states provide their own CSR awards. These financial incentives 
undoubtedly increase awareness and take-up of CSR initiatives, and should be considered in New 
Zealand. While it has been suggested that tax incentives may provide a viable mechanism (see, for 
instance, Welford, 2005, p. 49), there appears to be no evidence of states instituting tax incentives 
for activities such as conducting due diligence or obtaining CSR certifications. 
 
      Mandatory TBL Reporting 
 
3d. ―States should encourage, and where appropriate require, business enterprises to 
communicate how they address their human rights impacts.‖ (UNHRC, 2011)  
 
To complement the partial success of voluntary initiatives, many countries have adopted binding 
standards on TBL reporting. Some states require either standalone reports, or for CSR criteria to be 
added to broader annual reports. They aim to increase reporting and to ensure comparability, 
enabling consumers and investors to support socially responsible companies (Holder-Webb, Cohen, 
Nath, & Wood, 2009). Mandatory reporting is therefore a means of enhancing the market‘s ability 
to incentivise social responsibility. While reporting is required, sanctions for irresponsible 
behaviour still come only through the market.  
 
Mandatory TBL reporting exists in various forms in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Japan, 
the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the UK and the US, among others (Architecture 
Source, 2011; CORE & Trade Justice Movement, 2006, p. 5; Ho, 2010, p. 90; Kerr & Aboubakr, 
2005; see also Knopf et al., 2010; van Wensen et al., 2011). In Japan, environmental reporting has 
been mandatory for specified companies since 2004 (Phung, 2011, p. 150-151). In the UK, the 
Government has required TBL reporting from 1300 publicly listed companies since 2006 (CORE & 
Trade Justice Movement, 2006; CORE, 2006b). In Sweden, the Government has required SOEs to 
issue reports in the Global Reporting Initiative framework since 2007. This is a clear effort to 
prevent human rights abuse by state enterprises (Principle 4), and is helpful for setting norms 
(Ascoli & Benzaken, 2009, p. 2). In addition, in South Africa, Malaysia and some European 
countries, stock exchanges specify reporting requirements (CORE & Trade Justice Movement, 
2006, p. 5; Vogel, 2010, p. 75). While reporting adds some costs to business, it also delivers cost 
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savings through improved business performance, and businesses have been found to benefit from 
access to Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) (Phung, 2011, p. 150-151). 
 
One recent example of a shift to mandatory reporting received a lot of media attention. In 2010 the 
US state of California introduced the Transparency in Supply Chains Act, which came into effect in 
2012. The Act requires that all retailers and manufacturers doing business in California, with annual 
revenues of more than $100 million, publicly disclose the extent of their due diligence to eradicate 
slavery and human trafficking from their direct supply chains (Verite, 2011a, p. 31; 2011b, p. 3).
30
 
This is expected to apply to approximately 3,200 companies (Todres, 2012, p. 191). A similar bill at 
federal level is currently under discussion (Christian Brothers Investment Services, 2012). 
However, should a company disclose that it undertakes no measures, there are no legal penalties. 
The initiative relies on market sanctions to push the company towards more responsible behaviour. 
This demonstrates the shortcomings of mandatory reporting compared to legal sanctions for 
irresponsible behaviour.  
 
Despite these limitations, mandatory reporting should be considered in New Zealand. Requiring 
businesses to disclose information through the Sustainable Supply Chains database could be one 
possible avenue. Disclosure could be mandated first for SOEs and suppliers to Government, then 
for all New Zealand businesses. This would contribute to upholding Principles 4 and 6. It would 
also help to set clear expectations that businesses operate in a socially-responsible manner 
(Principle 2), and empower consumers to identify and support socially-responsible business.  
 
      Government Procurement 
 
―4. States should take additional steps to protect against human rights abuses by business      
enterprises that are owned or controlled by the State...  
 6. States should promote respect for human rights by business enterprises with which they 
conduct commercial transactions.‖ (UNHRC, 2011) 
 
A number of foreign governments create additional market rewards for CSR by favouring socially-
responsible companies in their own procurement. Procurers in France are obliged to consider 
sustainable development in their purchasing process (Steurer, Berger, Konrad, & Martinuzzi, 2007, 
                                                 
30 Businesses must publicly disclose to what extent they evaluate and address risks of human trafficking and slavery, 
perform supplier audits, and train relevant employees to mitigate risks of human trafficking and slavery in the supply 
chain. 
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p. 4). They are also required to include at least one social or environmental clause per large contract 
(p. 27). In Belgium, at least 50 per cent of newly purchased vehicles must comply with specific 
environmental criteria (Steurer et al., 2007, p. 19). The Belgian Government has also pushed for 
ILO conventions to be used as selection criteria (Aaronson, 2007a, p. 35-36). In Italy, some 
provinces include SA8000 certification among selection criteria when awarding contracts 
(Aaronson, 2007a, p. 35-36).  Socially-responsible procurement is a fulfillment of Principles 4 and 
6. It serves as a model for the private sector. It also creates an additional source of demand, and 
therefore market rewards, for socially-responsible businesses. 
 
To make a genuine commitment to social responsibility in New Zealand, the Government should 
revive efforts through its own procurement. The Government should reintroduce incentives for TBL 
reporting among government departments, and move towards mandatory reporting. It should 
develop a standardised code of conduct for use in all government tenders, and for purchasing 
through individual departments. This could double as a model code for the private sector, as 
suggested above. The code should specify minimum acceptable standards. These should include the 
mandatory standards already existing for forestry and other products, and be expanded to other 
products over time. The Government should introduce auditing to monitor compliance. It should 
also train staff to discern acceptable minimum standards when awarding tenders. In addition, the 
Government should consider introducing a complaints mechanism into its procurement (discussed 
below). This would hold departments accountable, and ensure transparency. 
 
      A Non-Judicial Complaints Mechanism 
 
―25. States must take appropriate steps to ensure,... that when such abuses occur within their 
territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy.‖ (UNHRC, 
2011) 
 
Regardless of the spread of market-driven initiatives, their scope remains limited until they provide 
redress for victims. States have the responsibility to address these limitations (Principle 25). 
Ultimately, redress is best provided through reforms of company law, discussed below. Currently, 
very few states provide any effective sanctions for their companies‘ irresponsibility offshore, 
whether through legal measures, or a non-judicial alternative. While the OECD Guidelines National 
Contact Point system provides some opportunity for redress, this is not accessible to victims outside 
participating countries. 
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Short of company law reform, New Zealand could deepen the scope of its CSR by backing 
voluntary initiatives with a non-judicial, national grievance mechanism. Labour advocates could 
assist offshore victims to raise complaints about the conduct of New Zealand companies or their 
subsidiaries. The mechanism could publicise complaints in New Zealand, allowing the public to 
pressure the company to provide redress. Such a mechanism would add teeth to other measures to 
promote CSR, by providing transparency and credible sanctions. It would also shift attention from 
monitoring companies‘ activities, to providing redress in the event of identified problems (Utting, 
2005, p. 9). 
 
A complaints mechanism in New Zealand could take a number of forms. The most far-reaching 
option would be to incorporate a complaints system into the BusinessNZ Sustainable Supply Chains 
initiative. A government agency or alternative group could set up a national complaints hotline, 
which would be run by an independent ombudsman. The ombudsman could forward any complaints 
received to the company responsible. The company could then be required to disclose the 
complaint, and their response to it, in a public database. State departments or other agencies could 
play a role in such a mechanism. It is possible that the Human Rights Commission, or the 
Parliamentary Office of the Ombudsman could expand their mandates to include receiving 
complaints about business conduct. Alternatively, a confrontational group could play the 
ombudsman role. In a similar example, Oxfam Australia established an ombudsman to monitor 
complaints in the mining industry, received through Oxfam networks throughout the world 
(International Federation for Human Rights [FIDH], 2012, p. 402). Should a company fail to 
remedy a complaint, Oxfam generates pressure through international media. A new organisation 
could be established to play this role in New Zealand.  
 
A similar option is to incorporate a complaints mechanism into Government procurement. This 
could be similar to the complaints mechanism adopted by the London Olympics Organising 
Committee. The Committee adopted a code of conduct, which included clauses on supply-chain 
labour standards (London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games, 
N.Y.). Should breaches be reported to their hotline, the Committee will attempt to remedy these 
through mediation (Ergon Associates, N.Y.). Complaints are also publicised on the Committee‘s 
website.  
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The New Zealand Government could follow a similar route. They could first adopt a national code 
of conduct for suppliers. The Government (or a civil society group) could then establish a 
complaints hotline, open to any stakeholder claiming breaches of this code in the production chains 
supplying to Government. Complaints could be followed by a mediation procedure. While the 
mechanism would extend only to suppliers to Government, it would promote transparency and 
communicate the expectation that New Zealand businesses should promote human rights (Principle 
2 above). It would also promote due diligence among suppliers tendering for government contracts 
(Principles 4 and 6), and provide redress for any victims (Principle 25). Such a mechanism would 
also demonstrate genuine Government commitment to transparency and social responsibility in its 
procurement. 
 
3. Imposing Legal Sanctions for Irresponsible Behaviour 
 
The measures discussed above would undoubtedly improve the coverage and depth of CSR among 
New Zealand businesses. However, all rely on market sanctions, which have numerous 
shortcomings. As discussed, even ―hardened‖ CSR is of limited effectiveness. Legal sanctions are 
also necessary. 
 
It would be an oversight to discuss means to improve social responsibility without addressing the 
aspects of company law that incentivise irresponsibility in the first place. As discussed in Chapter 
Four, New Zealand has no duties on company directors to consider adverse impacts on 
stakeholders. Due to the restricted use of extraterritorial jurisdiction, there is a lack of liability for 
activities offshore. In addition, the ―corporate veil‖ allows parent companies to escape 
responsibility for abuse by their subsidiaries.  A genuine effort to uphold the UN Principles 
(particularly Principles 2, 25 and 26) would require New Zealand to reform these aspects of its 
company law.  
 
Responsibility to Seek More than Maximised Profits: Reform of Directors’ Duties 
 
2. ―States should set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises...respect human 
rights throughout their operations. 
25. States must take appropriate steps to ensure,... that when such abuses occur within their 
territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy.‖ (UNHRC, 
2011) 
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At the heart of the problem of business irresponsibility is the corporation‘s primary motivation to 
maximise value for shareholders, without a duty to consider impacts on stakeholders. Any serious 
attempt to promote business responsibility must challenge this purely shareholder-oriented view 
(Doane, 2005). One improvement could be in the form of a duty on directors to consider the impact 
of the company‘s activities on stakeholders. A stronger improvement would be a positive duty to 
take reasonable steps to prevent harm. The strongest reform would be to require a plural duty on 
directors, to maximise not only benefit to shareholders but also benefit to stakeholders. This would 
be a radical shift from the current view of corporations, as it implies that corporations should 
benefit society in ways other than maximising shareholder wealth.31 Any of these measures would 
communicate the expectation that businesses respect human rights throughout their operations 
(Principle 2). 
 
The UK Government has taken small steps to encourage consideration of stakeholders. In its 2006 
reform of the Companies Act, the Government imposed a new duty on directors not only to 
maximise profit, but also to ―have regard to‖ the impacts of their business on people and the 
environment (CORE, 2006a). This fell far short of campaigners‘ demands for a positive duty on 
directors ―to take reasonable steps to minimise significant adverse impacts on workers, local 
communities and the environment‖ (CORE & Trade Justice Movement, 2006, p. 2-3). The new 
duty is also described as ―practically unenforceable‖, as its language is subjective and breaches are 
difficult to prove (Ellis & Hodgson, 2011). However, the reform does represent a paradigm shift. 
For the first time, company law enunciated the concept of ―enlightened shareholder value‖, that 
directors should consider value to shareholders more broadly than short-term financial interests 
(Ellis & Hodgson, 2011). It also acknowledges that community impacts may affect long-term 
profitability. While this reform is far from a plural duty on directors, it does raise the profile of 
stakeholder interests. 
 
                                                 
31
 Some critics of shareholder capitalism go even further, arguing that corporations should indeed be vehicles for the 
public interest. See for instance, Corporation 2020 (http://www.corporation2020.org/) which campaigns for the 
following principles: 
1. The purpose of the corporation is to harness private interests in service of the public interest. 
2. Corporations shall accrue fair profits for shareholders, but not at the expense of the legitimate interests of other 
stakeholders.  
3. Corporations shall operate sustainably, helping to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet theirs.  
4. Corporations shall distribute their wealth equitably among those who contribute to its creation.  
5. Corporations shall be governed in a manner that is participatory, transparent, and accountable. 
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If serious about incentivising social responsibility, New Zealand could also move to impose duties 
on directors. A first step could be to follow the UK in requiring consideration of social and 
environmental impacts. A next step could then be to impose a positive duty on directors to take 
steps to minimise the negative social and environmental impacts of their operations (discussed 
further below). Inevitably, these steps would be opposed by business sectors, and are therefore 
politically unfavourable. However, as the UK has taken steps in this direction, it is conceivable that 
New Zealand could at some time do so. 
 
The reforms in the UK could be strengthened significantly by enabling stakeholders to enforce 
directors‘ duties. Such a step could also be considered in New Zealand. Currently, a breach can only 
be enforced by the company, or in limited circumstances, by shareholders or creditors (Companies 
Act, 1993, s. 301). While stakeholders can become creditors, this involves numerous procedural 
barriers. Enabling stakeholders to enforce directors‘ duties would provide more direct access to 
remedy (a step towards upholding Principles 25 and 26). Increasing the likelihood of a challenge by 
stakeholders would incentivise greater attention from businesses, and thereby create a deterrent 
from irresponsible behaviour. 
 
Increase Liability for Activities Offshore: Broaden the use of Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction 
 
25. ―States must take appropriate steps to ensure... that when such abuses occur within their 
territory and/or jurisdiction those affected have access to effective remedy. 
26. States should take appropriate steps to ensure the effectiveness of domestic judicial 
mechanisms when addressing business-related human rights abuses, including considering 
ways to reduce ...barriers that could lead to a denial of access to remedy.‖ (UNHRC, 2011) 
 
To impose greater liability on New Zealand companies for their offshore activities would require 
greater extraterritorial application of New Zealand company law. As described in Chapter Four, 
there are a number of barriers to New Zealand‘s jurisdiction being accepted, and for offshore 
victims bringing claims. These must be overcome to give victims genuine opportunities for redress.  
 
Other countries exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction to a greater extent than New Zealand, 
suggesting possibilities for wider use. The United States Alien Tort Claims Act 1789 (ATCA) is the 
most far-reaching example. The ATCA provides US courts with jurisdiction over civil actions that 
violate ―the law of nations‖ or a treaty of the US, even where these occurred outside the US and did 
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not involve a US actor (Flynn & O‘Brien, 2010, p. 218). The one requirement is that the defendant 
is on US soil when the case is brought (FIDH, 2012, p. 181). The ATCA has been interpreted to 
apply to some labour rights cases. In 2001, it was used to bring accusations against Coca-Cola for 
the murder of union officials by paramilitary units in Colombia, and for denying workers the right 
to organise (FIDH, 2012, p. 197; Shamir, 2004, p. 640). As of April 2012, no cases against 
corporations regarding human rights violations had come to a conclusion, though some victims 
have received compensation through out of court settlements (FIDH, 2012, p. 187).
 
 
While the ATCA suggests one measure to hold corporations to account, its use is highly 
controversial. Due to opposition from economic interests, use of the ATCA is increasingly 
restricted. Furthermore, it is also unlikely that sweatshop conditions, wage or working hour issues 
would be deemed of necessary gravity to constitute violations of the law of nations (Flynn & 
O‘Brien, 2010, p. 219). This application would bring a flood of litigation. The use of ATCA is 
certainly moving away from any possibility of this application (Day, 2010, p. 20; Shamir, 2004). 
For these reasons, it is unlikely that an equivalent would be introduced in New Zealand.
 
 
In the EU, the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction is narrower than ATCA, but broader than that in 
New Zealand regarding where cases may be heard. Provided a company has its parent company 
somewhere in the EU, plaintiffs may bring a claim against them in any EU jurisdiction where the 
company has a branch (FIDH, 2012, p. 218). This reduces barriers to the plaintiff bringing claims, 
and allows them to choose the most favourable jurisdiction. Barriers to the exercise of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction also vary between countries. The obstacle of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine (that the home territory is not the appropriate forum) applies in most, but not all 
jurisdictions (Oxford Pro Bono Publico, 2008, p. ii). Some states are more willing than others to 
reject claims based on this doctrine. States also extend different degrees of support to reduce 
practical barriers for victims.  
 
There are therefore a range of ways in which New Zealand could broaden its application of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. If New Zealand is to do so, there is a continuum onto which this could 
fall. The most far-reaching option would be to adopt an equivalent of the US ATCA. In light of the 
opposition to the use of the ATCA in the US, pursuing a New Zealand equivalent is far from 
pragmatic. A less expansive option is for New Zealand courts to accept claims for breaches of 
limited international law, for instance the core ILO conventions, anywhere in the world, by 
companies incorporated in a select group of self-appointing states. Flynn and O‘Brien suggest that 
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states could open their courts to do this simultaneously (2010, p. 221). This would bring 
enforceability to the ILO conventions. This measure could be possible in the future, for instance if 
undertaken by the majority of ILO members.  
 
Alternatively, similar to the EU model, New Zealand and select trading partners could agree to hear 
cases against companies from any of the participating states, for breaches of collectively acceptable 
standards. Claimants could then select whichever jurisdiction was most favourable, increasing their 
access to remedy. Such a collective effort to expand extraterritorial jurisdiction would have several 
advantages. Communicating the parameters of extraterritorial jurisdiction through international 
agreements would allay fears over sovereignty. It would also reduce the loss of predictability for 
business. However, there are enormous practical challenges of coordinating states in such a manner. 
 
A more practical alternative would be to incorporate parameters of extraterritorial jurisdiction into 
bilateral treaties. For instance, the NZ-China FTA or MoU could have included the parameters 
under which New Zealand courts could hold New Zealand companies liable for abuse in China. 
New Zealand could extend the range of cases eligible to be heard in New Zealand Courts to include 
breaches of ILO conventions, even in states which have not incorporated these concepts into their 
domestic law. This practice may not be well-received from developing states whose (poorly-
enforced) laws New Zealand would override. However, it would be a decisive step towards 
providing justice for victims in these countries who have suffered abuse by New Zealand 
companies. If New Zealand is to expand trade into regions with weak legal systems, this is arguably 
a responsible means of doing so. 
 
At a minimum, New Zealand should investigate the current practical and legal barriers to offshore 
victims seeking redress from New Zealand companies. Second, it should expand the circumstances 
under which extraterritorial claims can be heard in New Zealand. Current challenges such as forum 
non conveniens should be reconsidered and reduced. New Zealand courts should make it as easy as 
possible for vulnerable stakeholders to bring complaints against New Zealand companies. To 
reduce the risk of extraterritorial jurisdiction causing sovereignty issues, or reducing predictability 
for business, the parameters of its use should be clearly established. Outlining these in bilateral 
trade treaties seems one potential avenue.  
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These reforms would increase the liability of New Zealand companies directly contributing to abuse 
offshore, or of those causing abuse through very close relationships with subsidiaries. However, 
reforms for piercing the corporate veil are also essential. 
 
Responsibility for the Behaviour of Subsidiaries and Subcontractors 
 
Expanding extraterritorial jurisdiction would do little without addressing the other significant 
barrier to redress: parent companies escape liability for their subsidiaries‘ and sub-contractors‘ 
actions. The problem hits right to the heart of the problem of global production operating through 
sub-contracting chains. The legal dilemma is as follows: what legal test would determine a buyer 
company‘s liability for other entities with whom it is in an economic relationship? 
 
An Argentine law provides a novel approach to this dilemma (Montero, 2011, p. 123-124). The 
Law of Homework regulates the link between brands, intermediaries and production workshops, 
and attributes equal responsibility to brands as to those below them in supply chains. If a worker at 
the bottom of the supply-chain raises a problem, the brand is held as much responsible as those 
further down the chain. A thorough investigation of this law, including what impact it has on the 
conduct of production workshops, is outside the scope of this thesis. However, the law is currently 
being used to take 113 national and multinational brands (including Adidas and Puma) to court, 
accused of profiteering from trafficked labour. The law may therefore offer a direction for New 
Zealand. 
 
For New Zealand to increase the liability of its companies operating through subsidiaries it must 
undo the limits to liability these structures were set up to achieve. In the case of subsidiaries, the 
proximity required for parent companies to be responsible should be reduced. In the case of 
operation through sub-contractors, a degree of responsibility over the behaviour of the sub-
contractor must be established. This is in recognition of the control they do exert over suppliers. 
 
In both subsidiary and sub-contractor models, New Zealand should take steps to impose on firms a 
legal responsibility that mirrors the benefit they extract from a supplier. One means of doing this is 
to impose a duty to take steps to prevent foreseeable harm
32
 to stakeholders, in keeping with the 
size of their contract with the supplier. (This would be similar to the directors‘ duty to minimise 
                                                 
32 The understanding of ―foreseeable harm‖ should be broad enough to incorporate common abuses of labour rights. For instance, 
low wages, long working hours, and harm to offshore workers of purchasing practices such as low unit prices, and short lead times. 
Taken to the extreme, behaviour such as withdrawing contracts at the last minute, resulting in suppliers going out of business, could 
even be considered an outcome that buyers should take steps to prevent. 
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adverse impacts on stakeholders, proposed above.) In the event of abuse, the company could be 
held liable based on the size of their contract as well as their purchasing behavior— therefore their 
contribution to the abuse— and the extent of their steps to prevent the abuse. While difficult to form 
into a legal framework, this task may not be impossible. In light of the political difficulties of such 
reform, it could apply first only to large companies, or to companies with contracts in developing 
economies. 
 
Import Bans 
 
While import bans have been unsuccessful to date, banning imports produced under unsatisfactory 
conditions is a route New Zealand could reattempt. An import ban would give Customs to power to 
seize such goods, as in the case of goods produced under prison labour. A fine could also be 
imposed. An import ban would therefore create an incentive for businesses to conduct due 
diligence. In sectors where mature certifications are available (as in the forestry industry), imports 
could be restricted to certified goods. In sectors without adequate certifications (as in most areas of 
labour standards, or regarding production in conflict zones), onus on identifying goods produced in 
unacceptable conditions could fall to confrontational groups. Such a ban would therefore add teeth 
to activists‘ efforts. While it would not create an obvious redress avenue for victims, it would signal 
clearly that socially-responsible behaviour is required (Principle 2). 
 
While overseas import bans have been challenged under WTO rules (see Bartley, 2003, p. 447), 
they are arguable under the GATT General Exceptions as a measure ―necessary to protect public 
morals…‖ or ―to protect human... health‖ (GATT, 1947). These debates have yet to be fully aired in 
international trade forums. New Zealand could contribute to efforts to explore these boundaries. 
The case of the diamond industry, in which the trade of non-certified products has been banned 
internationally through the WTO (Aaronson, 2007a, p. 3, 25; Woody, 2006, p. 336), demonstrates 
that import bans for humanitarian reasons are not entirely off the agenda. 
 
Overcoming Inevitable Opposition  
 
The degree to which the business sector will oppose any reforms that increase their costs or liability 
cannot be overstated (Flynn & O‘Brien, 2010, p. 220-223). Extending extraterritorial jurisdiction 
has been opposed by ―the most powerful economic actors on the planet‖ (p. 223). A review of 13 
jurisdictions found that attempts to extend territorial jurisdiction and pierce the corporate veil have 
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not led to any cases found in favour of foreign victims (Oxford Pro Bono Publico, 2008, p. iv). The 
weak reforms of directors‘ duties in the UK required a coalition of over 130 organisations, with a 
combined membership of over nine million people (CORE, 2006a). Even attempts to harden CSR 
initiatives have been strongly opposed. Mandatory reporting requirements in California prompted 
outcry from business, and mere discussions of mandatory reporting in the EU have aroused similar 
opposition (De Schutter, 2008, p. 207). In New Zealand, with a consumer movement undeveloped 
and confrontational groups near non-existent, these types of change appear impossible.  
 
Despite these challenges, it is important to retain sight of what would be required for New Zealand 
to make a genuine effort towards social responsibility and upholding the UN Principles. As this 
chapter has shown, explicit state action is necessary to improve social responsibility. Such action 
would require a concerted political lobbying effort in New Zealand, to persuade Government that 
protecting offshore workers is an important issue. CSR will bring only limited improvements. 
Ultimately, for a genuine effort towards social responsibility, reform of company law and 
mandatory requirements must be on the agenda.  
 
These outcomes can only be achieved by a shift in power towards confrontational groups. Lessons 
from the competitiveness approach suggest that market forces are highly unlikely to provoke 
businesses to pursue binding regulation. This does not appear likely to occur in the New Zealand 
case. The political approach suggests that to move beyond voluntary private regulation would 
require confrontational groups to challenge the current settlement, and push for stronger 
alternatives. Confrontational groups could challenge neoliberal assumptions at the New Zealand or 
international level. In discussions such as those around the Customs and Excise amendment bills or 
free trade negotiations, they could campaign for binding measures on states and businesses. They 
could resume efforts towards the linking of trade with labour standards, and challenge existing 
constraints, including perceptions of WTO rules. Most fundamentally, these groups could question 
the presumption that protecting vulnerable stakeholders in the production process should be 
subsumed to the pursuit of free trade. They should also advocate for New Zealand businesses and 
consumers to accept a greater share of the true costs of production. These would be significant 
paradigm shifts in New Zealand. They would also represent strong steps towards progress on social 
responsibility. 
 
The status quo in New Zealand, of poorly-developed, voluntary initiatives, is therefore not 
inevitable. While opposition should be expected, increased pressure from confrontational groups 
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can not only increase the supply of CSR, but also create alternative settlements. The development of 
this pressure should be a priority in New Zealand. 
 
Based on the discussion above, Box 1 summarises the steps that could be taken to improve social 
responsibility in New Zealand‘s offshore supply chains. 
 
Box 1. Steps to improve social responsibility in New Zealand’s offshore supply chains 
 
Institutionalise attention to the UN Principles 
• Launch a multi-stakeholder discussion on social responsibility of New Zealand businesses 
operating offshore, with a view to determining where to situate ongoing responsibility for 
directing implementation of the UN Principles. Consider: 
• Broadening the mandate of the OECD NCP to include advising Government on 
implementation of the UN Principles 
• An independent multi-stakeholder body to advise the Government 
• An inter-departmental body with representatives from New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, 
Ministry for Economic Development, Department of Labour, Ministry for the 
Environment and the OECD NCP. 
• Draft a National Framework on Social Responsibility, considering the points below. 
 
Foster market demand for social responsibility 
At a minimum: 
• Endorse the Sustainable Supply Chains database as the primary tool for promoting transparency, 
with a view to making disclosure a mandatory requirement. Require that this database be publicly 
accessible. 
• Continue to support existing awards schemes. 
• Commission a comprehensive national ranking system on social responsibility criteria, using the 
Sustainable Supply Chains database, or the tool in Appendix B. 
• Commission research into the extent of greenwash in New Zealand, and update advertising 
standards accordingly. 
• Foster the development of confrontational groups through specific research funding, a grant to 
establish the ranking system above, or a grant to establish a complaints mechanism. 
Consider in future: 
• A national social label similar to that in Belgium. 
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• Making disclosure in the Sustainable Supply Chains database compulsory for suppliers to SOEs 
and Government, and later, for all New Zealand businesses. 
 
Enable and incentivise CSR among the private sector 
At a minimum: 
• Undertake a national awareness campaign on the importance of business responsibility when 
operating offshore. This should include raising awareness of the OECD Guidelines and UN 
Principles. The campaign should involve a focus on supply-chain issues.  
• Prepare or commission guidelines documents on CSR, with an emphasis on supply-chain 
initiatives. Guidelines could be country- or sector-specific. 
• Draft a national code of conduct as a model for businesses. This could be made mandatory in 
government procurement (discussed below). It could also provide the basis for a social label, or 
complaints mechanism. 
• Commission a comprehensive training programme on CSR, similar to the Danish, Swedish and 
Dutch models, with emphasis on implementing supply-chain initiatives. This could involve 
seminars and forums in which businesses can share best practices. 
Consider in future: 
• Including reference to the OECD Guidelines in bilateral trade agreements. 
• Introducing financial incentives for CSR initiatives (direct funding or subsidies for CSR 
certifications). 
• Using New Zealand foreign embassies to provide training in CSR, or facilities for stakeholder 
dialogues, as in the Swedish and Canadian examples. 
• Requiring New Zealand companies to declare familiarity with the OECD Guidelines as a 
precondition for importing goods. 
• Directing development aid towards overseas social responsibility. 
 
Raise the profile of social responsibility in Government procurement 
At a minimum: 
• Revive efforts to implement the Government Framework for Sustainable Procurement.  
• Reintroduce incentives for TBL reporting among government departments and SOEs, with a 
view to making reporting mandatory, for instance through the Sustainable Supply Chains 
database. 
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• Develop a national code of conduct for compulsory use in all-of-government purchases, and 
purchases by individual departments. Introduce auditing of high-risk suppliers, with a view to 
extending auditing to more supply chains. 
• Raise the priority of social responsibility considerations when awarding contracts. Train 
procurement staff to discern acceptable minimum standards. 
• Re-publicise and enforce the existing mandatory minimum standards in government 
procurement.  
Consider in future: 
• Requiring compulsory TBL reporting from all government departments and SOEs. 
• Extending mandatory minimum standards to more products. 
• Introducing a complaints mechanism into Government procurement. 
 
Investigate legal sanctions for irresponsible behaviour 
At a minimum: 
•Commission research into the current barriers that prevent offshore victims being able to seek 
redress in New Zealand. Initiate discussion around this research. 
•Investigate options for including parameters of extraterritorial jurisdiction in bilateral trade 
negotiations. 
•Explore the implications of imposing a duty on company directors to consider their companies‘ 
impacts on offshore stakeholders, as included in the UK Companies Act 2006. 
Consider in future: 
• Reforming company law to enable stakeholders to enforce directors‘ duties. 
• Reattempting import bans. 
• Exploring ways to broaden the use of extraterritorial jurisdiction.  
• Restricting challenges to New Zealand‘s jurisdiction, such as forum non conveniens. 
• Allowing foreign victims to file claims in New Zealand for any breach of ILO 
conventions by a New Zealand company. 
•Exploring options for piercing the corporate veil. 
• Reducing the proximity required for parent companies to be responsible for abuse by 
their subsidiaries. 
• Exploring the implications of a positive duty on directors to take reasonable steps to 
prevent harm to stakeholders. Define ―reasonable steps‖ in keeping with their 
purchasing power, therefore their extent of contribution to the abuse. 
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Track ongoing progress 
• Fund ongoing research into the extent of New Zealand social responsibility, in a manner 
comparable with international benchmarks. The research agenda should include: 
• Extent and nature of New Zealand CSR initiatives in general 
• Extent and nature of supply-chain labour initiatives 
• Effectiveness of initiatives 
• Business attitudes and perceived barriers 
• Consumer attitudes 
• Publish regular progress reports concerning implementation of the UN Principles and/or the 
National Framework on Social Responsibility. 
 
Contributing towards improved working conditions in China 
 
As concluded in the Chapter Five, the hope for improved working conditions in China lies in 
improved state enforcement and a strengthened labour movement. While New Zealand CSR 
initiatives may bring small improvements, the effectiveness of these initiatives is fundamentally 
limited. Spread and scope are subject to weak market demand. Buyer companies seldom share in 
the costs of improving compliance. Even hardening CSR and imposing legal sanctions would 
benefit only a fraction of workers in New Zealand‘s developing-country trading partners. Supply 
chain conditions are intrinsically affected by the wider societies in which they operate, and it would 
be foolish to imagine they could be improved in isolation. It is therefore worthwhile to consider 
what contribution New Zealand can make to improving labour conditions in trading partners more 
broadly. This part will investigate possibilities for the case of China. 
 
Options for greater contribution exist on the levels of Government, unions and NGOs. Individuals 
can also play a valuable role. Possibilities fall into four categories, greater cooperation under the 
MoU, use of development aid to improve working conditions, increased use of forums to call the 
Chinese Government to account, and greater use of avenues to support the Chinese labour 
movement. In the case of trading partners generally, New Zealand should consider including 
sanctions to strengthen future labour agreements. 
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Improving Cooperation Under the MoU: Capacity Building and Poverty Alleviation 
 
There is potential for the MoU to facilitate further cooperation around labour issues. As discussed 
in Chapter Four, it is unlikely the New Zealand Government will pursue projects on sensitive 
issues, such as collective bargaining, which is obstructed by the Chinese state. However, the New 
Zealand Government should still prioritise projects that address pressing labour rights problems. 
For these reasons, it is most pragmatic to focus collaboration on capacity building and poverty 
alleviation,
33
 which are pressing but not sensitive. There is scope for many such projects.  
 
More capacity-building projects, using the model of the coal industry collaboration, should be 
undertaken. These could include projects on health and safety in shared sectors such as 
manufacturing. In the area of poverty alleviation, New Zealand could use existing links to seed 
further projects. New Zealand already contributes NZ$500,000 annually to poverty-alleviation 
projects in China‘s western regions (MFAT, 2012a). Additional projects could be established in 
migrants‘ sending provinces under the purview of the MoU, and such projects could incorporate 
training on worker rights. Projects on workers‘ rights awareness are supported by local 
governments in some provinces, so similar projects may be welcomed. These projects could benefit 
and empower the workers that eventually migrate to industrial zones, who may work in New 
Zealand supply chains.  
 
Unions, NGOs and individuals should use the opportunity of the MoU to propose cooperative 
projects with China. Union projects could include sectoral or regional exchanges, or collaboration 
and research around a particular supply chain or international framework agreement (discussed 
below). Individuals can also spark cooperation. New Zealand NGOs with interests in labour issues 
or poverty alleviation may be able to set up joint projects under the MoU‘s purview. The 
Government should increase funding for MoU projects and resource projects suggested by non-
government groups.  
 
Directing Development Aid Towards Improving Working Conditions 
 
New Zealand could consider directing existing development aid towards projects on working 
conditions. The UK Department for International Development has established a fund to improve 
conditions for workers in low-income countries that supply the UK market (Knopf et al., 2010, p. 
                                                 
33 Poverty alleviation projects, given their contribution to preventing people becoming vulnerable workers, also can be deemed to fall 
under the purview of labour. 
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21-23). The German Government uses part of its development aid to support developing-country 
suppliers that seek CSR certifications. The Dutch Government provides CSR advisory services to 
developing-country producers exporting to the Netherlands. In addition, the Irish Government has 
provided more than €15 million towards fair trade programmes. These projects have a broader 
target than simply the supply chains of the country in question. New Zealand could consider similar 
initiatives. It should also consider using aid funding to support the Chinese labour movement, 
discussed below.  
 
New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade could consider granting Development 
Scholarships on the subjects of work safety and industrial relations. New Zealand awards a number 
of these scholarships to developing-country trading partners. It currently offers four postgraduate 
scholarships per year to candidates selected from China‘s poorest provinces. However, subjects 
relating to working conditions are not included under the list of available choices (MFAT Aid 
Programme, 2012b). This list of applicable subjects could be expanded to include ―labour relations‖ 
and ―work safety‖. 
 
Raising Issues of Non-Compliance With China 
 
New Zealand‘s policy of engagement with China does not rule out drawing attention to instances in 
which the Chinese Government has actively blocked progress on labour standards. Indeed, it is vital 
the international community keeps a spotlight on these issues. Before raising criticisms with China, 
New Zealand should ensure its own labour conditions comply with international standards. New 
Zealand has yet to ratify ILO Conventions 138 regarding minimum working age, and 87 on 
freedom of association (ILO, 2012). This is a sensitive issue in China (Peter Conway, personal 
communication, June 3, 2011), and limits New Zealand‘s ability to raise concerns. Once New 
Zealand has ratified these conventions, it can then encourage progress from China.  
 
The New Zealand Government can raise criticisms through several forums. First, Ministers should 
raise the profile of labour rights concerns in ministerial meetings. They should discuss violations of 
core labour conventions, repression of labour leaders and discrimination through the hukou system 
among wider human rights concerns raised with China. This would communicate that a spotlight 
remains on the issue. Ministers should also encourage China to ratify outstanding labour 
conventions, while acknowledging areas of improvement. Second, New Zealand should use 
opportunities in the ILO and UN to encourage progress. While there is the opportunity for states to 
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instigate an ILO Commission of Inquiry into systematic violations (FIDH, 2012, p. 91), this is 
unlikely to be a pragmatic route for New Zealand, unless supporting an action from other states.  
 
New Zealand unions and civil society actors can also respond to violations. They can expose 
Chinese labour disputes in the New Zealand media and conduct solidarity actions. They can also 
keep pressure on New Zealand Ministers to ensure they do in fact discuss labour rights violations 
with Chinese counterparts. For serious violations of ILO conventions, there are two avenues New 
Zealand unions could pursue. Unions could attempt to persuade the Government to raise a 
complaint through the MoU. They could consider raising a complaint through the ILO. International 
unions have already laid six cases against China with the ILO‘s Committee on Freedom of 
Association (FIDH, 2012, p. 86). New Zealand unions could participate in bringing a similar 
complaint. They must be careful, however, to preserve avenues for cooperative activity.  
 
Supporting the Chinese Labour Movement: Union Engagement with the ACFTU 
 
New Zealand‘s union engagement with the ACFTU could be enhanced in light of overseas 
examples. 
 
      Exchanges 
 
Several unions undertake exchanges with the ACFTU, aiming to build capacity among progressive 
officials and to expose them to foreign models. One example is the persistent exchange programme 
undertaken by the Canadian union movement, including the Canadian Auto Workers, the Canadian 
Union of Public Employees, and the Ontario Public Service Employees Union (Walker, 2005). 
German and US unions also undertake similar exchanges (China Labour News Transations, 2010c). 
The unions have encountered a variety of responses, but some Chinese officials have received their 
presentations extremely warmly. This strategy is based on the acknowledgement that the ACFTU is 
not monolithic, but rather contains a proportion of officials with progressive opinions.  
 
New Zealand unions have developed a good base of exchanges with China, and there are numerous 
ways these could be improved. First, New Zealand exchanges with the ACFTU should be made 
more strategic. New Zealand unions should build relationships with Chinese unions in regions with 
relatively heavy New Zealand investment, with industries common to New Zealand, or with other 
links, such as sister-city relationships. They should prioritise regions with potential for collaborative 
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projects. Rather than receiving all Chinese delegations, many of which are merely sight-seeing 
tours, unions should accept fewer delegations, prioritising the above. Whenever resources allow, 
New Zealand unions should aim to send delegations to these places. 
 
The content of dialogues can also be made more strategic. Noting the success of New Zealand-
China dialogues in the coal industry, future exchanges could also bring together New Zealand and 
Chinese groups in a particular sector. (These could be considered capacity-building projects under 
the MoU.) New Zealand unions should also use exchanges to share perspectives on the 
technicalities of collective bargaining and Western unions under capitalism. This should be made an 
intentional strategy, as seen with Canadian unions.  
 
      International Framework Agreements and Collaboration Along a TNC‘s Supply Chain 
 
A developing trend in international union movement strategy is collaboration between Northern and 
Southern unions to support workers throughout a particular supply chain. In some instances, 
collaboration is formalised through international framework agreements (IFAs). These are 
negotiated between a TNC and a global union federation, and aim to ensure that the company 
respects the same standards in whichever countries it operates. Sectoral unions in the home country 
may participate in negotiating the agreement. They can then work with union counterparts in other 
countries where the TNC operates, to monitor implementation throughout the supply chain. IFAs 
therefore present an alternative to CSR programmes as a means of improving conditions for 
workers. They may also provide a focal point for collaboration with Chinese unions.  
 
One New Zealand example of an IFA is that with Fonterra, New Zealand‘s largest dairy company. 
Fonterra is expanding production in China. New Zealand unions could explore the potential of this 
IFA as a focal point for collaboration. Unions could monitor implementation of the IFA, or use this 
opportunity to conduct research into conditions in the two countries‘ dairy sectors. (Such 
investigation could double as research into the effects of the FTA‘s dairy provisions on Chinese 
workers.) 
 
Short of IFAs, foreign unions have pursued other means of collaboration with Chinese counterparts. 
One example is San Francisco union, which has had friendly relations and exchanges with the 
Guangzhou Federation of Trade Unions (GZFTU) since 2008, and even proposed a city to city 
union alliance (Century Economic Report, 2010, p. 1). In 2011, following the suicides at Foxconn, 
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the San Francisco union pressured Apple to increase its payment to Chinese workers. Eventually 
Apple conceded, claiming it would give each Foxconn worker an allowance of 3.98 to 7.96 yuan 
per iPad. While it is unknown whether the allowance reached the hands of workers, the case does 
demonstrate the potential for international union collaboration to benefit workers. In a further 
example, a Nokia head office union representative approached the GZFTU in the hope of a 
cooperation agreement to protect the rights of Nokia workers. These is great potential in these 
partnerships which align the interests of unions in Northern and Southern countries. This 
collaboration enable pressures on multiple levels of the supply chain. 
 
      Foreign Union Involvement in Chinese Suppliers 
 
One further step is for foreign unions to interact with ACFTU branches in certain major factories 
supplying to their countries (Chan, 2009, p. 313). Some German and Danish trade unions have 
already made attempts, and similar efforts may be on the agenda of American and Belgian unions 
(p. 313). These selected suppliers could become focal points for capacity building or other forms of 
collaboration. New Zealand unions could also attempt union collaboration through certain major 
suppliers to New Zealand. This would be particularly effective if focused on a supplier to an SOE 
or the Government. New Zealand and Chinese unions could collaborate to monitor conditions in the 
supplier, with the New Zealand union creating pressure towards consumer activism and good 
purchasing practices, and the Chinese union monitoring changes on the ground. A best case 
scenario could be for the New Zealand union to gain access to the Chinese supplier, in order to 
work with the Chinese union or to train workers. Depending on the buying structure of the 
company, unions could work towards an IFA.  
 
A 2011 purchase of rail wagons could have provided a good case for collaboration. The New 
Zealand Government, through its SOE Kiwirail, awarded a NZ$49 million contract to a Chinese 
supplier at the cost of 44 New Zealand jobs (Benson, 2012). As Kiwirail does not have a long 
history of purchasing from overseas, it did not have a code of conduct for offshore suppliers. Given 
that this was such a significant SOE contract, research and monitoring into labour conditions would 
be warranted. 
 
Other Avenues to Support the Chinese Labour Movement 
 
Non-governmental groups can support the Chinese labour movement in a number of ways. Unions, 
NGOs and individuals can use the New Zealand media to raise awareness of Chinese labour 
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disputes. They can conduct solidarity actions, pressure companies directly, or provide funding to 
support Chinese or Hong Kong labour NGOs‘ or individual workers‘ causes.  
 
The New Zealand Government could also consider supporting Chinese organisations that focus on 
workers‘ rights. For instance, it could use for this purpose the $80,000 annual development aid 
grant administered by the New Zealand embassy in Beijing (MFAT, 2012a). While it would be 
important to ensure this use of funding was acceptable to the Chinese Government, such support 
would not be unusual. The US State Department‘s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and 
Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour make considerable contributions to Chinese 
labour organisations, as do the UN Development Program and other organisations (Harney, 2008, p. 
126). 
 
A further avenue is for New Zealand unions, NGOs and individuals to pursue alternative production 
models that prioritise the interests of workers. For a production system to prioritise workers may 
require a different model to the globalised supply chain (AMRC, 2011a, p. 3). Existing examples, 
such as fair trade certifications, have yet to spread into China, as they are limited by the requirement 
that fair trade producers enjoy freedom of association. Exploring the options for fair trade and other 
models to be introduced into China may be enormously worthwhile. These could make a significant 
contribution to improving conditions and to empowering the Chinese labour movement.  
 
Strengthening Future Labour Agreements 
 
In light of the weakness of the New Zealand-China MoU, New Zealand should consider 
incorporating trade sanctions in future bilateral trade agreements. Sanctions are already seen in a 
number of cases internationally (Alston, 2004, p. 499; Greven, 2005). A coalition of international 
trade unions suggest that in the event of derogation from ILO standards, labour agreements should 
provide ―effective dispute resolution procedures with strong remedies up to and including trade 
sanctions‖ (Burrow et al., 2011, p. 2). This coalition also suggests that compliance with ILO 
conventions should be pursued in tandem with FTA negotiations and made a prerequisite for 
completion of the agreement. While sanctions have been shown to be a weak measure 
internationally, and seldom effective to deliver redress, their inclusion would demonstrate greater 
commitment to advancing labour standards than do current instruments. Labour advocates could 
consider pursuing these measures, though should prioritise projects likely to have a more direct 
impact on workers. 
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Based on the above discussion, Box 2 outlines the steps that could be taken by the Government, 
unions, NGOs and individuals to contribute towards improved working conditions in China. 
 
Box 2. Steps for New Zealand groups to contribute to improved working conditions in China 
 
Government 
To Improve Cooperation Under the MoU 
• Increase resourcing of MoU activities. Encourage non-government cooperation by endorsing and 
funding union, NGO and individuals‘ projects.  
• Prioritise projects that address pressing labour issues. As one possible project, consider research 
into conditions in the three largest service and goods sectors each way. 
To Channel Development Aid Towards Improving Working Conditions  
• Weighing the issue of working conditions against other development needs. Explore avenues for 
directing existing or future projects to include a focus on working conditions. 
• Consider expanding the allowable subjects of Development Scholarships to include those relating 
to working conditions. 
To Raise Issues of Non-Compliance With China 
• Ratify ILO Conventions 87 and 138. 
• Have Government ministers raise concerns with Chinese counterparts about violations of ILO 
conventions. Ensure labour rights violations have a high profile among human rights concerns. 
To Support the Chinese Labour Movement 
• Channel aid funds towards organisations that directly or indirectly empower workers. 
• Consider using the grant of the New Zealand embassy in Beijing to support organisations that 
focus on workers‘ rights. 
• Consider endorsing alternative production models. 
To Strengthen Future Agreements 
• Consider including sanctions to allow action in the event of non-compliances. 
 
Unions 
To Improve Cooperation Under the MoU 
• Propose cooperative projects. These could include sectoral or regional exchanges, or collaboration 
and research around a particular supply chain or IFA. 
To Raise Issues of Non-Compliance With China 
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• Expose violations in the media. Conduct actions of solidarity with victims.  
• Keep pressure on New Zealand Government Ministers to discuss labour rights violations with 
Chinese counterparts.  
• For serious violations of ILO conventions:  
• Consider persuading the Government to raise a complaint through the MoU  
• Consider raising a complaint through the ILO. 
To Support the Chinese Labour Movement 
• Make exchanges more strategic.  
• Prioritise relationships with Chinese unions in regions with relatively heavy New Zealand 
investment, industries common to New Zealand, other links, or potential for supply chain 
collaboration projects. 
• Make content of dialogues more strategic. Consider sectoral exchanges. Share 
perspectives on collective bargaining and unions under capitalism. Use exchanges as a 
basis for other projects. 
• Consider collaboration around a particular supply chain. 
• Consider a project around monitoring the Fonterra IFA.  
• Consider a project around one significant supplier, for instance a supplier to SOE or 
Government. Seek access for NZ unions to this supplier, or pursue an IFA.  
• Support Chinese workers‘ demonstrations. Use media to raise awareness, conduct solidarity 
actions, provide donations to the workers‘ cause. 
• Pursue alternative production models that prioritise the interests of workers. 
To Strengthen Future Agreements 
• Consider campaigning for stronger labour clauses in trade agreements, including trade sanctions. 
However prioritise projects that are more likely to bring practical benefits to workers. 
 
NGOs and Individuals 
To Improve Cooperation Under the MoU 
• Propose cooperative projects. These could include projects on labour issues or poverty alleviation. 
To Raise Issues of Non-Compliance With China 
• Expose violations in the media. Conduct actions of solidarity with victims.  
• Keep pressure on New Zealand Ministers to discuss labour rights violations with Chinese 
counterparts.  
• For serious violations of ILO conventions, consider persuading the Government to raise a 
complaint through the MoU.  
To Support the Chinese Labour Movement 
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• Support Chinese workers‘ demonstrations. Raise awareness through media, conduct solidarity 
actions, provide donations to the workers‘ cause. 
• Pursue alternative production models that prioritise the interests of workers. 
To Strengthen Future Agreements 
• Consider pursuit of stronger labour clauses. However, priotise projects more likely to deliver 
practical benefits. 
 
Conclusion  
 
The steps discussed demonstrate what is required for New Zealand to improve social responsibility 
of its businesses, and to contribute to improving labour conditions in its trading partners more 
generally. To improve social responsibility would require explicit state action, and ultimately for 
the state to impose mandatory requirements and increased liability on businesses operating offshore. 
Short of these measures, the Government and civil society groups can promote CSR as a step 
towards binding measures. As the competitiveness approach suggests, this can be achieved through 
increasing market rewards for CSR, and increasing costs of irresponsibility. While CSR is wholly 
insufficient to affect significant changes, it can bring limited improvements. To varying degrees, all 
these steps impose costs on New Zealand businesses and consumers, as they internalise production 
costs currently borne by offshore communities.  
 
Any progress on social responsibility would inevitably arouse opposition from businesses that 
prefer to operate in a regulatory gap. To encourage progress would require a shift in power towards 
confrontational groups. As suggested in the political approach, to move beyond the settlement at 
private regulation, confrontational groups must challenge existing constraints on policy-makers 
imposed by the neoliberal context. These include the assumption that free trade should trump 
freedoms to protect vulnerable stakeholders. Confrontational groups should also advocate for New 
Zealand businesses and consumers to assume a greater share of the true costs of production, 
currently borne by offshore communities. These represent significant paradigm shifts. They also 
signify important steps towards improving social responsibility in New Zealand. 
 
For New Zealand to contribute to improved labour conditions in China would take greater support 
for the Chinese labour movement and state enforcement. This could take the form of increased 
cooperation, highlighting non-compliances, union collaboration and development aid. While these 
steps also require increased investment, these costs should be considered necessary in order to trade 
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responsibly with China. With New Zealand‘s economy increasingly reliant on Chinese workers, 
New Zealand has an accompanying responsibility to contribute towards improving their conditions. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the effectiveness of private regulation for improving labour conditions in 
developing countries, and the reasons for its use, through a case study of the New Zealand-China 
relationship. The case of the export-manufacturing sector in China has provided insight into the 
effectiveness of private regulation. The case of social responsibility development in New Zealand 
has shed light on the reasons for the emergence of private regulation. Both debates inform a 
discussion of what it would take to improve social responsibility in New Zealand, and for New 
Zealand to contribute to improved labour conditions in China.  
 
Findings 
 
The findings confirm the need for greater attention to supply-chain labour conditions. As discussed 
in Chapter Three, labour conditions in China require improvement in many areas. Migrant workers 
in export factories work in dangerous environments for low pay and hours in excess of legal limits. 
They are highly susceptible to becoming bonded labour. In addition, workers are systematically 
denied the rights to freedom of association, collective bargaining and the right to strike. Trading 
partners buying from China do not pay the full costs of production. Instead, the externalities are 
borne by migrant workers and their home communities.  
 
These conditions will not improve automatically as a result of increased trade. Core labour rights 
are obstructed by political barriers which prevent workers organising for improvements. A national 
labour surplus will weaken workers‘ bargaining power for some time, even while regional shortages 
improve conditions in some areas. It is likely that the Chinese state has tolerated systematic 
discrimination against migrant workers at least in part to maintain foreign investment. Economic 
competition puts downwards pressures on conditions, and trading partners further contribute 
through their buying practices. Trading-partner companies and governments have a responsibility to 
address these conditions, as beneficiaries of, and contributors to current standards.  
 
Research Question 1: To what extent is private regulation used to regulate social responsibility in 
New Zealand‘s offshore supply chains? 
 
New Zealand efforts to address supply-chain social responsibility are tending towards reliance on 
private regulation. As described in Chapter Four, New Zealand businesses face minimal legal 
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sanctions for irresponsible behaviour when operating offshore. The structure of New Zealand 
company law allows businesses to escape liability for offshore abuses. While some international 
instruments and bilateral agreements supposedly cover social responsibility issues, they are weak at 
encouraging socially-responsible behaviour. The MoU with China provides no assurance that 
conditions will be improved. Meanwhile, bilateral cooperation to address labour issues in China 
largely avoids the most pressing concerns. There is therefore minimal attention in New Zealand to 
labour rights violations in the offshore communities that supply its products. 
 
Private regulation to address supply-chain labour issues is also poorly developed, but is an area of 
growth. In discussions of supply-chain social responsibility in New Zealand, the Government has 
promoted voluntary initiatives. While there is no research to confirm the extent of supply-chain 
labour initiatives, it is likely well under one third of businesses currently undertake these initiatives. 
Scope appears confined to codes of conduct, and monitoring attempts are poor. These initiatives are 
very limited in their ability to improve conditions in China. Nevertheless, New Zealand businesses‘ 
attention to CSR is gradually increasing. While there remains minimal attention to any forms of 
supply-chain social responsibility in New Zealand, CSR is a significant part of future plans. 
 
Research Questions 3 and 4: How effective is private regulation in improving labour conditions in 
China? What limits its effectiveness? 
 
CSR in China offers limited actual and potential benefits to workers. It also carries a number of 
serious risks. As discussed in Chapter Five, CSR initiatives have brought some improvements. In 
sectors exposed to consumers, initiatives that do not threaten profits, or that address abhorrent or 
easily-detectable problems are implemented. In addition, in visible sectors the CSR movement has 
to some extent increased workers‘ rights awareness, and provided NGOs with factory access. It may 
also have advanced state regulatory capacity by providing learning opportunities for government 
officials. 
 
However, the spread and scope of initiatives has been fundamentally limited by CSR‘s reliance on 
market forces. Nearly 20 years since the first CSR initiatives in China, coverage remains extremely 
low. Scope is overwhelmingly limited to codes of conduct and unreliable auditing methods. These 
common initiatives fail to affect significant improvements. Even in the best-case examples, CSR 
has failed to solve systemic problems. The market has therefore prompted the development of 
supply-chain CSR initiatives only to a very limited degree. The business case for CSR, positing that 
effective regulation will be prompted by market forces, is flawed. 
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Reliance on CSR is not only misguided, but potentially harmful for Chinese workers. Engagement 
with CSR distracts from efforts to enhance state enforcement or organise workers. Hong Kong 
labour NGOs are divided over whether to partner with companies implementing CSR. The CSR 
movement may undermine state enforcement, democratic governance and the development of the 
labour movement. Labour advocates should therefore demystify CSR. In order to engage wisely, 
they should dispel illusions that it offers anything beyond cosmetic improvements, and call 
businesses to a higher standard. Ultimately, CSR is no substitute for the legislation, enforcement 
and collective bargaining which have brought improvements in other countries. These alternatives 
should be prioritised.  
 
Research Question 2: Why is private regulation used to regulate New Zealand‘s offshore supply 
chains? 
 
Both the competitiveness and political approaches are useful for explaining the emergence of 
private regulation in New Zealand. However, the political approach provides a far more thorough 
explanation, offering insight into what would be required for alternatives to CSR. 
 
The competitiveness approach explains the emergence of CSR as a result of New Zealand 
businesses‘ defence and pursuit of competitive advantage. It explains the low level of attention to 
social responsibility in light of the low risks of activism or government regulation, and therefore the 
low need for businesses to defend their competitive advantage. It also explains CSR‘s emergence in 
light of limited market rewards, and therefore limited motivation to choose supply-chain initiatives 
to pursue competitive advantage. The gradual increase in attention can be explained by businesses 
anticipating growing pressure in New Zealand, and the gradual development of social responsibility 
markets. While some advanced businesses may perceive specific market benefits from supply-chain 
social responsibility initiatives, for the majority of businesses there remain few motivations even for 
voluntary initiatives. There are no motivations for stronger alternatives. The competitiveness 
approach therefore explains the emergence of CSR in New Zealand in light of the low but 
gradually-developing market rewards and sanctions, and the minimal motivations for stronger 
alternatives. 
 
The competitiveness approach has a number of limitations. It provides no explanation for the levels 
of demand for social responsibility. It provides no explanation for the activities of non-state actors, 
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and therefore does not explain why binding regulations have not been imposed on business. The 
approach is therefore limited to suggesting how to improve CSR through market pressures, not how 
to move beyond it. 
   
The political approach is far more comprehensive, explaining the emergence of CSR as a result of 
New Zealand‘s neoliberal trajectory, and the constraints this imposes on policy-makers. The 
approach also takes into account resulting power imbalances. The New Zealand Government has 
been unwilling to impose binding regulation for the sake of social responsibility. Instead, the 
National Government prioritised trade freedom, under the belief (or at least with the justification) 
that free trade maximises social goods. In maintaining and acting on these neoliberal assumptions, 
New Zealand has limited its freedom to protect vulnerable stakeholders in the production process.  
 
Power balances have also led to the settlement at private regulation, rather than alternative means of 
addressing supply-chain labour conditions. In light of the low development of confrontational 
groups in New Zealand, BSOs dominate in discussions on social responsibility. BSOs‘ structural 
and discursive power, and the subsequent dominance of business-case discourses, reinforce the 
current Government‘s reluctance to regulate. However, consumers and confrontational groups do 
possess some actual and latent power, which is forcing businesses to pay some degree of attention 
to supply-chain labour issues. The settlement therefore falls at private regulation, rather than no 
regulation at all. The political approach thus provides considerable insight into the emergence of 
private regulation in New Zealand. 
 
Both these approaches suggest what would be required for more effective supply-chain social 
responsibility in New Zealand. As the competitiveness approach suggests, increasing demand for 
social responsibility, or costs of irresponsibility should encourage firms towards more widespread 
and harder CSR activity. The political approach offers further insight, suggesting what is required 
to move beyond private regulation. As this approach shows, the fact that the conflict has settled 
where it has—at private regulation—is not inevitable. Rather, it is a consequence of actors‘ relative 
power, and the constraints of neoliberal rules and scripts, that stronger alternatives have not 
eventuated.  The balance of power between business and confrontational groups could be shifted. 
The constraints of the national and international neoliberal context could be challenged. Should this 
occur, alternative settlements would be possible. 
 
 161 
 
Research Question 5: What would it take to improve social responsibility in New Zealand’s 
offshore supply chains? 
 
Explicit state action is necessary to improve social responsibility in New Zealand. As discussed in 
Chapter Six, strengthening confrontational groups is an essential foundation. To follow the example 
of the most advanced states internationally, the New Zealand Government should institutionalise 
action on social responsibility and codify it in a strategic framework. All steps to uphold social 
responsibility to varying degrees involve assuming costs, as the externalities of production are 
internalised.  
 
In light of the shortcomings of CSR, a genuine effort to uphold supply-chain social responsibility 
would require the Government to impose legal sanctions on New Zealand businesses operating 
offshore. New Zealand could extend its use of extraterritorial jurisdiction to allow offshore victims 
easier access to redress. The Government could also impose a duty on directors to consider 
stakeholders‘ interests, and increase their liability for subcontractors over whom they exert 
significant influence. These reforms would require significant power of confrontational groups, and 
therefore seem aspirational in the current climate. However, states advanced in social responsibility 
have made steps towards these reforms. New Zealand should aim towards a similar paradigm shift. 
 
Short of these measures, New Zealand should promote and resource CSR initiatives as a step 
towards mandatory requirements. As shown in Chapter Five, audited codes can bring cosmetic 
improvements. Improving the spread and depth of CSR initiatives would therefore be helpful. As 
suggested by the competitiveness approach, the Government and civil society should streamline the 
ability of the market to provide CSR, by increasing market rewards and sanctions. These groups 
should enable consumers to demand social responsibility, and resource businesses to respond to 
these demands. The Government could also create additional incentives, for instance by mandating 
TBL reporting, or creating a market for social responsibility by requiring it in Government 
procurement. The Government could also commission a complaints mechanism to expose 
businesses to sanctions for irresponsible behaviour. These steps would incentivise socially-
responsible behaviour through market sanctions and rewards.  
 
However, it is unrealistic to expect CSR to spread to all sectors, or to address systemic problems. 
Labour advocates should deter undue belief in the capabilities of CSR by maintaining an agenda 
towards company law reform. As the political approach suggests, moving beyond CSR would 
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require a shift in power to confrontational groups, to challenge existing constraints and to push for a 
settlement at binding measures. The development of these groups is therefore essential. Pursuing 
avenues to improve labour conditions beyond New Zealand supply-chains would also be a means to 
prevent reliance on CSR. 
 
Research Question 6: What would it take to contribute towards improved labour conditions in 
China? 
 
This thesis has also shed light on a number of avenues to improve working conditions in trading 
partners more generally. As indicated in Chapter Three, while some factors are pushing labour 
conditions in a positive direction in China, political barriers remain and economic pressures 
threaten to weaken labour standards. Positive trends therefore do not displace the need for the 
development of the labour movement and state law enforcement in China. New Zealand can support 
these developments in a number of ways.  
 
The Government and non-governmental groups can improve cooperation under the MoU. There is 
scope for an increased number of projects, by Government, unions and NGOs. Unions could also 
investigate opportunities for testing the MoU disputes mechanism. Second, there is the potential to 
direct development aid towards projects that contribute to improving working conditions. This 
could be in the form of poverty alleviation in migrants‘ sending provinces, projects to raise 
workers‘ rights-awareness, or postgraduate scholarships for Chinese students on subjects relevant to 
labour relations.  
 
Third, New Zealand should encourage greater state enforcement of labour law, and challenge the 
state obstruction of labour rights, by more frequently raising these issues with China. This could be 
in the form of ministerial discussions with China, media coverage or solidarity actions by unions 
and confrontational groups when state violations arise.  
 
Finally, there are a range of avenues through which New Zealand groups can support the Chinese 
labour movement. Union exchanges are an obvious avenue. The current relationship with the 
ACFTU should be made more strategic, introducing a focus on industries shared by the two 
countries, or other areas of commonality. Avenues for China-NZ union collaboration along a 
particular supply chain should be considered. New Zealand unions could also explore opportunities 
to collaborate with ACFTU branches in high-profile New Zealand suppliers. Finally, New Zealand 
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groups can support the labour movement through media reporting and solidarity actions, financial 
support of labour NGOs, and an exploration of alternative production models. These steps would 
demonstrate a significant commitment by New Zealand groups to act as a partner with Chinese 
groups towards improved labour conditions in China. 
 
Limitations of this Study 
 
A lack of available data has limited these findings. A lack of quantitative research on the spread and 
scope of CSR initiatives in China, and on supply-chain labour initiatives in New Zealand, may 
mean that the estimations in this thesis (and the picture portrayed by interviewees) are unduly 
pessimistic. The outline of current labour conditions in China is limited by the research available. 
Furthermore, there is scant research documenting the effects of CSR on the Chinese labour 
movement, democratic governance and state regulation and enforcement. These findings are 
therefore limited to suggesting potential outcomes. As discussed in Chapter One, the method of 
gathering data also has limitations. It is possible there are significant cases of CSR in China which 
did not come to light during my research. These may have altered the conclusions reached.  
 
A lack of available data has limited the discussion of CSR‘s emergence. To determine definitively 
the explanatory power of the competitiveness approach would require targeted interviews exploring 
businesses‘ motivations for implementing supply-chain labour initiatives. These have been outside 
the scope of this thesis. The analysis of the political approach was also limited by the lack of 
information on businesses‘ lobbying power in New Zealand. Access to data on business lobbying 
during discussions of social responsibility would shed further light on the influence of business 
power in the emergence of CSR.   
 
Some factors which may influence the emergence of CSR have been omitted entirely from this 
thesis. Neither the competitiveness nor political approach takes into consideration the impact of 
business norms, or the values of management, in businesses‘ take-up of supply-chain labour 
initiatives. (The competitiveness approach touches on the adoption of social responsibility norms 
only as a strategy for defending reputation, not as a motivating factor in itself.) I have not explored 
whether the decline of New Zealand‘s manufacturing sector in any way motivates attention to 
supply-chain labour conditions. Neither have I touched on the issue of Socially Responsible 
Investment and shareholder activism in the development of CSR. The influence of these factors is 
an area for further research. 
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The exploration of the political approach in New Zealand would benefit from more thorough 
analysis than has been possible here. As there have been few attempts to regulate supply-chain 
social responsibility in New Zealand, the above discussion focused on only two cases. The findings 
could be strengthened with an exploration of private regulation in sectors other than social 
responsibility. This has been outside the scope of this thesis. 
 
An investigation of motivations and barriers in SMEs has also been outside the scope of this 
research. Given New Zealand‘s predominance of SMEs, their capabilities and attitudes regarding 
supply-chain initiatives are highly relevant. However, as mentioned in Chapter Four, the limited 
existing research on ethical sourcing found no significant difference between small and large 
businesses (Collins, Lawrence, Roper et al., 2010, p. 10). Small businesses may also be more 
capable than some larger businesses of implementing supply-chain labour initiatives, if their buying 
structure allows economic clout over a particular supplier. While the specific characteristics of 
SMEs should be considered in any future work, the omission does not invalidate these findings. 
 
Opportunities for Further Research 
 
A number of areas for further research have been mentioned above. These include the spread and 
scope of CSR initiatives in China and the impacts of CSR on China‘s labour movement, state 
regulation and democratic governance. Specific surveys into the motivations for New Zealand 
businesses‘ supply-chain labour initiatives, and research on the extent of business lobbying would 
provide greater insight into the explanations for the emergence of CSR. Research into socially 
responsible investment in New Zealand, the decline of New Zealand‘s manufacturing sector, the 
influence of business norms and values of management on CSR development, and specific 
motivations and barriers faced by SMEs would also be relevant. These areas of research would 
address some shortcomings of this thesis.  
 
As recommended in Chapter Six, the following areas warrant ongoing research to advance the 
development of social responsibility in New Zealand. 
• Consumer attitudes towards social responsibility, including supply-chain labour issues. 
• New Zealand‘s performance in social responsibility generally, against international benchmarks, 
and against the UN Guiding Principles. 
• The extent of supply-chain labour initiatives among New Zealand businesses. 
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• The frequency of these initiatives (in a manner comparable with international benchmarks) 
• The profile of businesses that do or do not undertake initiatives (including sector, 
company size, purchasing structure (degree of economic clout over suppliers), affiliation 
with BSOs, and whether they sell to New Zealand or offshore markets) 
• Motivations for and barriers to take-up. 
• The effectiveness of individual New Zealand supply-chain labour initiatives. 
• The nature of ethical purchasing initiatives. 
• Do these concern New Zealand or offshore supply chains? What countries and risk areas 
are most frequently targeted? 
• What do initiatives entail? The tool provided in Appendix B may be helpful to assess and 
compare supply-chain labour initiatives. Such research could form the basis for a ranking 
system, to empower consumers to support socially-responsible businesses and to identify 
areas in which to call businesses to a higher standard. A confrontational group or research 
institution could routinely rank businesses using this or another tool. 
 
The development of social responsibility in New Zealand would also benefit from research into: 
• The extent of greenwash in New Zealand, and reforms to advertising standards necessary to 
reduce it. 
• The development of confrontational groups to demand supply-chain social responsibility. Why 
have these groups been slow to develop in New Zealand? What factors hinder, or would assist, 
their development?  
• Current barriers to offshore victims successfully seeking remedy in New Zealand courts. 
• Options for including parameters of extraterritorial jurisdiction in bilateral trade negotiations.  
• Implications of imposing a duty on company directors to consider impacts on offshore 
stakeholders. 
Research is also warranted into the most viable avenues for collaborative projects with Chinese 
groups. These include viable opportunities for collaboration and joint research under the MoU, 
projects on working conditions that would fit within development aid, and specific supply-chains 
and major suppliers to New Zealand that would be suitable for union collaboration or IFAs. 
 
Several areas of further research would fill gaps in the wider literature. Research into the use of 
private regulation in the labour histories of industrialised nations would supplement existing 
literature on CSR. Research into trends in companies including social criteria in TBL reports would 
 166 
 
shed light on the development of social aspects of CSR. Case studies of international support of the 
Chinese labour movement would also be useful for states considering such cooperation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Developed countries have a responsibility to contribute to improved working conditions in their 
trading partners, as contributors to, and beneficiaries of current standards. Private regulation is an 
ineffective means of upholding this responsibility. It also carries risks. That CSR continues to 
emerge as the primary means to regulate offshore working conditions is not inevitable. Rather, it is 
a product of power balances and constraints imposed by the political context. These are factors that 
can be altered. 
 
For states to demonstrate a genuine commitment to social responsibility in their offshore supply 
chains would require explicit state action, and a willingness to impose legal sanctions for 
irresponsible behaviour. While improving CSR can bring some benefits to workers in China, its 
effectiveness is fundamentally limited. As the political approach shows, to impose legal sanctions 
would require a shift in power towards confrontational groups. These groups should challenge 
political constraints that prevent progress on social responsibility. They should also advocate for 
New Zealand groups to assume a greater share of the true costs of production.  
 
A contribution to improving labour conditions in trading partners more generally can be made 
through bilateral cooperation, development aid and keeping a spotlight on violations, at the level of 
Government, unions, NGOs and individuals. Ultimately, there is no alternative to an organised 
workers‘ movement and enhanced state law enforcement for improving working conditions. The 
above measures are a contribution to these ends. All these activities require significant investment, 
and do impose some restrictions on businesses. However, to internalise the true costs of production 
necessarily comes at a price. For developed countries to assume a greater share of these costs is 
unavoidable if they are to take responsibility for the offshore communities on whom their 
economies increasingly rely. 
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Anita Chan         Australia National University College of Asia and the Pacific 
Diana Beaumont        Australia Asia Worker Links 
Andrew Wang            Supplier Program Director, Verite, China Office 
Monina Wong  Executive Director, ITUC/GUF Hong Kong Liaison Office 
Debby Chan   SACOM (Students and Scholars Against Corporate Misbehaviour)  
May Wong  Globalisation Monitor  
Dmitri Kessler  China Representative, Ethical Trading Initiative 
Geoffrey Crothall China Labour Bulletin, Hong Kong Office 
Helen Kelly  New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (CTU) President 
Peter Conway  CTU Secretary 
Ross Wilson  Former CTU President 
Robert Reid   General Secretary FIRST Union, New Zealand 
Trevor Johnston Sustainability Manager, The Warehouse 
David Walker  Deputy-Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Steve McCombie New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Asia Desk 
Jessica Russell Adviser International, New Zealand Department of Labour 
Michael Hobby Principal Adviser International, New Zealand Department of Labour 
Liz Innes  Government Procurement Solutions, Ministry of Economic Development 
Andrew Woodwark Government Procurement Solutions, Ministry of Economic Development 
Tim Barber  Government Procurement Solutions, Ministry of Economic Development 
David Feickert Recipient, China‘s Friendship Prize for Foreign Experts 2009 
Jacinta Syme  Sustainable Business Forum Manager, Sustainable BusinessNZ 
Julie Donvin-Irons Director, The Stanley East Company  
Larry Podmore Christchurch Sister Cities Committee for Wuhan; Canterbury Development 
   Corporation 
Michelle MacWilliamChristchurch Sister Cities Committee for Gansu Province; New Zealand   
   China Trade Association Executive 
John Richards  Strategic Procurement Manager, NZ Post 
Geoff White  General Manager, Trade Aid 
 
 
  
Appendix B: Supply-Chain Labour Initiatives Assessment Tool 
 
Grading System 
 
Code of Conduct  
Standard of Code Content 
0.   Code compiled arbitrarily, fails to cover some areas of concern 
(wages, working hours, health and safety, bonded labour, child 
labour, discipline methods, freedom of association). 
1. Code covers five or more of the above areas, however standards 
refers to local laws and norms on wages, freedom of association 
AND overtime hours. (Codes that refer to local laws and norms are considered ―realistic‖ codes.*)  
2. Content refers to local laws/norms on two of the following: wages, collective bargaining, overtime hours. 
3. Content refers to local laws/norms on one of the following: wages, collective bargaining, overtime hours. 
4. Comprehensive content, international standards on collective bargaining, overtime hours and living wage 
provisions included. (Such codes are considered aspirational.*) 
*It is a matter of debate whether realistic or aspirational codes are more effective for bringing improvements. 
 
Communication of the Code 
0. Code not communicated to suppliers. 
1. Communicated in English only. 
2. Communicated in English AND native language, to management only. 
3. Communicated in English AND native language, management encouraged to communicate code to 
workers.  
4. Communication to workers checked during auditing (eg. Is code visibly displayed in the factory in local 
language?). 
 
 
 
 201 
 
Auditing 
 
Stringency 
0.   No auditing, or sporadic self-auditing during visits for other purposes. 
1. Regular* self-auditing or auditing by third-party against a code. However audits pre-announced, brief, 
workers not interviewed (or interviewed in environment in which their ability to answer  honestly is 
questionable). Non-compliances not followed up. 
2. Regular self-auditing or auditing by third-party against a code. Thorough audits, but noncompliances not 
followed up, OR brief audits, but follow-up audits for non-compliances. 
3. Self-auditing or auditing by third-party against a code, conducted at least annually. Thorough  audits AND 
follow-up audits for non-compliances. 
4. Regular auditing by third-party meeting the above conditions. Compliance certified. 
*Regular- at least every 18 months. Less frequent auditing can be considered sporadic. 
 
Proportion of the Supply Chain Covered 
0.   No auditing 
1. Auditing covers direct suppliers of less than 50% (by value) of product imported from high-risk regions.  
2. Auditing covers direct suppliers of more than 50% (by value) of product imported from high-risk regions. 
Evidence that highest-risk suppliers are included in those audited. 
3. Auditing covers direct suppliers of more than 90% (by value) of product imported from high-risk regions. 
Evidence that highest-risk suppliers are included in those audited. 
4. Above conditions met, plus evidence that suppliers are encouraged to extend standards to subsequent tiers 
of supply chain. 
 
Findings Impact Purchasing 
0. Audit results do not impact purchasing. 
1. Purchasing is discontinued if compliance fails to meet minimum standards. 
2. The compliance histories of suppliers are communicated to the NZ company‘s purchasing team. Either: 1) 
some evidence of attempts to enlarge contracts with suppliers that have improved compliance, or reduce 
contracts for deterioration OR 2) Audits are conducted prior to commencing contract with a new supplier.   
3. The compliance histories of suppliers are communicated to the NZ company‘s purchasing team. Both 1) 
and 2) above.    
4. Systematic practice of linking contracts with compliance history. Evidence that these considerations 
trump economic considerations on a more than ad hoc basis. 
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Worker Complaints Procedure 
0. No complaints procedure. 
1. Requirement in code of conduct that supplier install workplace-based complaints procedure. 
2. Mechanism in place for workers to raise complaints to NZ company, however the mechanism is poorly 
communicated to workers, and/or complaints are not acted on. 
3. Mechanism in place for workers to raise complaints to NZ company. Well-communicated to workers. NZ 
company relays complaints to supplier without disclosing workers‘ identity. 
4. Mechanism in place for workers to raise complaints to NZ company. Well-communicated to workers. NZ 
company relays complaints to supplier without disclosing workers‘ identity. NZ company follows these 
up, and complaints and the supplier‘s response are publicly disclosed. 
 
Transparency 
 
TBL Reporting 
0. No disclosure of social or environmental impacts. 
1. Limited disclosure in an ad hoc format. 
2. Limited disclosure follows internationally-recognised format (allowing comparability) OR comprehensive 
disclosure in ad hoc format. 
3. Comprehensive disclosure in an internationally-recognised format. 
4. Comprehensive disclosure in an internationally-recognised format, independent assurance provided. 
 
Disclosure of Audit Results  
0. No public disclosure of audit results 
3. Public disclosure of selected audit results. 
4. Systematic disclosure of audit results. 
 
Disclosure of Suppliers   
0. No disclosure of suppliers 
3. Disclosure of selected suppliers 
4. Disclosure of suppliers collectively supplying more than 50 percent of goods. 
 
Disclosure of Complaints 
0. Stakeholders‘ complaints not disclosed. 
3. Some disclosure of complaints. 
4. Disclosure of all complaints. 
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Proactive Steps 
 
Contribution to a Multi-Stakeholder Initiative 
0. No contribution. 
1. Membership and occasional participation. 
2. Regular involvement. 
3. Regular involvement, including in at least one cooperative project annually. 
4. Evidence of leadership role. 
 
Cooperation with Other Buyers (outside of a MSI) 
0. No cooperation 
2. Limited cooperation 
3. Regular cooperation 
4. Evidence of leadership role 
 
Individual Projects with Suppliers to Improve Conditions 
0. No involvement. 
1. Projects proposed to suppliers, but none taken up.  
2. At least one project attempted. 
3. Any project attempted in which any assistance was provided by the NZ company. 
4. Any project attempted in which financial assistance was provided by the NZ company. 
  
